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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S0366: WannaCry

WannaCry is ransomware that was first seen in a global attack during May 2017, which affected more than 150 countries. It contains worm-like features to spread itself across a computer network using the SMBv1 exploit EternalBlue.[1][2][3][4]

EnterpriseS0366MalwareObject v1.1Modified
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S0366: WannaCry describes [WannaCry](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0366) is ransomware that was first seen in a global attack during May 2017, which affected more than 150 countries. It contains worm-like features to spread itself across a computer network using the SMBv1 exploit EternalBlue.(Citation: LogRhythm WannaCry)(Citation: US-CERT WannaCry 2017)(Citation: Washington Post WannaCry 2017)(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017)

Executive priority

S0366: WannaCry is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S0366: WannaCry by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S0366: WannaCry appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

WannaCry

WannaCry is ransomware that was first seen in a global attack during May 2017, which affected more than 150 countries. It contains worm-like features to spread itself across a computer network using the SMBv1 exploit EternalBlue.[1][2][3][4]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

16 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1210Exploitation of Remote Services

WannaCry uses an exploit in SMBv1 to spread itself to other remote systems on a network.[1][4][2]

EnterpriseT1489Service Stop

WannaCry attempts to kill processes associated with Exchange, Microsoft SQL Server, and MySQL to make it possible to encrypt their data stores.[4][5]

EnterpriseT1083File and Directory Discovery

WannaCry searches for variety of user files by file extension before encrypting them using RSA and AES, including Office, PDF, image, audio, video, source code, archive/compression format, and key and certificate files.[1][4]

EnterpriseT1120Peripheral Device Discovery

WannaCry contains a thread that will attempt to scan for new attached drives every few seconds. If one is identified, it will encrypt the files on the attached device.[4]

EnterpriseT1486Data Encrypted for Impact

WannaCry encrypts user files and demands that a ransom be paid in Bitcoin to decrypt those files.[1][4][5]

EnterpriseT1047Windows Management Instrumentation

WannaCry utilizes wmic to delete shadow copies.[1][4][5]

EnterpriseT1563.002RDP HijackingSub-technique

WannaCry enumerates current remote desktop sessions and tries to execute the malware on each session.[1]

EnterpriseT1490Inhibit System Recovery

WannaCry uses vssadmin, wbadmin, bcdedit, and wmic to delete and disable operating system recovery features.[1][4][5]

EnterpriseT1018Remote System Discovery

WannaCry scans its local network segment for remote systems to try to exploit and copy itself to.[5]

EnterpriseT1564.001Hidden Files and DirectoriesSub-technique

WannaCry uses attrib +h to make some of its files hidden.[1]CitationCheckpoint WannaCry 2017

EnterpriseT1016System Network Configuration Discovery

WannaCry will attempt to determine the local network segment it is a part of.[5]

EnterpriseT1222.001Windows PermissionsSub-technique

WannaCry uses attrib +h and icacls . /grant Everyone:F /T /C /Q to make some of its files hidden and grant all users full access controls.[1]

EnterpriseT1090.003Multi-hop ProxySub-technique

WannaCry uses Tor for command and control traffic.[5]

EnterpriseT1573.002Asymmetric CryptographySub-technique

WannaCry uses Tor for command and control traffic and routes a custom cryptographic protocol over the Tor circuit.[5]

EnterpriseT1543.003Windows ServiceSub-technique

WannaCry creates the service "mssecsvc2.0" with the display name "Microsoft Security Center (2.0) Service."[1][4]

EnterpriseT1570Lateral Tool Transfer

WannaCry attempts to copy itself to remote computers after gaining access via an SMB exploit.[1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupEnterprise

G0032: Lazarus Group

Lazarus Group is a North Korean state-sponsored cyber threat group attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB). [1] [2] Lazarus Group has been active since at least 2009 and is reportedly responsible for the November 2014 destructive wiper attack on Sony Pictures Entertainment, identified by Novetta as part of Operation Blockbuster. Malware used by Lazarus Group correlates to other reported campaigns, including Operation Flame, Operation 1Mission, Operation Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Days of Rain.[3]

North Korea’s cyber operations have shown a consistent pattern of adaptation, forming and reorganizing units as national priorities shift. These units frequently share personnel, infrastructure, malware, and tradecraft, making it difficult to attribute specific operations with high confidence. Public reporting often uses “Lazarus Group” as an umbrella term for multiple North Korean cyber operators conducting espionage, destructive attacks, and financially motivated campaigns.[4][5][6]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
20.0
Object version
1.1
Created
Modified
Raw hash
341f1fe9cc7d848a...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(3)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
20.01.1Current bundle341f1fe9cc7d…
19.21.1Older bundle341f1fe9cc7d…
19.11.1Older bundle341f1fe9cc7d…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    LogRhythm WannaCry

    Noerenberg, E., Costis, A., and Quist, N. (2017, May 16). A Technical Analysis of WannaCry Ransomware. Retrieved December 8, 2024.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    US-CERT WannaCry 2017

    US-CERT. (2017, May 12). Alert (TA17-132A): Indicators Associated With WannaCry Ransomware. Retrieved March 25, 2019.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    Washington Post WannaCry 2017

    Dwoskin, E. and Adam, K. (2017, May 14). More than 150 countries affected by massive cyberattack, Europol says. Retrieved March 25, 2019.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    FireEye WannaCry 2017

    Berry, A., Homan, J., and Eitzman, R. (2017, May 23). WannaCry Malware Profile. Retrieved March 15, 2019.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    SecureWorks WannaCry Analysis

    Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2017, May 18). WCry Ransomware Analysis. Retrieved March 26, 2019.

    Open source URL
  6. [6]
    WCry

    (Citation: LogRhythm WannaCry)(Citation: SecureWorks WannaCry Analysis)

  7. [7]
    WanaCry

    (Citation: SecureWorks WannaCry Analysis)

  8. [8]
    WanaCrypt

    (Citation: SecureWorks WannaCry Analysis)

  9. [9]
    WanaCrypt0r

    (Citation: LogRhythm WannaCry)

  10. [10]
    mitre-attackS0366
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.