LiveActive security incident?Get immediate response
MITRE ATT&CK® Group

G0142: Confucius

Confucius is a cyber espionage group that has primarily targeted military personnel, high-profile personalities, business persons, and government organizations in South Asia since at least 2013. Security researchers have noted similarities between Confucius and Patchwork, particularly in their respective custom malware code and targets.[1][2][3]

EnterpriseG0142GroupObject v1.1Modified
Discuss defensive coverageBack to ATT&CK
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

G0142: Confucius describes [Confucius](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0142) is a cyber espionage group that has primarily targeted military personnel, high-profile personalities, business persons, and government organizations in South Asia since at least 2013. Security researchers have noted similarities between [Confucius](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0142) and [Patchwork](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0040), particularly in their respective custom malware code and targets.(Citation: TrendMicro Confucius APT Feb 2018)(Citation: Tre...

Executive priority

G0142: Confucius is an official MITRE ATT&CK group. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate G0142: Confucius by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (the platforms named in the official object), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata

Detection direction

  • Validate whether G0142: Confucius appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Confucius

Confucius is a cyber espionage group that has primarily targeted military personnel, high-profile personalities, business persons, and government organizations in South Asia since at least 2013. Security researchers have noted similarities between Confucius and Patchwork, particularly in their respective custom malware code and targets.[1][2][3]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

19 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1566.002Spearphishing LinkSub-technique

Confucius has sent malicious links to victims through email campaigns.[2]

EnterpriseT1204.001Malicious LinkSub-technique

Confucius has lured victims into clicking on a malicious link sent through spearphishing.[2]

EnterpriseT1567.002Exfiltration to Cloud StorageSub-technique

Confucius has exfiltrated victim data to cloud storage service accounts.[1]

EnterpriseT1221Template Injection

Confucius has used a weaponized Microsoft Word document with an embedded RTF exploit.[3]

EnterpriseT1059.005Visual BasicSub-technique

Confucius has used VBScript to execute malicious code.[1]

EnterpriseT1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentSub-technique

Confucius has crafted and sent victims malicious attachments to gain initial access.[3]

EnterpriseT1203Exploitation for Client Execution

Confucius has exploited Microsoft Office vulnerabilities, including CVE-2015-1641, CVE-2017-11882, and CVE-2018-0802.[3][1]

EnterpriseT1680Local Storage Discovery

Confucius has used a file stealer that can examine system drives, including those other than the C drive.[2]

EnterpriseT1105Ingress Tool Transfer

Confucius has downloaded additional files and payloads onto a compromised host following initial access.[3][2]

EnterpriseT1119Automated Collection

Confucius has used a file stealer to steal documents and images with the following extensions: txt, pdf, png, jpg, doc, xls, xlm, odp, ods, odt, rtf, ppt, xlsx, xlsm, docx, pptx, and jpeg.[2]

EnterpriseT1583.006Web ServicesSub-technique

Confucius has obtained cloud storage service accounts to host stolen data.[1]

EnterpriseT1071.001Web ProtocolsSub-technique

Confucius has used HTTP for C2 communications.[3]

EnterpriseT1041Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

Confucius has exfiltrated stolen files to its C2 server.[2]

EnterpriseT1218.005MshtaSub-technique

Confucius has used mshta.exe to execute malicious VBScript.[1]

EnterpriseT1083File and Directory Discovery

Confucius has used a file stealer that checks the Document, Downloads, Desktop, and Picture folders for documents and images with specific extensions.[2]

EnterpriseT1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique

Confucius has dropped malicious files into the startup folder `%AppData%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup` on a compromised host in order to maintain persistence.[3]

EnterpriseT1053.005Scheduled TaskSub-technique

Confucius has created scheduled tasks to maintain persistence on a compromised host.[2]

EnterpriseT1204.002Malicious FileSub-technique

Confucius has lured victims to execute malicious attachments included in crafted spearphishing emails related to current topics.[3]

EnterpriseT1059.001PowerShellSub-technique

Confucius has used PowerShell to execute malicious files and payloads.[2]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

MalwareEnterprise

S0670: WarzoneRAT

WarzoneRAT is a malware-as-a-service remote access tool (RAT) written in C++ that has been publicly available for purchase since at least late 2018.[1][2]

Windows
Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · TechniqueT1566.002: Spearphishing LinkEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1204.001: Malicious LinkEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1567.002: Exfiltration to Cloud StorageEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1221: Template InjectionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1059.005: Visual BasicEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1566.001: Spearphishing AttachmentEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1203: Exploitation for Client ExecutionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1680: Local Storage DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1105: Ingress Tool TransferEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1119: Automated CollectionEnterpriseuses · MalwareS0670: WarzoneRATEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1583.006: Web ServicesEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1071.001: Web ProtocolsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1041: Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1218.005: MshtaEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1083: File and Directory DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1547.001: Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1053.005: Scheduled TaskEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1204.002: Malicious FileEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1059.001: PowerShellEnterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
20.0
Object version
1.1
Created
Modified
Raw hash
c6336369fe178f6d...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(3)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
20.01.1Current bundlec6336369fe17…
19.21.1Older bundlec6336369fe17…
19.11.1Older bundle43e06974ced0…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    TrendMicro Confucius APT Feb 2018

    Lunghi, D and Horejsi, J. (2018, February 13). Deciphering Confucius: A Look at the Group's Cyberespionage Operations. Retrieved December 26, 2021.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    TrendMicro Confucius APT Aug 2021

    Lunghi, D. (2021, August 17). Confucius Uses Pegasus Spyware-related Lures to Target Pakistani Military. Retrieved December 26, 2021.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    Uptycs Confucius APT Jan 2021

    Uptycs Threat Research Team. (2021, January 12). Confucius APT deploys Warzone RAT. Retrieved December 17, 2021.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    mitre-attackG0142
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

Official MITRE ATT&CK siteOfficial STIX data repositoryMITRE ATT&CK terms of use