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MITRE ATT&CK® Technique

T1190: Exploit Public-Facing Application

Adversaries may attempt to exploit a weakness in an Internet-facing host or system to initially access a network. The weakness in the system can be a software bug, a temporary glitch, or a misconfiguration.

Exploited applications are often websites/web servers, but can also include databases (like SQL), standard services (like SMB or SSH), network device administration and management protocols (like SNMP and Smart Install), and any other system with Internet-accessible open sockets.[1][2][3][4][5] On ESXi infrastructure, adversaries may exploit exposed OpenSLP services; they may alternatively exploit exposed VMware vCenter servers.[6][7] Depending on the flaw being exploited, this may also involve Exploitation for Stealth or Exploitation for Client Execution.

If an application is hosted on cloud-based infrastructure and/or is containerized, then exploiting it may lead to compromise of the underlying instance or container. This can allow an adversary a path to access the cloud or container APIs (e.g., via the Cloud Instance Metadata API), exploit container host access via Escape to Host, or take advantage of weak identity and access management policies.

Adversaries may also exploit edge network infrastructure and related appliances, specifically targeting devices that do not support robust host-based defenses.[8][9]

For websites and databases, the OWASP top 10 and CWE top 25 highlight the most common web-based vulnerabilities.[10][11]

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Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

T1190: Exploit Public-Facing Application describes Adversaries may attempt to exploit a weakness in an Internet-facing host or system to initially access a network. The weakness in the system can be a software bug, a temporary glitch, or a misconfiguration. Exploited applications are often websites/web servers, but can also include databases (like SQL), standard services (like SMB or SSH), network device administration and management protocols (like SNMP and Smart Install), and any other system with Internet-accessible open sockets.(Citation: NVD CVE-2016-6662)(Cit...

Executive priority

T1190: Exploit Public-Facing Application is an official MITRE ATT&CK technique. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate T1190: Exploit Public-Facing Application by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (initial-access), supported platforms (Containers, ESXi, IaaS, Linux), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Cloud control-plane, SaaS audit, and container platform logs
  • Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

  • Validate whether T1190: Exploit Public-Facing Application appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Exploit Public-Facing Application

Adversaries may attempt to exploit a weakness in an Internet-facing host or system to initially access a network. The weakness in the system can be a software bug, a temporary glitch, or a misconfiguration.

Exploited applications are often websites/web servers, but can also include databases (like SQL), standard services (like SMB or SSH), network device administration and management protocols (like SNMP and Smart Install), and any other system with Internet-accessible open sockets.[1][2][3][4][5] On ESXi infrastructure, adversaries may exploit exposed OpenSLP services; they may alternatively exploit exposed VMware vCenter servers.[6][7] Depending on the flaw being exploited, this may also involve Exploitation for Stealth or Exploitation for Client Execution.

If an application is hosted on cloud-based infrastructure and/or is containerized, then exploiting it may lead to compromise of the underlying instance or container. This can allow an adversary a path to access the cloud or container APIs (e.g., via the Cloud Instance Metadata API), exploit container host access via Escape to Host, or take advantage of weak identity and access management policies.

Adversaries may also exploit edge network infrastructure and related appliances, specifically targeting devices that do not support robust host-based defenses.[8][9]

For websites and databases, the OWASP top 10 and CWE top 25 highlight the most common web-based vulnerabilities.[10][11]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupEnterprise

G0106: Rocke

Rocke is an alleged Chinese-speaking adversary whose primary objective appeared to be cryptojacking, or stealing victim system resources for the purposes of mining cryptocurrency. The name Rocke comes from the email address "rocke@live.cn" used to create the wallet which held collected cryptocurrency. Researchers have detected overlaps between Rocke and the Iron Cybercrime Group, though this attribution has not been confirmed.[1]

GroupEnterprise

G0027: Threat Group-3390

Threat Group-3390 is a Chinese threat group that has extensively used strategic Web compromises to target victims.[1] The group has been active since at least 2010 and has targeted organizations in the aerospace, government, defense, technology, energy, manufacturing and gambling/betting sectors.[2][3][4]

GroupEnterprise

G0046: FIN7

FIN7 is a financially-motivated threat group that has been active since 2013. FIN7 has targeted the retail, restaurant, hospitality, software, consulting, financial services, medical equipment, cloud services, media, food and beverage, transportation, pharmaceutical, and utilities industries in the United States. A portion of FIN7 was operated out of a front company called Combi Security and often used point-of-sale malware for targeting efforts. Since 2020, FIN7 shifted operations to big game hunting (BGH), including use of REvil ransomware and their own Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS), Darkside. FIN7 may be linked to the Carbanak Group, but multiple threat groups have been observed using Carbanak, leading these groups to be tracked separately.[1][2][3][4][5][6][7]

