T1210: Exploitation of Remote Services
MITRE ATT&CK T1210: Exploitation of Remote Services Technique details for Linux, Windows, macOS, with detection guidance, relationships and mapped CVEs.
Security context for executives and security teams
T1210: Exploitation of Remote Services describes Adversaries may exploit remote services to gain unauthorized access to internal systems once inside of a network. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. A common goal for post-compromise exploitation of remote services is for lateral movement to enable access to a remote system. An adversary may need to determine if the remote system ...
Executive priority
T1210: Exploitation of Remote Services is an official MITRE ATT&CK technique. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate T1210: Exploitation of Remote Services by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (lateral-movement), supported platforms (Linux, Windows, macOS, ESXi), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Endpoint process, command-line, and script execution logs
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether T1210: Exploitation of Remote Services appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Exploitation of Remote Services
No official description is available in the imported ATT&CK source object.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Groups, software, and campaigns
G0102: Wizard Spider
Wizard Spider is a Russia-based financially motivated threat group originally known for the creation and deployment of TrickBot since at least 2016. Wizard Spider possesses a diverse arsenal of tools and has conducted ransomware campaigns against a variety of organizations, ranging from major corporations to hospitals.CitationCrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019CitationDHS/CISA Ransomware Targeting Healthcare October 2020CitationCrowdStrike Wizard Spider October 2020
G1057: ShinyHunters
ShinyHunters is a cyber criminal collective that has been active since at least 2019 operating under the ShinyCorp persona. ShinyHunters has targeted multiple industries and geographic regions gathering legitimate credentials and personally identifiable information (PII) for resale or extortion of victims. ShinyHunters has been associated with the broader collective called The Community, also known as The Com whose members have also included Scattered Spider and LAPSUS$. Public reporting has mentioned a variety of names for operations ShinyHunters members have reportedly conducted with members of other groups, including “Scattered Lapsus Hunters,” “Scattered Lapsus Shiny Hunters,” and “SLSH.”CitationElecticIQ Buyukkaya_ShinyHunters_Sept2025CitationSOCRadar_ShinyHunters_Mar2024CitationUnit42KelleyVaya_BlingLibra_Aug2024CitationIntel471_SH_Aug2021CitationFBI_SHLMS_May2026CitationGoogle_SHOracle_Jun2026CitationMandiant_SHDataTheft_Jan2026CitationGoogle Salesforce JUN 2025
G0117: Fox Kitten
Fox Kitten is threat actor with a suspected nexus to the Iranian government that has been active since at least 2017 against entities in the Middle East, North Africa, Europe, Australia, and North America. Fox Kitten has targeted multiple industrial verticals including oil and gas, technology, government, defense, healthcare, manufacturing, and engineering.CitationClearkSky Fox Kitten February 2020CitationCrowdStrike PIONEER KITTEN August 2020CitationDragos PARISITECitationClearSky Pay2Kitten December 2020
G1006: Earth Lusca
Earth Lusca is a suspected China-based cyber espionage group that has been active since at least April 2019. Earth Lusca has targeted organizations in Australia, China, Hong Kong, Mongolia, Nepal, the Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand, Vietnam, the United Arab Emirates, Nigeria, Germany, France, and the United States. Targets included government institutions, news media outlets, gambling companies, educational institutions, COVID-19 research organizations, telecommunications companies, religious movements banned in China, and cryptocurrency trading platforms; security researchers assess some Earth Lusca operations may be financially motivated.CitationTrendMicro EarthLusca 2022
Earth Lusca has used malware commonly used by other Chinese threat groups, including APT41 and the Winnti Group cluster, however security researchers assess Earth Lusca's techniques and infrastructure are separate.CitationTrendMicro EarthLusca 2022
G1003: Ember Bear
