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MITRE ATT&CK® Group

G1003: Ember Bear

Ember Bear is a Russian state-sponsored cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2020, linked to Russia's General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) 161st Specialist Training Center (Unit 29155).[1] Ember Bear has primarily focused operations against Ukrainian government and telecommunication entities, but has also operated against critical infrastructure entities in Europe and the Americas.[2] Ember Bear conducted the WhisperGate destructive wiper attacks against Ukraine in early 2022.[3][4][1] There is some confusion as to whether Ember Bear overlaps with another Russian-linked entity referred to as Saint Bear. At present available evidence strongly suggests these are distinct activities with different behavioral profiles.[2][5]

EnterpriseG1003GroupObject v2.1 Modified
Glexia's Take

Analyst context for executives and security teams

Analyst confidence Medium

Ember Bear matters because ATT&CK describes it as a Russian state-sponsored espionage group linked to GRU Unit 29155, with operations focused on Ukrainian government and telecommunications entities and critical infrastructure in Europe and the Americas. The related behaviors point to a practical defender concern: credential theft, Active Directory discovery, remote execution, tunneling/proxying, web shells, file collection, and destructive wiper activity via WhisperGate. For leaders, this is less about one malware family and more about whether the organization can withstand identity-driven intrusion, lateral movement, and potential disruption.

Executive priority

Prioritize this as a resilience and readiness question for identity, Windows administration pathways, critical infrastructure exposure, and incident response decision-making. Executives should ask whether privileged credentials, remote administration tools, web-facing servers, and outbound tunneling services are monitored well enough to support rapid containment and audit evidence. Because ATT&CK does not provide a group-level detection section or platforms, prioritization should be based on local exposure to the related techniques and software rather than assumptions of direct targeting.

Technical view

SOC and IR teams should validate coverage across the related ATT&CK relationships: OS credential dumping including LSASS, SAM, and LSA Secrets; remote services and WMI; scheduled tasks; PowerShell; remote system and network service discovery; masquerading; local data collection; and tools such as PsExec, Impacket, CrackMapExec, Responder, BloodHound, ngrok, Rclone, P.A.S. Webshell, reGeorg, Saint Bot, and WhisperGate. The strongest validation path is to map these relationships to actual telemetry sources, alert logic, and containment playbooks, especially around Windows identity infrastructure and web-accessible systems.

Likely telemetry

  • Windows Security, Sysmon, EDR, and process creation logs for PowerShell, WMI, scheduled tasks, credential access indicators, and remote execution tooling
  • Authentication and domain controller logs for abnormal account use, lateral movement, NTLM activity, and Active Directory enumeration patterns
  • Network flow, DNS, proxy, and firewall logs for service discovery, tunneling, reverse proxy activity, and unusual outbound cloud-storage or tunnel destinations
  • Web server logs, file integrity monitoring, and EDR telemetry for PHP web shells and proxy web shells such as P.A.S. Webshell and reGeorg
  • File, command-line, and data transfer telemetry relevant to local collection and tools such as Rclone

Detection direction

  • Do not treat tool names alone as sufficient detection: PsExec, ngrok, Rclone, BloodHound, Impacket, CrackMapExec, and Responder can overlap with legitimate administration, testing, or engineering activity.
  • Tune detections around behavior chains: discovery followed by credential access, privileged authentication, remote execution, scheduled task creation, web shell access, tunneling, or file synchronization.
  • Validate that credential dumping detections cover LSASS memory access, SAM access, and LSA Secrets, not only known tool hashes or filenames.
  • Review allowlisted administrative utilities and remote management pathways because masquerading and legitimate-tool abuse can reduce the value of simple blocklists.
  • Use relationship context to hunt for Active Directory attack-path discovery and lateral movement patterns, especially where BloodHound, CrackMapExec, Impacket, PsExec, WMI, or remote services appear together.

Mitigation priorities

  • Start with identity hardening: reduce standing privilege, protect administrative accounts, monitor domain controllers, and limit credential exposure on endpoints.
  • Restrict and monitor remote administration mechanisms such as PsExec-style execution, WMI, scheduled tasks, and remote services according to business need.
  • Harden web-facing servers and monitor for web shells and proxy tunneling behavior, especially where PHP applications or externally reachable services exist.
  • Control outbound tunneling and file synchronization paths with egress filtering, proxy logging, and review of sanctioned cloud storage usage.
  • Improve resilience against destructive activity through tested backups, recovery procedures, segmentation, and incident response playbooks for rapid isolation.
Analyst notes and limits

The supplied ATT&CK object identifies Ember Bear aliases including UNC2589, Bleeding Bear, DEV-0586, Cadet Blizzard, Frozenvista, and UAC-0056. MITRE notes some confusion with Saint Bear but states available evidence strongly suggests distinct activities with different behavioral profiles. Relationship-derived context is central here because the group object itself has no explicit tactics, platforms, or detection text.

