T1070.009: Clear Persistence
Adversaries may clear artifacts associated with previously established persistence on a host system to remove evidence of their activity. This may involve various actions, such as removing services, deleting executables, Modify Registry, Plist File Modification, or other methods of cleanup to prevent defenders from collecting evidence of their persistent presence.[1] Adversaries may also delete accounts previously created to maintain persistence (i.e. Create Account).[2]
In some instances, artifacts of persistence may also be removed once an adversary’s persistence is executed in order to prevent errors with the new instance of the malware.[3]
Security context for executives and security teams
T1070.009: Clear Persistence describes Adversaries may clear artifacts associated with previously established persistence on a host system to remove evidence of their activity. This may involve various actions, such as removing services, deleting executables, [Modify Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112), [Plist File Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1647), or other methods of cleanup to prevent defenders from collecting evidence of their persistent presence.(Citation: Cylance Dust Storm) Adversaries may also delete accou...
Executive priority
T1070.009: Clear Persistence is an official MITRE ATT&CK technique. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate T1070.009: Clear Persistence by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (stealth), supported platforms (ESXi, Linux, macOS, Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether T1070.009: Clear Persistence appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Clear Persistence
Adversaries may clear artifacts associated with previously established persistence on a host system to remove evidence of their activity. This may involve various actions, such as removing services, deleting executables, Modify Registry, Plist File Modification, or other methods of cleanup to prevent defenders from collecting evidence of their persistent presence.[1] Adversaries may also delete accounts previously created to maintain persistence (i.e. Create Account).[2]
In some instances, artifacts of persistence may also be removed once an adversary’s persistence is executed in order to prevent errors with the new instance of the malware.[3]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Related techniques
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1070 | Indicator Removal | This object subtechnique of Indicator Removal. |
Groups, software, and campaigns
G1045: Salt Typhoon
Salt Typhoon is a People's Republic of China (PRC) state-backed actor that has been active since at least 2019 and responsible for numerous compromises of network infrastructure at major U.S. telecommunication and internet service providers (ISP). Salt Typhoon has targeted and leveraged public facing network edge devices to gain access to victim environments. Salt Typhoon has been publicly associated with activities resembling other security industry reported activity groups to include OPERATOR PANDA, RedMike, GhostEmperor, and UNC5807.[1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8]
S0559: SUNBURST
S0500: MCMD
S0534: Bazar
Bazar is a downloader and backdoor that has been used since at least April 2020, with infections primarily against professional services, healthcare, manufacturing, IT, logistics and travel companies across the US and Europe. Bazar reportedly has ties to TrickBot campaigns and can be used to deploy additional malware, including ransomware, and to steal sensitive data.[1]
S1132: IPsec Helper
IPsec Helper is a post-exploitation remote access tool linked to Agrius operations. This malware shares significant programming and functional overlaps with Apostle ransomware, also linked to Agrius. IPsec Helper provides basic remote access tool functionality such as uploading files from victim systems, running commands, and deploying additional payloads.[1]
S0013: PlugX
S9046: IOControl
IOControl is a malware that targeted Linux ARM-based IoT/OT devices including Hikvision IP cameras, D-Link firewalls and routers, Unitronics PLCs and HMIs, Orpak and Gasboy fuel management systems, and Baicells LTE controllers across the United States and Israel. The malware has been attributed to CyberAv3ngers which is suspected to be affiliated with the Iranian Government Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).[1][2][3]
S0517: Pillowmint
Pillowmint is a point-of-sale malware used by FIN7 designed to capture credit card information.[1]
S0083: Misdat
Misdat is a backdoor that was used in Operation Dust Storm from 2010 to 2011.[1]
S1190: Kapeka
Kapeka is a backdoor written in C++ used against victims in Eastern Europe since at least mid-2022. Kapeka has technical overlaps with Exaramel for Windows and Prestige malware variants, both of which are linked to Sandworm Team. Kapeka may have been used in advance of Prestige deployment in late 2022.[1][2]
S0085: S-Type
S-Type is a backdoor that was used in Operation Dust Storm since at least 2013.[1]
S0385: njRAT
S0669: KOCTOPUS
All related ATT&CK context
Mitigation direction
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(3)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 20.0 | 2.0 | Current bundle | 4bdef41d6ab4… | ||
| 19.2 | 2.0 | Older bundle | 4bdef41d6ab4… | ||
| 19.1 | 2.0 | Older bundle | 4bdef41d6ab4… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Cylance Dust Storm
Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved December 22, 2021.
Open source URL - [2]Talos - Cisco Attack 2022
Nick Biasini. (2022, August 10). Cisco Talos shares insights related to recent cyber attack on Cisco. Retrieved March 9, 2023.
Open source URL - [3]NCC Group Team9 June 2020
Pantazopoulos, N. (2020, June 2). In-depth analysis of the new Team9 malware family. Retrieved December 1, 2020.
Open source URL - [4]mitre-attackT1070.009Open source URL
Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.