Ember Bear is a Russian state-sponsored cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2020, linked to Russia's General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) 161st Specialist Training Center (Unit 29155).CitationCISA GRU29155 2024 Ember Bear has primarily focused operations against Ukrainian government and telecommunication entities, but has also operated against critical infrastructure entities in Europe and the Americas.CitationCadet Blizzard emerges as novel threat actor Ember Bear conducted the WhisperGate destructive wiper attacks against Ukraine in early 2022.CitationCrowdStrike Ember Bear Profile March 2022CitationMandiant UNC2589 March 2022CitationCISA GRU29155 2024 There is some confusion as to whether Ember Bear overlaps with another Russian-linked entity referred to as Saint Bear. At present available evidence strongly suggests these are distinct activities with different behavioral profiles.CitationCadet Blizzard emerges as novel threat actorCitationPalo Alto Unit 42 OutSteel SaintBot February 2022
G0007: APT28
APT28 is a threat group that has been attributed to Russia's General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) 85th Main Special Service Center (GTsSS) military unit 26165.CitationNSA/FBI Drovorub August 2020CitationCybersecurity Advisory GRU Brute Force Campaign July 2021 This group has been active since at least 2004.CitationDOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018CitationArs Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018CitationCrowdstrike DNC June 2016CitationFireEye APT28CitationSecureWorks TG-4127CitationFireEye APT28 January 2017CitationGRIZZLY STEPPE JARCitationSofacy DealersChoiceCitationPalo Alto Sofacy 06-2018CitationSymantec APT28 Oct 2018CitationESET Zebrocy May 2019
APT28 reportedly compromised the Hillary Clinton campaign, the Democratic National Committee, and the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee in 2016 in an attempt to interfere with the U.S. presidential election.CitationCrowdstrike DNC June 2016 In 2018, the US indicted five GRU Unit 26165 officers associated with APT28 for cyber operations (including close-access operations) conducted between 2014 and 2018 against the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), the US Anti-Doping Agency, a US nuclear facility, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the Spiez Swiss Chemicals Laboratory, and other organizations.CitationUS District Court Indictment GRU Oct 2018 Some of these were conducted with the assistance of GRU Unit 74455, which is also referred to as Sandworm Team.
G0131: Tonto Team
Tonto Team is a suspected Chinese state-sponsored cyber espionage threat group that has primarily targeted South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and the United States since at least 2009; by 2020 they expanded operations to include other Asian as well as Eastern European countries. Tonto Team has targeted government, military, energy, mining, financial, education, healthcare, and technology organizations, including through the Heartbeat Campaign (2009-2012) and Operation Bitter Biscuit (2017).CitationKaspersky CactusPete Aug 2020CitationESET Exchange Mar 2021CitationFireEye Chinese Espionage October 2019CitationARS Technica China Hack SK April 2017CitationTrend Micro HeartBeat Campaign January 2013CitationTalos Bisonal 10 Years March 2020
G0045: menuPass
menuPass is a threat group that has been active since at least 2006. Individual members of menuPass are known to have acted in association with the Chinese Ministry of State Security's (MSS) Tianjin State Security Bureau and worked for the Huaying Haitai Science and Technology Development Company.CitationDOJ APT10 Dec 2018CitationDistrict Court of NY APT10 Indictment December 2018
menuPass has targeted healthcare, defense, aerospace, finance, maritime, biotechnology, energy, and government sectors globally, with an emphasis on Japanese organizations. In 2016 and 2017, the group is known to have targeted managed IT service providers (MSPs), manufacturing and mining companies, and a university.CitationPalo Alto menuPass Feb 2017CitationCrowdstrike CrowdCast Oct 2013CitationFireEye Poison IvyCitationPWC Cloud Hopper April 2017CitationFireEye APT10 April 2017CitationDOJ APT10 Dec 2018CitationDistrict Court of NY APT10 Indictment December 2018
G0035: Dragonfly
Dragonfly is a cyber espionage group that has been attributed to Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB) Center 16.CitationDOJ Russia Targeting Critical Infrastructure March 2022CitationUK GOV FSB Factsheet April 2022 Active since at least 2010, Dragonfly has targeted defense and aviation companies, government entities, companies related to industrial control systems, and critical infrastructure sectors worldwide through supply chain, spearphishing, and drive-by compromise attacks.CitationSymantec DragonflyCitationSecureworks IRON LIBERTY July 2019CitationSymantec Dragonfly Sept 2017CitationFortune Dragonfly 2.0 Sept 2017CitationGigamon Berserk Bear October 2021CitationCISA AA20-296A Berserk Bear December 2020CitationSymantec Dragonfly 2.0 October 2017
G0069: MuddyWater
