G1003: Ember Bear
Ember Bear is a Russian state-sponsored cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2020, linked to Russia's General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) 161st Specialist Training Center (Unit 29155).[1] Ember Bear has primarily focused operations against Ukrainian government and telecommunication entities, but has also operated against critical infrastructure entities in Europe and the Americas.[2] Ember Bear conducted the WhisperGate destructive wiper attacks against Ukraine in early 2022.[3][4][1] There is some confusion as to whether Ember Bear overlaps with another Russian-linked entity referred to as Saint Bear. At present available evidence strongly suggests these are distinct activities with different behavioral profiles.[2][5]
Security context for executives and security teams
G1003: Ember Bear describes [Ember Bear](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1003) is a Russian state-sponsored cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2020, linked to Russia's General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) 161st Specialist Training Center (Unit 29155).(Citation: CISA GRU29155 2024) [Ember Bear](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1003) has primarily focused operations against Ukrainian government and telecommunication entities, but has also operated against critical infrastructure entities in Europe and the Am...
Executive priority
G1003: Ember Bear is an official MITRE ATT&CK group. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate G1003: Ember Bear by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (the platforms named in the official object), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Detection direction
- Validate whether G1003: Ember Bear appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Ember Bear
Ember Bear is a Russian state-sponsored cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2020, linked to Russia's General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) 161st Specialist Training Center (Unit 29155).[1] Ember Bear has primarily focused operations against Ukrainian government and telecommunication entities, but has also operated against critical infrastructure entities in Europe and the Americas.[2] Ember Bear conducted the WhisperGate destructive wiper attacks against Ukraine in early 2022.[3][4][1] There is some confusion as to whether Ember Bear overlaps with another Russian-linked entity referred to as Saint Bear. At present available evidence strongly suggests these are distinct activities with different behavioral profiles.[2][5]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1018 | Remote System Discovery | Ember Bear has used tools such as Nmap and MASSCAN for remote service discovery.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1090.003 | Multi-hop ProxySub-technique | Ember Bear has configured multi-hop proxies via ProxyChains within victim environments.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1114 | Email Collection | Ember Bear attempts to collect mail from accessed systems and servers.[2][1] |
| Enterprise | T1583 | Acquire Infrastructure | Ember Bear uses services such as IVPN, SurfShark, and Tor to add anonymization to operations.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1560 | Archive Collected Data | Ember Bear has compressed collected data prior to exfiltration.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1036 | Masquerading | Ember Bear has renamed the legitimate Sysinternals tool procdump to alternative names such as |
| Enterprise | T1595.002 | Vulnerability ScanningSub-technique | Ember Bear has used publicly available tools such as MASSCAN and Acunetix for vulnerability scanning of public-facing infrastructure.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1583.003 | Virtual Private ServerSub-technique | Ember Bear has used virtual private servers (VPSs) to host tools, perform reconnaissance, exploit victim infrastructure, and as a destination for data exfiltration.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1654 | Log Enumeration | Ember Bear has enumerated SECURITY and SYSTEM log files during intrusions.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1190 | Exploit Public-Facing Application | Ember Bear gains initial access to victim environments by exploiting external-facing services. Examples include exploitation of CVE-2021-26084 in Confluence servers; CVE-2022-41040, ProxyShell, and other vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange; and multiple vulnerabilities in open-source platforms such as content management systems.[2][1] |
