S0608: Conficker
Security context for executives and security teams
S0608: Conficker describes [Conficker](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0608) is a computer worm first detected in October 2008 that targeted Microsoft Windows using the MS08-067 Windows vulnerability to spread.(Citation: SANS Conficker) In 2016, a variant of [Conficker](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0608) made its way on computers and removable disk drives belonging to a nuclear power plant.(Citation: Conficker Nuclear Power Plant)
Executive priority
S0608: Conficker is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate S0608: Conficker by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether S0608: Conficker appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Conficker
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1112 | Modify Registry | |
| Enterprise | T1543.003 | Windows ServiceSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1124 | System Time Discovery | |
| Enterprise | T1021.002 | SMB/Windows Admin SharesSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1547.001 | Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique | Conficker adds Registry Run keys to establish persistence.CitationTrend Micro Conficker |
| Enterprise | T1568.002 | Domain Generation AlgorithmsSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1027 | Obfuscated Files or Information | Conficker has obfuscated its code to prevent its removal from host machines.CitationTrend Micro Conficker |
| Enterprise | T1046 | Network Service Discovery | |
| Enterprise | T1685 | Disable or Modify Tools | |
| Enterprise | T1490 | Inhibit System Recovery | |
| Enterprise | T1091 | Replication Through Removable Media | |
| Enterprise | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | |
| Enterprise | T1210 | Exploitation of Remote Services |
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.0 | Current bundle | c553520e1c1b… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Older bundle | c553520e1c1b… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]SANS Conficker
Burton, K. (n.d.). The Conficker Worm. Retrieved February 18, 2021.
Open source URL - [2]Conficker Nuclear Power Plant
Cimpanu, C. (2016, April 26). Malware Shuts Down German Nuclear Power Plant on Chernobyl's 30th Anniversary. Retrieved February 18, 2021.
Open source URL - [3]Downadup
(Citation: SANS Conficker)
- [4]Kido
(Citation: SANS Conficker)
- [5]mitre-attackS0608Open source URL
Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.