MuddyWater is a cyber espionage group assessed to be a subordinate element within Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS).CitationCYBERCOM Iranian Intel Cyber January 2022 Since at least 2017, MuddyWater has targeted a range of government and private organizations across sectors, including telecommunications, local government, finance, defense, and oil and natural gas organizations, in the Middle East (specifically the UAE and Saudi Arabia), Asia, Africa, Europe, and North America. MuddyWater has reused domains dating back to October 2025, and has a preference for NameCheap and Hosterdaddy Private Limited (AS136557). In late 2025 and early 2026, MuddyWater used commercial satellite internet (i.e., Starlink) for command and control (C2) communication. CitationFalconFeeds_Iran_Mar2026CitationHuntio_IranInfra_Mar2026CitationUnit 42 MuddyWater Nov 2017CitationSymantec MuddyWater Dec 2018CitationClearSky MuddyWater Nov 2018CitationClearSky MuddyWater June 2019CitationReaqta MuddyWater November 2017CitationDHS CISA AA22-055A MuddyWater February 2022CitationTalos MuddyWater Jan 2022CitationNaumaanProofpoint_GlobalClickFix_April2025CitationESET_MuddyWater_Dec2025CitationSymantecCarbonBlack_Seedworm_Mar2026
G0027: Threat Group-3390
Threat Group-3390 is a Chinese threat group that has extensively used strategic Web compromises to target victims.CitationDell TG-3390 The group has been active since at least 2010 and has targeted organizations in the aerospace, government, defense, technology, energy, manufacturing and gambling/betting sectors.CitationSecureWorks BRONZE UNION June 2017CitationSecurelist LuckyMouse June 2018CitationTrend Micro DRBControl February 2020
G0046: FIN7
FIN7 is a financially-motivated threat group that has been active since 2013. FIN7 has targeted the retail, restaurant, hospitality, software, consulting, financial services, medical equipment, cloud services, media, food and beverage, transportation, pharmaceutical, and utilities industries in the United States. A portion of FIN7 was operated out of a front company called Combi Security and often used point-of-sale malware for targeting efforts. Since 2020, FIN7 shifted operations to big game hunting (BGH), including use of REvil ransomware and their own Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS), Darkside. FIN7 may be linked to the Carbanak Group, but multiple threat groups have been observed using Carbanak, leading these groups to be tracked separately.CitationFireEye FIN7 March 2017CitationFireEye FIN7 April 2017CitationFireEye CARBANAK June 2017CitationFireEye FIN7 Aug 2018CitationCrowdStrike Carbon Spider August 2021CitationMandiant FIN7 Apr 2022CitationBiZone Lizar May 2021
S0143: Flame
Flame is a sophisticated toolkit that has been used to collect information since at least 2010, largely targeting Middle East countries. CitationKaspersky Flame
S0366: WannaCry
WannaCry is ransomware that was first seen in a global attack during May 2017, which affected more than 150 countries. It contains worm-like features to spread itself across a computer network using the SMBv1 exploit EternalBlue.CitationLogRhythm WannaCryCitationUS-CERT WannaCry 2017CitationWashington Post WannaCry 2017CitationFireEye WannaCry 2017
S0603: Stuxnet
Stuxnet was the first publicly reported malware to specifically target industrial control systems devices. Stuxnet is a large and complex malware that utilized multiple behaviors, including numerous zero-day vulnerabilities, a sophisticated Windows rootkit, and network infection routines.CitationNicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien February 2011CitationCISA ICS Advisory ICSA-10-272-01CitationESET Stuxnet Under the MicroscopeCitationLanger Stuxnet Stuxnet was discovered in 2010, with some components being used as early as November 2008.CitationNicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien February 2011
S0650: QakBot
QakBot is a modular banking trojan that has been used primarily by financially-motivated actors since at least 2007. QakBot is continuously maintained and developed and has evolved from an information stealer into a delivery agent for ransomware, most notably ProLock and Egregor.CitationTrend Micro Qakbot December 2020CitationRed Canary QbotCitationKaspersky QakBot September 2021CitationATT QakBot April 2021
S0367: Emotet
Emotet is a modular malware variant which is primarily used as a downloader for other malware variants such as TrickBot and IcedID. Emotet first emerged in June 2014, initially targeting the financial sector, and has expanded to multiple verticals over time.CitationTrend Micro Banking Malware Jan 2019
S0363: Empire
Empire is an open-source, cross-platform remote administration and post-exploitation framework that is publicly available on GitHub. While the tool itself is primarily written in Python, the post-exploitation agents are written in pure PowerShell for Windows and Python for Linux/macOS. Empire was one of five tools singled out by a joint report on public hacking tools being widely used by adversaries.CitationNCSC Joint Report Public ToolsCitationGithub PowerShell EmpireCitationGitHub ATTACK Empire