GroupEnterprise

G1056: TeamPCP

TeamPCP is a financially-motivated, cloud-native threat group that has been active since at least September 2025. Initially focused on ransomware and cryptocurrency theft, TeamPCP shifted in early 2026 to systematic, worm-driven credential theft and software supply chain attacks targeting Continuous Integration and Continuous Delivery (CI/CD) workflows. TeamPCP has monetized access through extortion and through partnerships with ransomware actors including Vect and CipherForce.[1][2][3][4][5][6]

GroupEnterprise

G1017: Volt Typhoon

Volt Typhoon is a People's Republic of China (PRC) state-sponsored actor that has been active since at least 2021, primarily targeting critical infrastructure organizations in the US and its territories including Guam. Volt Typhoon's targeting and pattern of behavior have been assessed as pre-positioning to enable lateral movement to operational technology (OT) assets for potential destructive or disruptive attacks. Volt Typhoon has emphasized stealth in operations using web shells, living-off-the-land (LOTL) binaries, hands on keyboard activities, and stolen credentials.[1][2][3][4]. The group has leveraged compromised SOHO routers to proxy command and control traffic and obscure its infrastructure, activity associated with the KV botnet.[5].

Reporting indicates a separate initial access cluster, SYLVANITE, has been observed exploiting internet-facing edge devices and transferring access to Volt Typhoon, also tracked as VOLTZITE, for follow-on operations. [6]

GroupEnterprise

G1055: VOID MANTICORE

VOID MANTICORE is a threat group assessed to operate on behalf of Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS).[1] Active since at least mid-2022, VOID MANTICORE has targeted government entities, critical infrastructure, and private sector organizations across Albania, Israel, and the United States.[1][2] VOID MANTICORE conducts destructive cyber operations, combining wiper attacks with hack-and-leak campaigns. The group has operated under multiple public-facing personas, including HomeLand Justice in operations against Albania, Karma and Karma Below in campaigns targeting Israeli organizations, and Handala Hack, its current primary persona, which has claimed activity against Israeli and U.S. entities, including a March 2026 attack against Stryker Corporation.[1][3] VOID MANTICORE has been observed collaborating with Scarred Manticore, which has been linked to initial access operations preceding VOID MANTICORE’s activity.[4]

GroupEnterprise

G0034: Sandworm Team

Sandworm Team is a destructive threat group that has been attributed to Russia's General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) Main Center for Special Technologies (GTsST) military unit 74455.[1][2] This group has been active since at least 2009.[3][4][5][6]

In October 2020, the US indicted six GRU Unit 74455 officers associated with Sandworm Team for the following cyber operations: the 2015 and 2016 attacks against Ukrainian electrical companies and government organizations, the 2017 worldwide NotPetya attack, targeting of the 2017 French presidential campaign, the 2018 Olympic Destroyer attack against the Winter Olympic Games, the 2018 operation against the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and attacks against the country of Georgia in 2018 and 2019.[1][2] Some of these were conducted with the assistance of GRU Unit 26165, which is also referred to as APT28.[7]

GroupEnterprise

G0007: APT28

APT28 is a threat group that has been attributed to Russia's General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) 85th Main Special Service Center (GTsSS) military unit 26165.[1][2] This group has been active since at least 2004.[3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13]

APT28 reportedly compromised the Hillary Clinton campaign, the Democratic National Committee, and the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee in 2016 in an attempt to interfere with the U.S. presidential election.[5] In 2018, the US indicted five GRU Unit 26165 officers associated with APT28 for cyber operations (including close-access operations) conducted between 2014 and 2018 against the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), the US Anti-Doping Agency, a US nuclear facility, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the Spiez Swiss Chemicals Laboratory, and other organizations.[14] Some of these were conducted with the assistance of GRU Unit 74455, which is also referred to as Sandworm Team.

GroupEnterprise

G0094: Kimsuky

Kimsuky is a Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)-based cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2012. The group initially targeted South Korean government agencies, think tanks, and subject-matter experts in various fields. Its operations expanded to include the United Nations and organizations in the government, education, business services, and manufacturing sectors across the United States, Japan, Russia, and Europe. Kimsuky has focused collection on foreign policy and national security issues tied to the Korean Peninsula, nuclear policy, and sanctions. Kimsuky operations have overlapped with those of other North Korean state-sponsored cyber espionage actors as a result of ad hoc collaborations or other limited resource sharing.[1][2][3][4][5][6]

Kimsuky was assessed to be responsible for the 2014 Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co. compromise; other notable campaigns include Operation STOLEN PENCIL (2018), Operation Kabar Cobra (2019), and Operation Smoke Screen (2019).[7][8][9] In 2023, Kimsuky was observed using commercial large language models (LLMs) to assist with vulnerability research, scripting, social engineering and reconnaissance.[10]

DPRK threat actor cluster boundaries overlap in open source reporting, with some security researchers consolidating all attributed North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under Lazarus Group, rather than tracking operationally distinct subgroups.

