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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S0405: Exodus

Exodus is Android spyware deployed in two distinct stages named Exodus One (dropper) and Exodus Two (payload).[1]

MobileS0405MalwareObject v1.0Modified
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Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S0405: Exodus describes [Exodus](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0405) is Android spyware deployed in two distinct stages named Exodus One (dropper) and Exodus Two (payload).(Citation: SWB Exodus March 2019)

Executive priority

S0405: Exodus is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S0405: Exodus by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Android), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S0405: Exodus appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Exodus

Exodus is Android spyware deployed in two distinct stages named Exodus One (dropper) and Exodus Two (payload).[1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

19 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
MobileT1636.001Calendar EntriesSub-technique

Exodus Two can exfiltrate calendar events.[1]

MobileT1532Archive Collected Data

Exodus One encrypts data using XOR prior to exfiltration.[1]

MobileT1409Stored Application Data

Exodus Two extracts information from Facebook, Facebook Messenger, Gmail, IMO, Skype, Telegram, Viber, WhatsApp, and WeChat.[1]

MobileT1422.001Internet Connection DiscoverySub-technique

Exodus One queries the device for its IMEI code and the phone number in order to validate the target of a new infection.[1]

MobileT1404Exploitation for Privilege Escalation

Exodus Two attempts to elevate privileges by using a modified version of the DirtyCow exploit.[1]

MobileT1437.001Web ProtocolsSub-technique

Exodus One checks in with the command and control server using HTTP POST requests.[1]

MobileT1636.003Contact ListSub-technique

Exodus Two can download the address book.[1]

MobileT1512Video Capture

Exodus Two can take pictures with the device cameras.[1]

MobileT1407Download New Code at Runtime

Exodus One, after checking in, sends a POST request and then downloads Exodus Two, the second stage binaries.[1]

MobileT1422System Network Configuration Discovery

Exodus One queries the device for its IMEI code and the phone number in order to validate the target of a new infection.[1]

MobileT1429Audio Capture

Exodus Two can record audio from the compromised device's microphone and can record call audio in 3GP format.[1]

MobileT1636.004SMS MessagesSub-technique

Exodus Two can capture SMS messages.[1]

MobileT1509Non-Standard Port

Exodus Two attempts to connect to port 22011 to provide a remote reverse shell.[1]

MobileT1421System Network Connections Discovery

Exodus Two collects a list of nearby base stations.[1]

MobileT1430Location Tracking

Exodus Two can extract the GPS coordinates of the device.[1]

MobileT1636.002Call LogSub-technique

Exodus Two can exfiltrate the call log.[1]

MobileT1533Data from Local System

Exodus Two can extract information on pictures from the Gallery, Chrome and SBrowser bookmarks, and the connected WiFi network's password.[1]

MobileT1513Screen Capture

Exodus Two can take screenshots of any application in the foreground.[1]

MobileT1418Software Discovery

Exodus Two can obtain a list of installed applications.[1]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · TechniqueT1636.001: Calendar EntriesMobileuses · TechniqueT1532: Archive Collected DataMobileuses · TechniqueT1409: Stored Application DataMobileuses · TechniqueT1422.001: Internet Connection DiscoveryMobileuses · TechniqueT1404: Exploitation for Privilege EscalationMobileuses · TechniqueT1437.001: Web ProtocolsMobileuses · TechniqueT1636.003: Contact ListMobileuses · TechniqueT1512: Video CaptureMobileuses · TechniqueT1407: Download New Code at RuntimeMobileuses · TechniqueT1422: System Network Configuration DiscoveryMobileuses · TechniqueT1429: Audio CaptureMobileuses · TechniqueT1636.004: SMS MessagesMobileuses · TechniqueT1509: Non-Standard PortMobileuses · TechniqueT1421: System Network Connections DiscoveryMobileuses · TechniqueT1430: Location TrackingMobileuses · TechniqueT1636.002: Call LogMobileuses · TechniqueT1533: Data from Local SystemMobileuses · TechniqueT1513: Screen CaptureMobileuses · TechniqueT1418: Software DiscoveryMobile
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
20.0
Object version
1.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
a7611c2cb5259a1a...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(3)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
20.01.0Current bundlea7611c2cb525…
19.21.0Older bundlea7611c2cb525…
19.11.0Older bundlea7611c2cb525…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    SWB Exodus March 2019

    Security Without Borders. (2019, March 29). Exodus: New Android Spyware Made in Italy. Retrieved November 17, 2024.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Exodus One

    (Citation: SWB Exodus March 2019)

  3. [3]
    Exodus Two

    (Citation: SWB Exodus March 2019)

  4. [4]
    mitre-attackS0405
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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