S0606: Bad Rabbit
Bad Rabbit is a self-propagating ransomware that affected the Ukrainian transportation sector in 2017. Bad Rabbit has also targeted organizations and consumers in Russia. CitationSecure List Bad RabbitCitationESET Bad RabbitCitationDragos Apr 2019
S0368: NotPetya
NotPetya is malware that was used by Sandworm Team in a worldwide attack starting on June 27, 2017. While NotPetya appears as a form of ransomware, its main purpose was to destroy data and disk structures on compromised systems; the attackers never intended to make the encrypted data recoverable. As such, NotPetya may be more appropriately thought of as a form of wiper malware. NotPetya contains worm-like features to spread itself across a computer network using the SMBv1 exploits EternalBlue and EternalRomance.CitationTalos Nyetya June 2017CitationUS-CERT NotPetya 2017CitationESET Telebots June 2017CitationUS District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020
S0260: InvisiMole
InvisiMole is a modular spyware program that has been used by the InvisiMole Group since at least 2013. InvisiMole has two backdoor modules called RC2FM and RC2CL that are used to perform post-exploitation activities. It has been discovered on compromised victims in the Ukraine and Russia. Gamaredon Group infrastructure has been used to download and execute InvisiMole against a small number of victims.CitationESET InvisiMole June 2018CitationESET InvisiMole June 2020
S0608: Conficker
Conficker is a computer worm first detected in October 2008 that targeted Microsoft Windows using the MS08-067 Windows vulnerability to spread.CitationSANS Conficker In 2016, a variant of Conficker made its way on computers and removable disk drives belonging to a nuclear power plant.CitationConficker Nuclear Power Plant
S0378: PoshC2
PoshC2 is an open source remote administration and post-exploitation framework that is publicly available on GitHub. The server-side components of the tool are primarily written in Python, while the implants are written in PowerShell. Although PoshC2 is primarily focused on Windows implantation, it does contain a basic Python dropper for Linux/macOS.CitationGitHub PoshC2
S0532: Lucifer
Lucifer is a crypto miner and DDoS hybrid malware that leverages well-known exploits to spread laterally on Windows platforms.CitationUnit 42 Lucifer June 2020
C0064: AI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure
The AI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure is a campaign where human operators used Claude Code AI and OpenAI GPT GPT-4.1 AI to perform reconnaissance, vulnerability exploitation, privilege escalation, discovery, credential harvesting, and exfiltration operations. The attack impacted several Mexican government institutions including the Federal Tax Authority (Servicio de Administracion Tributaria), Mexico State Government (Estado de Mexico), Mexico City Civil Registry (Registro Civil de CDMX), Jalisco State Government, National Electoral Institute (Instituto Nacional Electoral), Michoacan State Government, SADM Monterrey Municipal Water Utility (Agua y Drenaje), Tamaulipas State Government, and the Mexico City Health Department (Salud CDMX). The attack resulted in the theft of large amounts of sensitive government data and civilian records. Please note that due to the breadth of this campaign, public reporting only provides select details and as a result this campaign should not be considered comprehensive.CitationAI-Mexico-Govt-Compromise
All related ATT&CK context
Mitigation direction
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(3)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 20.0 | 1.2 | Current bundle | ddc50d8e3ec1… | ||
| 19.2 | 1.2 | Older bundle | ddc50d8e3ec1… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.2 | Older bundle | ee3c5e3af3aa… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]CIS Multiple SMB Vulnerabilities
CIS. (2017, May 15). Multiple Vulnerabilities in Microsoft Windows SMB Server Could Allow for Remote Code Execution. Retrieved April 3, 2018.
Open source URL - [2]NVD CVE-2017-0176
National Vulnerability Database. (2017, June 22). CVE-2017-0176 Detail. Retrieved April 3, 2018.
Open source URL - [3]NVD CVE-2016-6662
National Vulnerability Database. (2017, February 2). CVE-2016-6662 Detail. Retrieved April 3, 2018.
Open source URL - [4]NVD CVE-2014-7169
National Vulnerability Database. (2017, September 24). CVE-2014-7169 Detail. Retrieved April 3, 2018.
Open source URL - [5]Ars Technica VMWare Code Execution Vulnerability 2021
Dan Goodin . (2021, February 25). Code-execution flaw in VMware has a severity rating of 9.8 out of 10. Retrieved April 8, 2025.
Open source URL - [6]Broadcom VMSA-2024-0019
Broadcom. (2024, September 17). VMSA-2024-0019: Questions & Answers. Retrieved April 8, 2025.
Open source URL - [7]mitre-attackT1210Open source URL
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