GroupEnterprise

G1003: Ember Bear

Ember Bear is a Russian state-sponsored cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2020, linked to Russia's General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) 161st Specialist Training Center (Unit 29155).[1] Ember Bear has primarily focused operations against Ukrainian government and telecommunication entities, but has also operated against critical infrastructure entities in Europe and the Americas.[2] Ember Bear conducted the WhisperGate destructive wiper attacks against Ukraine in early 2022.[3][4][1] There is some confusion as to whether Ember Bear overlaps with another Russian-linked entity referred to as Saint Bear. At present available evidence strongly suggests these are distinct activities with different behavioral profiles.[2][5]

GroupEnterprise

G0115: GOLD SOUTHFIELD

GOLD SOUTHFIELD is a financially motivated threat group active since at least 2018 that operates the REvil Ransomware-as-a Service (RaaS). GOLD SOUTHFIELD provides backend infrastructure for affiliates recruited on underground forums to perpetrate high value deployments. By early 2020, GOLD SOUTHFIELD started capitalizing on the new trend of stealing data and further extorting the victim to pay for their data to not get publicly leaked.[1][2][3][4]

ToolEnterprise

S0225: sqlmap

sqlmap is an open source penetration testing tool that can be used to automate the process of detecting and exploiting SQL injection flaws. [1]

MalwareEnterprise

S0412: ZxShell

ZxShell is a remote administration tool and backdoor that can be downloaded from the Internet, particularly from Chinese hacker websites. It has been used since at least 2004.[1][2]

Windows
MalwareEnterprise

S1105: COATHANGER

COATHANGER is a remote access tool (RAT) targeting FortiGate networking appliances. First used in 2023 in targeted intrusions against military and government entities in the Netherlands along with other victims, COATHANGER was disclosed in early 2024, with a high confidence assessment linking this malware to a state-sponsored entity in the People's Republic of China. COATHANGER is delivered after gaining access to a FortiGate device, with in-the-wild observations linked to exploitation of CVE-2022-42475. The name COATHANGER is based on a unique string in the malware used to encrypt configuration files on disk: “She took his coat and hung it up”.[1]

LinuxNetwork Devices
MalwareEnterprise

S1242: Qilin

Qilin is a ransomware family operated as a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) that has been active since at least 2022. It includes variants written in Go and Rust capable of targeting Windows, Linux, and VMware ESXi environments. Qilin shares functionality overlaps with Black Basta, REvil, and BlackCat ransomware. Qilin affiliates have targeted multiple entities worldwide with the majority of victims in the US, France, Canada, and the UK, primarily in the manufacturing, technology, financial services, and healthcare sectors.[1][2][3][4][5]

ESXiWindowsLinux
MalwareEnterprise

S1184: BOLDMOVE

BOLDMOVE is a type of backdoor malware written in C linked to People’s Republic of China operations from 2022 through 2023. BOLDMOVE includes both Windows and Linux variants, with some Linux variants specifically designed for FortiGate Firewall devices. BOLDMOVE is linked to zero-day exploitation of CVE-2022-42475 in FortiOSS SSL-VPNs.[1] The record for BOLDMOVE only covers known Linux variants.

LinuxNetwork Devices
ToolEnterprise

S0224: Havij

Havij is an automatic SQL Injection tool distributed by the Iranian ITSecTeam security company. Havij has been used by penetration testers and adversaries. [1]

CampaignEnterprise

C0062: Anthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign

The Anthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign was conducted in September 2025 by a likely China nexus espionage actor identified as GTG-1002. The Anthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign was a highly coordinated operation that manipulated Claude Code to perform reconnaissance, vulnerability discovery, exploitation, lateral movement, credential harvesting, data analysis, and exfiltration operations at approximately 30 entities in the technology, financial, chemical, and government sectors. During the Anthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign, human operators used Claude Code agents and Model Context Protocol (MCP) tools to automate cyber operations. Operators broke attacks into discrete tasks, used crafted prompts, and established personas to bypass AI guardrails, enabling the agents to execute the operations with minimal human involvement.[1][2]

CampaignEnterprise

C0027: C0027

C0027 was a financially-motivated campaign linked to Scattered Spider that targeted telecommunications and business process outsourcing (BPO) companies from at least June through December of 2022. During C0027 Scattered Spider used various forms of social engineering, performed SIM swapping, and attempted to leverage access from victim environments to mobile carrier networks.[1]

