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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S1243: DCHSpy

DCHSpy is an Android spyware likely used by MuddyWater. DCHSpy uses political decoys and masquerades as legitimate applications, such as VPNs and banking applications, to trick victims into downloading the malware. Once downloaded, DCHSpy collects information from the device and exfiltrates the data to the command and control (C2) server.[1]

MobileS1243MalwareObject v1.0Modified
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Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S1243: DCHSpy describes [DCHSpy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1243) is an Android spyware likely used by [MuddyWater](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0069). [DCHSpy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1243) uses political decoys and masquerades as legitimate applications, such as VPNs and banking applications, to trick victims into downloading the malware. Once downloaded, [DCHSpy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1243) collects information from the device and exfiltrates the data to the command and control (C2) server.(Citation:...

Executive priority

S1243: DCHSpy is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S1243: DCHSpy by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Android), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S1243: DCHSpy appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

DCHSpy

DCHSpy is an Android spyware likely used by MuddyWater. DCHSpy uses political decoys and masquerades as legitimate applications, such as VPNs and banking applications, to trick victims into downloading the malware. Once downloaded, DCHSpy collects information from the device and exfiltrates the data to the command and control (C2) server.[1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

12 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
MobileT1636.003Contact ListSub-technique

DCHSpy has accessed the device’s contact list.[1]

MobileT1512Video Capture

DCHSpy has captured photos from the device by taking control of the camera.[1]

MobileT1430Location Tracking

DCHSpy has collected location data.[1]

MobileT1429Audio Capture

DCHSpy has captured audio from the device by taking control of the microphone.[1]

MobileT1636.004SMS MessagesSub-technique

DCHSpy has accessed the device’s SMS messages, including messages that were in the inbox, sent, draft, outbox, failed, and queued.[1]

MobileT1437Application Layer Protocol

DCHSpy has uploaded collected data to a Secure File Transfer Protocol (SFTP) server.[1]

MobileT1409Stored Application Data

DCHSpy has collected files of interest on the device, including WhatsApp files.[1]

MobileT1532Archive Collected Data

DCHSpy has compressed and encrypted collected data with a password from the C2 server.[1]

MobileT1636.005AccountsSub-technique

DCHSpy has collected account names and their types from the device.[1]

MobileT1636.002Call LogSub-technique

DCHSpy has accessed the device’s call log.[1]

MobileT1533Data from Local System

DCHSpy has collected files of interest on the device, including WhatsApp files.[1]

MobileT1655.001Match Legitimate Name or LocationSub-technique

DCHSpy has masqueraded as legitimate applications, such as VPN and banking applications.[1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupMobile

G0069: MuddyWater

MuddyWater is a cyber espionage group assessed to be a subordinate element within Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS).[1] Since at least 2017, MuddyWater has targeted a range of government and private organizations across sectors, including telecommunications, local government, finance, defense, and oil and natural gas organizations, in the Middle East (specifically the UAE and Saudi Arabia), Asia, Africa, Europe, and North America. MuddyWater has reused domains dating back to October 2025, and has a preference for NameCheap and Hosterdaddy Private Limited (AS136557). In late 2025 and early 2026, MuddyWater used commercial satellite internet (i.e., Starlink) for command and control (C2) communication. [2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · GroupG0069: MuddyWaterMobileuses · TechniqueT1636.003: Contact ListMobileuses · TechniqueT1512: Video CaptureMobileuses · TechniqueT1430: Location TrackingMobileuses · TechniqueT1429: Audio CaptureMobileuses · TechniqueT1636.004: SMS MessagesMobileuses · TechniqueT1437: Application Layer ProtocolMobileuses · TechniqueT1409: Stored Application DataMobileuses · TechniqueT1532: Archive Collected DataMobileuses · TechniqueT1636.005: AccountsMobileuses · TechniqueT1636.002: Call LogMobileuses · TechniqueT1533: Data from Local SystemMobileuses · TechniqueT1655.001: Match Legitimate Name or LocationMobile
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
e311c4834227e754...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.0Current bundlee311c4834227…
19.11.0Older bundlee311c4834227…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Lookout_DCHSpy_July2025

    Albrecht, J., Islamoglu, A. (2025, July 21). Lookout Discovers Iranian APT MuddyWater Leveraging DCHSpy During Israel-Iran Conflict . Retrieved September 19, 2025.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    mitre-attackS1243
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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