This take is limited to the supplied ATT&CK fields, references, and relationships. It does not assert current targeting, customer exposure, active exploitation, or guaranteed detection. Platforms and tactics are inferred only from related software and techniques, not from group-level platform or tactic fields.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Ember Bear

Ember Bear is a Russian state-sponsored cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2020, linked to Russia's General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) 161st Specialist Training Center (Unit 29155).[1] Ember Bear has primarily focused operations against Ukrainian government and telecommunication entities, but has also operated against critical infrastructure entities in Europe and the Americas.[2] Ember Bear conducted the WhisperGate destructive wiper attacks against Ukraine in early 2022.[3][4][1] There is some confusion as to whether Ember Bear overlaps with another Russian-linked entity referred to as Saint Bear. At present available evidence strongly suggests these are distinct activities with different behavioral profiles.[2][5]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

47 rows
Domain ID Name Relationship / procedure
Enterprise T1018 Remote System Discovery

Ember Bear has used tools such as Nmap and MASSCAN for remote service discovery.[1]

Enterprise T1003 OS Credential Dumping

Ember Bear gathers credential material from target systems, such as SSH keys, to facilitate access to victim environments.[2]

Enterprise T1090.003 Multi-hop Proxy Sub-technique

Ember Bear has configured multi-hop proxies via ProxyChains within victim environments.[1]

Enterprise T1114 Email Collection

Ember Bear attempts to collect mail from accessed systems and servers.[2][1]

Enterprise T1583 Acquire Infrastructure

Ember Bear uses services such as IVPN, SurfShark, and Tor to add anonymization to operations.[2]

Enterprise T1560 Archive Collected Data

Ember Bear has compressed collected data prior to exfiltration.[1]

Enterprise T1036 Masquerading

Ember Bear has renamed the legitimate Sysinternals tool procdump to alternative names such as dump64.exe to evade detection.[2]

Enterprise T1595.002 Vulnerability Scanning Sub-technique

Ember Bear has used publicly available tools such as MASSCAN and Acunetix for vulnerability scanning of public-facing infrastructure.[1]

Enterprise T1583.003 Virtual Private Server Sub-technique

Ember Bear has used virtual private servers (VPSs) to host tools, perform reconnaissance, exploit victim infrastructure, and as a destination for data exfiltration.[1]

Enterprise T1654 Log Enumeration

Ember Bear has enumerated SECURITY and SYSTEM log files during intrusions.[1]

Enterprise T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application

Ember Bear gains initial access to victim environments by exploiting external-facing services. Examples include exploitation of CVE-2021-26084 in Confluence servers; CVE-2022-41040, ProxyShell, and other vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange; and multiple vulnerabilities in open-source platforms such as content management systems.[2][1]

Enterprise T1133 External Remote Services

Ember Bear have used VPNs both for initial access to victim environments and for persistence within them following compromise.[1]

Enterprise T1119 Automated Collection

Ember Bear engages in mass collection from compromised systems during intrusions.[2]

Enterprise T1571 Non-Standard Port

Ember Bear has used various non-standard ports for C2 communication.[1]

Enterprise T1070.004 File Deletion Sub-technique

Ember Bear deletes files related to lateral movement to avoid detection.[2]

Enterprise T1570 Lateral Tool Transfer

Ember Bear retrieves follow-on payloads direct from adversary-owned infrastructure for deployment on compromised hosts.[2]

Enterprise T1095 Non-Application Layer Protocol

Ember Bear uses socket-based tunneling utilities for command and control purposes such as NetCat and Go Simple Tunnel (GOST). These tunnels are used to push interactive command prompts over the created sockets.[2] Ember Bear has also used reverse TCP connections from Meterpreter installations to communicate back with C2 infrastructure.[1]

Enterprise T1125 Video Capture

Ember Bear has exfiltrated images from compromised IP cameras.[1]