CampaignEnterprise

C0039: Versa Director Zero Day Exploitation

Versa Director Zero Day Exploitation was conducted by Volt Typhoon from early June through August 2024 as zero-day exploitation of Versa Director servers controlling software-defined wide area network (SD-WAN) applications. Since tracked as CVE-2024-39717, exploitation focused on credential capture from compromised Versa Director servers at managed service providers (MSPs) and internet service providers (ISPs) to enable follow-on access to service provider clients. Versa Director Zero Day Exploitation was followed by the delivery of the VersaMem web shell for both credential theft and follow-on code execution.[1]

CampaignEnterprise

C0045: ShadowRay

ShadowRay was a campaign that began in late 2023 targeting the education, cryptocurrency, biopharma, and other sectors through a vulnerability (CVE-2023-48022) in the Ray AI framework named ShadowRay. According to security researchers ShadowRay was the first known instance of AI workloads being activley exploited in the wild through vulnerabilities in AI infrastructure. CVE-2023-48022, which allows access to compute resources and sensitive data for exposed instances, remains unpatched and has been disputed by the vendor as they maintain that Ray is not intended for use outside of a strictly controlled network environment.[1]

CampaignEnterprise

C0018: C0018

C0018 was a month-long ransomware intrusion that successfully deployed AvosLocker onto a compromised network. The unidentified actors gained initial access to the victim network through an exposed server and used a variety of open-source tools prior to executing AvosLocker.[1][2]

CampaignEnterprise

C0014: Operation Wocao

Operation Wocao was a cyber espionage campaign that targeted organizations around the world, including in Brazil, China, France, Germany, Italy, Mexico, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The suspected China-based actors compromised government organizations and managed service providers, as well as aviation, construction, energy, finance, health care, insurance, offshore engineering, software development, and transportation companies.[1]

Security researchers assessed the Operation Wocao actors used similar TTPs and tools as APT20, suggesting a possible overlap. Operation Wocao was named after an observed command line entry by one of the threat actors, possibly out of frustration from losing webshell access.[1]

CampaignEnterprise

C0002: Night Dragon

Night Dragon was a cyber espionage campaign that targeted oil, energy, and petrochemical companies, along with individuals and executives in Kazakhstan, Taiwan, Greece, and the United States. The unidentified threat actors searched for information related to oil and gas field production systems, financials, and collected data from SCADA systems. Based on the observed techniques, tools, and network activities, security researchers assessed the campaign involved a threat group based in China.[1]

CampaignEnterprise

C0017: C0017

C0017 was an APT41 campaign conducted between May 2021 and February 2022 that successfully compromised at least six U.S. state government networks through the exploitation of vulnerable Internet facing web applications. During C0017, APT41 was quick to adapt and use publicly-disclosed as well as zero-day vulnerabilities for initial access, and in at least two cases re-compromised victims following remediation efforts. The goals of C0017 are unknown, however APT41 was observed exfiltrating Personal Identifiable Information (PII).[1]

CampaignEnterprise

C0064: AI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure

The AI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure is a campaign where human operators used Claude Code AI and OpenAI GPT GPT-4.1 AI to perform reconnaissance, vulnerability exploitation, privilege escalation, discovery, credential harvesting, and exfiltration operations. The attack impacted several Mexican government institutions including the Federal Tax Authority (Servicio de Administracion Tributaria), Mexico State Government (Estado de Mexico), Mexico City Civil Registry (Registro Civil de CDMX), Jalisco State Government, National Electoral Institute (Instituto Nacional Electoral), Michoacan State Government, SADM Monterrey Municipal Water Utility (Agua y Drenaje), Tamaulipas State Government, and the Mexico City Health Department (Salud CDMX). The attack resulted in the theft of large amounts of sensitive government data and civilian records. Please note that due to the breadth of this campaign, public reporting only provides select details and as a result this campaign should not be considered comprehensive.[1]

CampaignEnterprise

C0049: Leviathan Australian Intrusions

Leviathan Australian Intrusions consisted of at least two long-term intrusions against victims in Australia by Leviathan, relying on similar tradecraft such as external service exploitation followed by extensive credential capture and re-use to enable privilege escalation and lateral movement. Leviathan Australian Intrusions were focused on exfiltrating sensitive data including valid credentials for the victim organizations.[1]