| Enterprise | T1133 | External Remote Services | Ember Bear have used VPNs both for initial access to victim environments and for persistence within them following compromise.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1119 | Automated Collection | Ember Bear engages in mass collection from compromised systems during intrusions.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1571 | Non-Standard Port | Ember Bear has used various non-standard ports for C2 communication.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1070.004 | File DeletionSub-technique | Ember Bear deletes files related to lateral movement to avoid detection.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1570 | Lateral Tool Transfer | Ember Bear retrieves follow-on payloads direct from adversary-owned infrastructure for deployment on compromised hosts.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1095 | Non-Application Layer Protocol | Ember Bear uses socket-based tunneling utilities for command and control purposes such as NetCat and Go Simple Tunnel (GOST). These tunnels are used to push interactive command prompts over the created sockets.[2] Ember Bear has also used reverse TCP connections from Meterpreter installations to communicate back with C2 infrastructure.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1125 | Video Capture | Ember Bear has exfiltrated images from compromised IP cameras.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1572 | Protocol Tunneling | Ember Bear has used ProxyChains to tunnel protocols to internal networks.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1110 | Brute Force | Ember Bear used the `su-bruteforce` tool to brute force specific users using the `su` command.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1588.001 | MalwareSub-technique | Ember Bear has acquired malware and related tools from dark web forums.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1110.003 | Password SprayingSub-technique | Ember Bear has conducted password spraying against Outlook Web Access (OWA) infrastructure to identify valid user names and passwords.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1595.001 | Scanning IP BlocksSub-technique | Ember Bear has targeted IP ranges for vulnerability scanning related to government and critical infrastructure organizations.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1505.003 | Web ShellSub-technique | Ember Bear deploys web shells following initial access for either follow-on command execution or protocol tunneling. Example web shells used by Ember Bear include P0wnyshell, reGeorg, P.A.S. Webshell, and custom variants of publicly-available web shell examples.[2][1] |
| Enterprise | T1585 | Establish Accounts | Ember Bear has created accounts on dark web forums to obtain various tools and malware.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1491.002 | External DefacementSub-technique | Ember Bear is linked to the defacement of several Ukrainian organization websites.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1053.005 | Scheduled TaskSub-technique | Ember Bear uses remotely scheduled tasks to facilitate remote command execution on victim machines.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1059.001 | PowerShellSub-technique | Ember Bear has used PowerShell commands to gather information from compromised systems, such as email servers.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1112 | Modify Registry | Ember Bear modifies registry values for anti-forensics and defense evasion purposes.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1071.004 | DNSSub-technique | Ember Bear has used DNS tunnelling tools, such as dnscat/2 and Iodine, for C2 purposes.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1550.002 | Pass the HashSub-technique | Ember Bear has used pass-the-hash techniques for lateral movement in victim environments.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1567.002 | Exfiltration to Cloud StorageSub-technique | Ember Bear has used tools such as Rclone to exfiltrate information from victim environments to cloud storage such as `mega.nz`.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1588.005 | ExploitsSub-technique | Ember Bear has obtained exploitation scripts against publicly-disclosed vulnerabilities from public repositories.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1195 | Supply Chain Compromise | Ember Bear has compromised information technology providers and software developers providing services to targets of interest, building initial access to ultimate victims at least in part through compromise of service providers that work with the victim organizations.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1005 | Data from Local System | Ember Bear gathers victim system information such as enumerating the volume of a given device or extracting system and security event logs for analysis.[2][1] |
| Enterprise | T1561.002 | Disk Structure WipeSub-technique | Ember Bear conducted destructive operations against victims, including disk structure wiping, via the WhisperGate malware in Ukraine.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1203 | Exploitation for Client Execution | Ember Bear has used exploits to enable follow-on execution of frameworks such as Meterpreter.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1036.005 | Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationSub-technique | Ember Bear has renamed tools to match legitimate utilities, such as renaming GOST tunneling instances to `java` in victim environments.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1552.001 | Credentials In FilesSub-technique | Ember Bear has dumped configuration settings in accessed IP cameras including plaintext credentials.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1003.001 | LSASS MemorySub-technique | Ember Bear uses legitimate Sysinternals tools such as procdump to dump LSASS memory.[2][1] |