Enterprise T1572 Protocol Tunneling

Ember Bear has used ProxyChains to tunnel protocols to internal networks.[1]

Enterprise T1110 Brute Force

Ember Bear used the `su-bruteforce` tool to brute force specific users using the `su` command.[1]

Enterprise T1588.001 Malware Sub-technique

Ember Bear has acquired malware and related tools from dark web forums.[1]

Enterprise T1110.003 Password Spraying Sub-technique

Ember Bear has conducted password spraying against Outlook Web Access (OWA) infrastructure to identify valid user names and passwords.[1]

Enterprise T1595.001 Scanning IP Blocks Sub-technique

Ember Bear has targeted IP ranges for vulnerability scanning related to government and critical infrastructure organizations.[1]

Enterprise T1505.003 Web Shell Sub-technique

Ember Bear deploys web shells following initial access for either follow-on command execution or protocol tunneling. Example web shells used by Ember Bear include P0wnyshell, reGeorg, P.A.S. Webshell, and custom variants of publicly-available web shell examples.[2][1]

Enterprise T1585 Establish Accounts

Ember Bear has created accounts on dark web forums to obtain various tools and malware.[1]

Enterprise T1491.002 External Defacement Sub-technique

Ember Bear is linked to the defacement of several Ukrainian organization websites.[2]

Enterprise T1053.005 Scheduled Task Sub-technique

Ember Bear uses remotely scheduled tasks to facilitate remote command execution on victim machines.[2]

Enterprise T1210 Exploitation of Remote Services

Ember Bear has used exploits for vulnerabilities such as MS17-010, also known as `Eternal Blue`, during operations.[1]

Enterprise T1059.001 PowerShell Sub-technique

Ember Bear has used PowerShell commands to gather information from compromised systems, such as email servers.[1]

Enterprise T1112 Modify Registry

Ember Bear modifies registry values for anti-forensics and defense evasion purposes.[2]

Enterprise T1071.004 DNS Sub-technique

Ember Bear has used DNS tunnelling tools, such as dnscat/2 and Iodine, for C2 purposes.[1]

Enterprise T1550.002 Pass the Hash Sub-technique

Ember Bear has used pass-the-hash techniques for lateral movement in victim environments.[1]

Enterprise T1567.002 Exfiltration to Cloud Storage Sub-technique

Ember Bear has used tools such as Rclone to exfiltrate information from victim environments to cloud storage such as `mega.nz`.[1]

Enterprise T1588.005 Exploits Sub-technique

Ember Bear has obtained exploitation scripts against publicly-disclosed vulnerabilities from public repositories.[1]

Enterprise T1195 Supply Chain Compromise

Ember Bear has compromised information technology providers and software developers providing services to targets of interest, building initial access to ultimate victims at least in part through compromise of service providers that work with the victim organizations.[2]

Enterprise T1005 Data from Local System

Ember Bear gathers victim system information such as enumerating the volume of a given device or extracting system and security event logs for analysis.[2][1]

Enterprise T1561.002 Disk Structure Wipe Sub-technique

Ember Bear conducted destructive operations against victims, including disk structure wiping, via the WhisperGate malware in Ukraine.[2]

Enterprise T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

Ember Bear has used exploits to enable follow-on execution of frameworks such as Meterpreter.[1]

Enterprise T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location Sub-technique

Ember Bear has renamed tools to match legitimate utilities, such as renaming GOST tunneling instances to `java` in victim environments.[1]

Enterprise T1552.001 Credentials In Files Sub-technique

Ember Bear has dumped configuration settings in accessed IP cameras including plaintext credentials.[1]

Enterprise T1003.001 LSASS Memory Sub-technique

Ember Bear uses legitimate Sysinternals tools such as procdump to dump LSASS memory.[2][1]

Enterprise T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation

Ember Bear has used WMI execution with password hashes for command execution and lateral movement.[1]

Enterprise T1021 Remote Services

Ember Bear uses valid network credentials gathered through credential harvesting to move laterally within victim networks, often employing the Impacket framework to do so.[2]

Enterprise T1003.004 LSA Secrets Sub-technique

Ember Bear has used frameworks such as Impacket to dump LSA secrets for credential capture.[1]

Enterprise T1003.002 Security Account Manager Sub-technique

Ember Bear acquires victim credentials by extracting registry hives such as the Security Account Manager through commands such as reg save.[2][1]