CampaignEnterprise

C0038: HomeLand Justice

HomeLand Justice was a disruptive cyber campaign conducted by Iranian state-affiliated actors against Albanian government networks in July and September 2022. The activity combined ransomware, wiper malware, and data leak operations. Initial access for HomeLand Justice was established as early as May 2021, and threat actors moved laterally, exfiltrated sensitive information, and maintained persistence for approximately 14 months prior to the destructive phase of the operation. Responsibility was claimed by the "HomeLand Justice" front, which framed the campaign as retaliation against the Mujahedeen-e Khalq (MEK), an Iranian opposition group with a presence in Albania. Multiple Iran-nexus groups are assessed to have participated in the campaign, including HEXANE who probed victim infrastructure.[1][2][3] A second wave of attacks was launched in September 2022 using similar tactics following public attribution of the previous activity to Iran and the severing of diplomatic ties between Iran and Albania.[3]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · CampaignC0062: Anthropic AI-orchestrated CampaignEnterpriseuses · CampaignC0027: C0027Enterpriseuses · GroupG0106: RockeEnterpriseuses · CampaignC0039: Versa Director Zero Day ExploitationEnterpriseuses · CampaignC0045: ShadowRayEnterprisemitigates · MitigationM1048: Application Isolation and SandboxingEnterpriseuses · GroupG0027: Threat Group-3390Enterpriseuses · GroupG0046: FIN7Enterprisemitigates · MitigationM1037: Filter Network TrafficEnterpriseuses · CampaignC0018: C0018Enterpriseuses · GroupG1056: TeamPCPEnterpriseuses · MalwareS0623: SiloscapeEnterpriseuses · GroupG1017: Volt TyphoonEnterpriseuses · GroupG1055: VOID MANTICOREEnterpriseuses · GroupG0034: Sandworm TeamEnterpriseuses · GroupG0007: APT28Enterpriseuses · GroupG0094: KimsukyEnterpriseuses · GroupG1003: Ember BearEnterpriseuses · CampaignC0014: Operation WocaoEnterprisemitigates · MitigationM1030: Network SegmentationEnterpriseuses · CampaignC0002: Night DragonEnterpriseuses · CampaignC0017: C0017Enterpriseuses · GroupG0135: BackdoorDiplomacyEnterpriseuses · GroupG0115: GOLD SOUTHFIELDEnterprise
Mitigations

Mitigation direction

MitigationEnterprise

M1048: Application Isolation and Sandboxing

Application Isolation and Sandboxing refers to the technique of restricting the execution of code to a controlled and isolated environment (e.g., a virtual environment, container, or sandbox). This method prevents potentially malicious code from affecting the rest of the system or network by limiting access to sensitive resources and critical operations. The goal is to contain threats and minimize their impact. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures:

Browser Sandboxing:

- Use Case: Implement browser sandboxing to isolate untrusted web content and prevent malicious web pages or scripts from accessing sensitive system resources or initiating unauthorized downloads. - Implementation: Use browsers with built-in sandboxing features (e.g., Google Chrome, Microsoft Edge) or deploy enhanced browser security frameworks that limit the execution scope of active content. Consider controls that monitor or restrict script-based file generation and downloads commonly abused in evasion techniques like HTML smuggling.

Application Virtualization:

- Use Case: Deploy critical or high-risk applications in a virtualized environment to ensure any compromise does not affect the host system. - Implementation: Use application virtualization platforms to run applications in isolated environments.

Email Attachment Sandboxing:

- Use Case: Route email attachments to a sandbox environment to detect and block malware before delivering emails to end-users. - Implementation: Integrate security solutions with sandbox capabilities to analyze email attachments.

Endpoint Sandboxing:

- Use Case: Run all downloaded files and applications in a restricted environment to monitor their behavior for malicious activity. - Implementation: Use endpoint protection tools for sandboxing at the endpoint level.

MitigationEnterprise

M1037: Filter Network Traffic

Employ network appliances and endpoint software to filter ingress, egress, and lateral network traffic. This includes protocol-based filtering, enforcing firewall rules, and blocking or restricting traffic based on predefined conditions to limit adversary movement and data exfiltration. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures:

Ingress Traffic Filtering:

- Use Case: Configure network firewalls to allow traffic only from authorized IP addresses to public-facing servers. - Implementation: Limit SSH (port 22) and RDP (port 3389) traffic to specific IP ranges.

Egress Traffic Filtering:

- Use Case: Use firewalls or endpoint security software to block unauthorized outbound traffic to prevent data exfiltration and command-and-control (C2) communications. - Implementation: Block outbound traffic to known malicious IPs or regions where communication is unexpected.

Protocol-Based Filtering:

- Use Case: Restrict the use of specific protocols that are commonly abused by adversaries, such as SMB, RPC, or Telnet, based on business needs. - Implementation: Disable SMBv1 on endpoints to prevent exploits like EternalBlue.

Network Segmentation:

- Use Case: Create network segments for critical systems and restrict communication between segments unless explicitly authorized. - Implementation: Implement VLANs to isolate IoT devices or guest networks from core business systems.

Application Layer Filtering:

- Use Case: Use proxy servers or Web Application Firewalls (WAFs) to inspect and block malicious HTTP/S traffic. - Implementation: Configure a WAF to block SQL injection attempts or other web application exploitation techniques.