| Enterprise | T1047 | Windows Management Instrumentation | Ember Bear has used WMI execution with password hashes for command execution and lateral movement.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1021 | Remote Services | Ember Bear uses valid network credentials gathered through credential harvesting to move laterally within victim networks, often employing the Impacket framework to do so.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1003.004 | LSA SecretsSub-technique | Ember Bear has used frameworks such as Impacket to dump LSA secrets for credential capture.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1003.002 | Security Account ManagerSub-technique | Ember Bear acquires victim credentials by extracting registry hives such as the Security Account Manager through commands such as |
| Enterprise | T1078.001 | Default AccountsSub-technique | Ember Bear has abused default user names and passwords in externally-accessible IP cameras for initial access.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1046 | Network Service Discovery | Ember Bear has used tools such as NMAP for remote system discovery and enumeration in victim environments.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1210 | Exploitation of Remote Services | Ember Bear has used exploits for vulnerabilities such as MS17-010, also known as `Eternal Blue`, during operations.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1003 | OS Credential Dumping | Ember Bear gathers credential material from target systems, such as SSH keys, to facilitate access to victim environments.[2] |
Groups, software, and campaigns
S0598: P.A.S. Webshell
P.A.S. Webshell is a publicly available multifunctional PHP webshell in use since at least 2016 that provides remote access and execution on target web servers.[1]
S0488: CrackMapExec
CrackMapExec, or CME, is a post-exploitation tool developed in Python and designed for penetration testing against networks. CrackMapExec collects Active Directory information to conduct lateral movement through targeted networks.[1]
S0174: Responder
Responder is an open source tool used for LLMNR, NBT-NS and MDNS poisoning, with built-in HTTP/SMB/MSSQL/FTP/LDAP rogue authentication server supporting NTLMv1/NTLMv2/LMv2, Extended Security NTLMSSP and Basic HTTP authentication. [1]
S0508: ngrok
S1187: reGeorg
S0689: WhisperGate
WhisperGate is a multi-stage wiper designed to look like ransomware that has been used against multiple government, non-profit, and information technology organizations in Ukraine since at least January 2022.[1][2][3]
S1018: Saint Bot
Saint Bot is a .NET downloader that has been used by Saint Bear since at least March 2021.[1][2]
S0029: PsExec
S1040: Rclone
S0521: BloodHound
BloodHound is an Active Directory (AD) reconnaissance tool that can reveal hidden relationships and identify attack paths within an AD environment.[1][2][3]
S0357: Impacket
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 2.1 | Current bundle | 94b27d5ca1cb… | ||
| 19.1 | 2.1 | Older bundle | e5c2595965fb… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]CISA GRU29155 2024
US Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency et al. (2024, September 5). Russian Military Cyber Actors Target U.S. and Global Critical Infrastructure. Retrieved September 6, 2024.
Open source URL - [2]Cadet Blizzard emerges as novel threat actor
Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2023, June 14). Cadet Blizzard emerges as a novel and distinct Russian threat actor. Retrieved July 10, 2023.
Open source URL - [3]CrowdStrike Ember Bear Profile March 2022
CrowdStrike. (2022, March 30). Who is EMBER BEAR?. Retrieved June 9, 2022.
Open source URL - [4]Mandiant UNC2589 March 2022
Sadowski, J; Hall, R. (2022, March 4). Responses to Russia's Invasion of Ukraine Likely to Spur Retaliation. Retrieved June 9, 2022.
Open source URL - [5]Palo Alto Unit 42 OutSteel SaintBot February 2022
Unit 42. (2022, February 25). Spear Phishing Attacks Target Organizations in Ukraine, Payloads Include the Document Stealer OutSteel and the Downloader SaintBot. Retrieved June 9, 2022.
Open source URL - [6]Bleeding Bear
(Citation: CrowdStrike Ember Bear Profile March 2022)
- [7]Cadet Blizzard
(Citation: Cadet Blizzard emerges as novel threat actor)
- [8]DEV-0586
(Citation: Cadet Blizzard emerges as novel threat actor)
- [9]Frozenvista
(Citation: CISA GRU29155 2024)
- [10]UAC-0056
(Citation: CISA GRU29155 2024)
- [11]UNC2589
(Citation: Mandiant UNC2589 March 2022)
- [12]mitre-attackG1003Open source URL
Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.