Enterprise T1078.001 Default Accounts Sub-technique

Ember Bear has abused default user names and passwords in externally-accessible IP cameras for initial access.[1]

Enterprise T1046 Network Service Discovery

Ember Bear has used tools such as NMAP for remote system discovery and enumeration in victim environments.[1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

Tool Enterprise

S0488: CrackMapExec

CrackMapExec, or CME, is a post-exploitation tool developed in Python and designed for penetration testing against networks. CrackMapExec collects Active Directory information to conduct lateral movement through targeted networks.[1]

Windows
Tool Enterprise

S0174: Responder

Responder is an open source tool used for LLMNR, NBT-NS and MDNS poisoning, with built-in HTTP/SMB/MSSQL/FTP/LDAP rogue authentication server supporting NTLMv1/NTLMv2/LMv2, Extended Security NTLMSSP and Basic HTTP authentication. [1]

Tool Enterprise

S0508: ngrok

ngrok is a legitimate reverse proxy tool that can create a secure tunnel to servers located behind firewalls or on local machines that do not have a public IP. ngrok has been leveraged by threat actors in several campaigns including use for lateral movement and data exfiltration.[1][2][3][4]

Windows
Malware Enterprise

S1187: reGeorg

reGeorg is an open-source web shell written in Python that can be used as a proxy to bypass firewall rules and tunnel data in and out of targeted networks.[1][2]

Network DevicesWindowsmacOS
Malware Enterprise

S0689: WhisperGate

WhisperGate is a multi-stage wiper designed to look like ransomware that has been used against multiple government, non-profit, and information technology organizations in Ukraine since at least January 2022.[1][2][3]

Windows
Tool Enterprise

S0029: PsExec

PsExec is a free Microsoft tool that can be used to execute a program on another computer. It is used by IT administrators and attackers.[1][2]

Windows
Tool Enterprise

S1040: Rclone

Rclone is a command line program for syncing files with cloud storage services such as Dropbox, Google Drive, Amazon S3, and MEGA. Rclone has been used in a number of ransomware campaigns, including those associated with the Conti and DarkSide Ransomware-as-a-Service operations.[1][2][3][4][5]

LinuxWindowsmacOS
Tool Enterprise

S0357: Impacket

Impacket is an open source collection of modules written in Python for programmatically constructing and manipulating network protocols. Impacket contains several tools for remote service execution, Kerberos manipulation, Windows credential dumping, packet sniffing, and relay attacks.[1]

LinuxmacOSWindows
Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .

ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
2.1
Created
Modified
Raw hash
e5c2595965fbb6d0...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
Release Bundle imported Object version Modified Status Raw hash
19.1 2.1 Current bundle e5c2595965fb…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    CISA GRU29155 2024

    US Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency et al. (2024, September 5). Russian Military Cyber Actors Target U.S. and Global Critical Infrastructure. Retrieved September 6, 2024.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Cadet Blizzard emerges as novel threat actor

    Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2023, June 14). Cadet Blizzard emerges as a novel and distinct Russian threat actor. Retrieved July 10, 2023.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    CrowdStrike Ember Bear Profile March 2022

    CrowdStrike. (2022, March 30). Who is EMBER BEAR?. Retrieved June 9, 2022.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    Mandiant UNC2589 March 2022

    Sadowski, J; Hall, R. (2022, March 4). Responses to Russia's Invasion of Ukraine Likely to Spur Retaliation. Retrieved June 9, 2022.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    Palo Alto Unit 42 OutSteel SaintBot February 2022

    Unit 42. (2022, February 25). Spear Phishing Attacks Target Organizations in Ukraine, Payloads Include the Document Stealer OutSteel and the Downloader SaintBot. Retrieved June 9, 2022.

    Open source URL
  6. [6]
    Bleeding Bear

    (Citation: CrowdStrike Ember Bear Profile March 2022)

  7. [7]
    Cadet Blizzard

    (Citation: Cadet Blizzard emerges as novel threat actor)

  8. [8]
    DEV-0586

    (Citation: Cadet Blizzard emerges as novel threat actor)

  9. [9]
    Frozenvista

    (Citation: CISA GRU29155 2024)

  10. [10]
    UAC-0056

    (Citation: CISA GRU29155 2024)

  11. [11]
    UNC2589

    (Citation: Mandiant UNC2589 March 2022)

  12. [12]
    mitre-attack G1003
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.