MitigationEnterprise

M1030: Network Segmentation

Network segmentation involves dividing a network into smaller, isolated segments to control and limit the flow of traffic between devices, systems, and applications. By segmenting networks, organizations can reduce the attack surface, restrict lateral movement by adversaries, and protect critical assets from compromise.

Effective network segmentation leverages a combination of physical boundaries, logical separation through VLANs, and access control policies enforced by network appliances like firewalls, routers, and cloud-based configurations. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures:

Segment Critical Systems:

- Identify and group systems based on their function, sensitivity, and risk. Examples include payment systems, HR databases, production systems, and internet-facing servers. - Use VLANs, firewalls, or routers to enforce logical separation.

Implement DMZ for Public-Facing Services:

- Host web servers, DNS servers, and email servers in a DMZ to limit their access to internal systems. - Apply strict firewall rules to filter traffic between the DMZ and internal networks.

Use Cloud-Based Segmentation:

- In cloud environments, use VPCs, subnets, and security groups to isolate applications and enforce traffic rules. - Apply AWS Transit Gateway or Azure VNet peering for controlled connectivity between cloud segments.

Apply Microsegmentation for Workloads:

- Use software-defined networking (SDN) tools to implement workload-level segmentation and prevent lateral movement.

Restrict Traffic with ACLs and Firewalls:

- Apply Access Control Lists (ACLs) to network devices to enforce "deny by default" policies. - Use firewalls to restrict both north-south (external-internal) and east-west (internal-internal) traffic.

Monitor and Audit Segmented Networks:

- Regularly review firewall rules, ACLs, and segmentation policies. - Monitor network flows for anomalies to ensure segmentation is effective.

Test Segmentation Effectiveness:

- Perform periodic penetration tests to verify that unauthorized access is blocked between network segments.

MitigationEnterprise

M1016: Vulnerability Scanning

Vulnerability scanning involves the automated or manual assessment of systems, applications, and networks to identify misconfigurations, unpatched software, or other security weaknesses. The process helps prioritize remediation efforts by classifying vulnerabilities based on risk and impact, reducing the likelihood of exploitation by adversaries. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures:

Proactive Identification of Vulnerabilities

- Implementation: Use tools like Nessus or OpenVAS to scan endpoints, servers, and applications for missing patches and configuration issues. Schedule regular scans to ensure timely identification of vulnerabilities introduced by new deployments or updates. - Use Case: A scan identifies unpatched software, such as outdated Apache servers, which could be exploited via CVE-XXXX-XXXX. The server is promptly patched, mitigating the risk.

Cloud Environment Scanning

- Implementation: Use cloud-specific vulnerability management tools like AWS Inspector, Azure Security Center, or GCP Security Command Center to identify issues like open S3 buckets or overly permissive IAM roles. - Use Case: The scan detects a misconfigured S3 bucket with public read access, which is remediated to prevent potential data leakage.

Network Device Scanning

- Implementation: Use tools to scan network devices for vulnerabilities, such as weak SNMP strings or outdated firmware. Correlate scan results with vendor advisories to prioritize updates. - Use Case: Scanning detects a router running outdated firmware vulnerable to CVE-XXXX-YYYY. The firmware is updated to a secure version.

Web Application Scanning

- Implementation: Use dynamic application security testing (DAST) tools such as OWASP ZAP or Burp Suite to scan for common vulnerabilities like SQL injection or cross-site scripting (XSS). Perform regular scans post-deployment to identify newly introduced vulnerabilities. - Use Case: A scan identifies a cross-site scripting vulnerability in a form input field, which is promptly remediated by developers.

Prioritizing Vulnerabilities

- Implementation: Use vulnerability scoring frameworks like CVSS to assess severity. Integrate vulnerability scanning tools with ticketing systems to assign remediation tasks based on criticality. - Use Case: A critical vulnerability with a CVSS score of 9.8 affecting remote access servers is prioritized and patched first.

*Tools for Implementation*

Open Source Tools:

- OpenVAS: Comprehensive network and system vulnerability scanning. - OWASP ZAP: Dynamic scanning of web applications for vulnerabilities. - Nmap with NSE Scripts: Network scanning with scripts to detect vulnerabilities.

MitigationEnterprise

M1026: Privileged Account Management

Privileged Account Management focuses on implementing policies, controls, and tools to securely manage privileged accounts (e.g., SYSTEM, root, or administrative accounts). This includes restricting access, limiting the scope of permissions, monitoring privileged account usage, and ensuring accountability through logging and auditing.This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures:

Account Permissions and Roles:

- Implement RBAC and least privilege principles to allocate permissions securely. - Use tools like Active Directory Group Policies to enforce access restrictions.

Credential Security:

- Deploy password vaulting tools like CyberArk, HashiCorp Vault, or KeePass for secure storage and rotation of credentials. - Enforce password policies for complexity, uniqueness, and expiration using tools like Microsoft Group Policy Objects (GPO).

Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA):

- Enforce MFA for all privileged accounts using Duo Security, Okta, or Microsoft Azure AD MFA.

Privileged Access Management (PAM):

- Use PAM solutions like CyberArk, BeyondTrust, or Thycotic to manage, monitor, and audit privileged access.

Auditing and Monitoring:

- Integrate activity monitoring into your SIEM (e.g., Splunk or QRadar) to detect and alert on anomalous privileged account usage.

Just-In-Time Access:

- Deploy JIT solutions like Azure Privileged Identity Management (PIM) or configure ephemeral roles in AWS and GCP to grant time-limited elevated permissions.

*Tools for Implementation*

Privileged Access Management (PAM):

- CyberArk, BeyondTrust, Thycotic, HashiCorp Vault.

Credential Management:

- Microsoft LAPS (Local Admin Password Solution), Password Safe, HashiCorp Vault, KeePass.

Multi-Factor Authentication:

- Duo Security, Okta, Microsoft Azure MFA, Google Authenticator.

Linux Privilege Management:

- sudo configuration, SELinux, AppArmor.

Just-In-Time Access:

- Azure Privileged Identity Management (PIM), AWS IAM Roles with session constraints, GCP Identity-Aware Proxy.

MitigationEnterprise

M1050: Exploit Protection

Deploy capabilities that detect, block, and mitigate conditions indicative of software exploits. These capabilities aim to prevent exploitation by addressing vulnerabilities, monitoring anomalous behaviors, and applying exploit-mitigation techniques to harden systems and software.

Operating System Exploit Protections:

- Use Case: Enable built-in exploit protection features provided by modern operating systems, such as Microsoft's Exploit Protection, which includes techniques like Data Execution Prevention (DEP), Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR), and Control Flow Guard (CFG). - Implementation: Enforce DEP for all programs and enable ASLR to randomize memory addresses used by system and application processes. Windows: Configure Exploit Protection through the Windows Security app or deploy settings via Group Policy. `ExploitProtectionExportSettings.exe -path "exploit_settings.xml"` Linux: Use Kernel-level hardening features like SELinux, AppArmor, or GRSEC to enforce memory protections and prevent exploits.

Third-Party Endpoint Security:

- Use Case: Use endpoint protection tools with built-in exploit protection, such as enhanced memory protection, behavior monitoring, and real-time exploit detection. - Implementation: Deploy tools to detect and block exploitation attempts targeting unpatched software.

Virtual Patching: - Use Case: Use tools to implement virtual patches that mitigate vulnerabilities in applications or operating systems until official patches are applied. - Implementation: Use Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) to block exploitation attempts on known vulnerabilities in outdated applications.

Hardening Application Configurations:

- Use Case: Disable risky application features that can be exploited, such as macros in Microsoft Office or JScript in Internet Explorer. - Implementation: Configure Microsoft Office Group Policies to disable execution of macros in downloaded files.

MitigationEnterprise

M1035: Limit Access to Resource Over Network

Restrict access to network resources, such as file shares, remote systems, and services, to only those users, accounts, or systems with a legitimate business requirement. This can include employing technologies like network concentrators, RDP gateways, and zero-trust network access (ZTNA) models, alongside hardening services and protocols. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures:

Audit and Restrict Access:

- Regularly audit permissions for file shares, network services, and remote access tools. - Remove unnecessary access and enforce least privilege principles for users and services. - Use Active Directory and IAM tools to restrict access based on roles and attributes.

Deploy Secure Remote Access Solutions:

- Use RDP gateways, VPN concentrators, and ZTNA solutions to aggregate and secure remote access connections. - Configure access controls to restrict connections based on time, device, and user identity. - Enforce MFA for all remote access mechanisms.

Disable Unnecessary Services:

- Identify running services using tools like netstat (Windows/Linux) or Nmap. - Disable unused services, such as Telnet, FTP, and legacy SMB, to reduce the attack surface. - Use firewall rules to block traffic on unused ports and protocols.

Network Segmentation and Isolation:

- Use VLANs, firewalls, or micro-segmentation to isolate critical network resources from general access. - Restrict communication between subnets to prevent lateral movement.

Monitor and Log Access:

- Monitor access attempts to file shares, RDP, and remote network resources using SIEM tools. - Enable auditing and logging for successful and failed attempts to access restricted resources.

*Tools for Implementation*

File Share Management:

- Microsoft Active Directory Group Policies - Samba (Linux/Unix file share management) - AccessEnum (Windows access auditing tool)

Secure Remote Access:

- Microsoft Remote Desktop Gateway - Apache Guacamole (open-source RDP/VNC gateway) - Zero Trust solutions: Tailscale, Cloudflare Zero Trust

Service and Protocol Hardening:

- Nmap or Nessus for network service discovery - Windows Group Policy Editor for disabling SMBv1, Telnet, and legacy protocols - iptables or firewalld (Linux) for blocking unnecessary traffic

Network Segmentation:

- pfSense for open-source network isolation

MitigationEnterprise

M1051: Update Software

Software updates ensure systems are protected against known vulnerabilities by applying patches and upgrades provided by vendors. Regular updates reduce the attack surface and prevent adversaries from exploiting known security gaps. This includes patching operating systems, applications, drivers, and firmware. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures:

Regular Operating System Updates

- Implementation: Apply the latest Windows security updates monthly using WSUS (Windows Server Update Services) or a similar patch management solution. Configure systems to check for updates automatically and schedule reboots during maintenance windows. - Use Case: Prevents exploitation of OS vulnerabilities such as privilege escalation or remote code execution.

Application Patching

- Implementation: Monitor Apache's update release notes for security patches addressing vulnerabilities. Schedule updates for off-peak hours to avoid downtime while maintaining security compliance. - Use Case: Prevents exploitation of web application vulnerabilities, such as those leading to unauthorized access or data breaches.

Firmware Updates

- Implementation: Regularly check the vendor’s website for firmware updates addressing vulnerabilities. Plan for update deployment during scheduled maintenance to minimize business disruption. - Use Case: Protects against vulnerabilities that adversaries could exploit to gain access to network devices or inject malicious traffic.

Emergency Patch Deployment

- Implementation: Use the emergency patch deployment feature of the organization's patch management tool to apply updates to all affected Exchange servers within 24 hours. - Use Case: Reduces the risk of exploitation by rapidly addressing critical vulnerabilities.

Centralized Patch Management

- Implementation: Implement a centralized patch management system, such as SCCM or ManageEngine, to automate and track patch deployment across all environments. Generate regular compliance reports to ensure all systems are updated. - Use Case: Streamlines patching processes and ensures no critical systems are missed.

*Tools for Implementation*

Patch Management Tools:

- WSUS: Manage and deploy Microsoft updates across the organization. - ManageEngine Patch Manager Plus: Automate patch deployment for OS and third-party apps. - Ansible: Automate updates across multiple platforms, including Linux and Windows.

Vulnerability Scanning Tools:

- OpenVAS: Open-source vulnerability scanning to identify missing patches.

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
20.0
Object version
2.8
Created
Modified
Raw hash
cff23fc3490cd00c...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(3)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
20.02.8Current bundlecff23fc3490c…
19.22.8Older bundlecff23fc3490c…
19.12.8Older bundlecff23fc3490c…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

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    NVD CVE-2016-6662

    National Vulnerability Database. (2017, February 2). CVE-2016-6662 Detail. Retrieved April 3, 2018.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    CIS Multiple SMB Vulnerabilities

    CIS. (2017, May 15). Multiple Vulnerabilities in Microsoft Windows SMB Server Could Allow for Remote Code Execution. Retrieved April 3, 2018.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    US-CERT TA18-106A Network Infrastructure Devices 2018

    US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks

    Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    NVD CVE-2014-7169

    National Vulnerability Database. (2017, September 24). CVE-2014-7169 Detail. Retrieved April 3, 2018.

    Open source URL
  6. [6]
    Recorded Future ESXiArgs Ransomware 2023

    German Hoeffner, Aaron Soehnen and Gianni Perez. (2023, February 7). ESXiArgs Ransomware Targets Publicly-Exposed ESXi OpenSLP Servers. Retrieved March 26, 2025.

    Open source URL
  7. [7]
    Ars Technica VMWare Code Execution Vulnerability 2021

    Dan Goodin . (2021, February 25). Code-execution flaw in VMware has a severity rating of 9.8 out of 10. Retrieved April 8, 2025.

    Open source URL
  8. [8]
    Mandiant Fortinet Zero Day

    Marvi, A. et al.. (2023, March 16). Fortinet Zero-Day and Custom Malware Used by Suspected Chinese Actor in Espionage Operation. Retrieved March 22, 2023.

    Open source URL
  9. [9]
    Wired Russia Cyberwar

    Greenberg, A. (2022, November 10). Russia’s New Cyberwarfare in Ukraine Is Fast, Dirty, and Relentless. Retrieved March 22, 2023.

    Open source URL
  10. [10]
    OWASP Top 10

    OWASP. (2018, February 23). OWASP Top Ten Project. Retrieved April 3, 2018.

    Open source URL
  11. [11]
    CWE top 25

    Christey, S., Brown, M., Kirby, D., Martin, B., Paller, A.. (2011, September 13). 2011 CWE/SANS Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Errors. Retrieved April 10, 2019.

    Open source URL
  12. [12]
    mitre-attackT1190
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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