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MITRE ATT&CK® Technique

T1110.001: Password Guessing

Adversaries with no prior knowledge of legitimate credentials within the system or environment may guess passwords to attempt access to accounts. Without knowledge of the password for an account, an adversary may opt to systematically guess the password using a repetitive or iterative mechanism. An adversary may guess login credentials without prior knowledge of system or environment passwords during an operation by using a list of common passwords. Password guessing may or may not take into account the target's policies on password complexity or use policies that may lock accounts out after a number of failed attempts.

Guessing passwords can be a risky option because it could cause numerous authentication failures and account lockouts, depending on the organization's login failure policies. [1]

Typically, management services over commonly used ports are used when guessing passwords. Commonly targeted services include the following:

* SSH (22/TCP) * Telnet (23/TCP) * FTP (21/TCP) * NetBIOS / SMB / Samba (139/TCP & 445/TCP) * LDAP (389/TCP) * Kerberos (88/TCP) * RDP / Terminal Services (3389/TCP) * HTTP/HTTP Management Services (80/TCP & 443/TCP) * MSSQL (1433/TCP) * Oracle (1521/TCP) * MySQL (3306/TCP) * VNC (5900/TCP) * SNMP (161/UDP and 162/TCP/UDP)

In addition to management services, adversaries may "target single sign-on (SSO) and cloud-based applications utilizing federated authentication protocols," as well as externally facing email applications, such as Office 365.[2]. Further, adversaries may abuse network device interfaces (such as `wlanAPI`) to brute force accessible wifi-router(s) via wireless authentication protocols.[3]

In default environments, LDAP and Kerberos connection attempts are less likely to trigger events over SMB, which creates Windows "logon failure" event ID 4625.

EnterpriseT1110.001Sub-techniqueObject v1.7Modified
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceHigh

Password Guessing matters because it turns weak or predictable passwords into a direct path to account access across many business-critical entry points: identity providers, SaaS and office platforms, cloud services, VPN-like management interfaces, servers, network devices, ESXi, containers, and traditional Windows/Linux/macOS services. For leaders, the practical issue is not only whether passwords are “strong,” but whether the organization can see repeated authentication failures across all major login surfaces before account lockouts, service disruption, or unauthorized access create an incident.

Executive priority

Treat this as an identity and access resilience issue, not just a password hygiene problem. The ATT&CK object spans enterprise platforms including Identity Provider, IaaS, SaaS, Office Suite, network devices, ESXi, containers, and operating systems, so ownership often crosses IAM, cloud, infrastructure, SOC, and compliance teams. Executives should ask: which externally reachable and privileged services still rely heavily on passwords; where MFA, password policy, and account-use policy are enforced; and whether audit evidence proves failed-login monitoring is complete across cloud, SSO, email, remote administration, and legacy protocols.

Technical view

This is a credential-access sub-technique of Brute Force focused on attempts to guess unknown passwords through repetitive or iterative logins. ATT&CK notes commonly targeted services such as SSH, Telnet, FTP, SMB/Samba, LDAP, Kerberos, RDP, HTTP/HTTPS management services, MSSQL, Oracle, MySQL, VNC, and SNMP, as well as SSO, federated cloud applications, externally facing email applications, and network device interfaces. Because no official detection text is provided, SOC teams should validate coverage using the related detection strategy DET0551: multi-source authentication failure correlation. A key ATT&CK-noted blind spot is that LDAP and Kerberos attempts may be less likely than SMB to produce Windows logon failure event ID 4625 in default environments, so Windows event monitoring alone may be insufficient.

Likely telemetry

  • Identity provider and SSO authentication success/failure logs
  • SaaS and office suite sign-in logs, including externally facing email applications
  • Cloud/IaaS control-plane authentication logs
  • Windows security logs, including logon failure events where generated
  • LDAP and Kerberos authentication telemetry

Detection direction

  • Validate multi-source correlation for repeated authentication failures by account, source, destination service, protocol, geography/network location, and time window.
  • Do not rely only on Windows event ID 4625; ATT&CK specifically notes LDAP and Kerberos attempts may be less visible than SMB in default environments.
  • Tune detections to distinguish password guessing from normal user error, password changes, expired credentials, service account misconfiguration, vulnerability scanning, and administrative testing.
  • Prioritize visibility for internet-facing authentication surfaces, SSO/federated authentication, office/email applications, remote management protocols, and privileged or high-value accounts.
  • Use relationship context from ATT&CK to inform threat modeling: multiple groups and software entries are associated with this technique, but local telemetry is required to determine relevance or exposure.

Mitigation priorities

  • Enforce strong password policies as represented by M1027, including complexity, length, history, and reuse prevention where supported by the environment.
  • Apply MFA as represented by M1032, prioritizing privileged accounts, externally accessible services, SSO/cloud applications, and remote administration paths.
  • Use account use policies as represented by M1036, including lockout or throttling behavior, login restrictions, and inactivity controls, while balancing business continuity risks from excessive lockouts.
  • Keep exposed services, operating systems, applications, drivers, and firmware updated in line with M1051 to reduce the broader attack surface around authentication services and management interfaces.
  • Review which legacy or management protocols are exposed and whether monitoring, MFA, password policy, and account restrictions are consistently enforced across them.
Additional notes and limits

ATT&CK provides no official detection narrative for this sub-technique, but the related DET0551 detection strategy supports a correlation-led approach across authentication sources. The relationship set includes several groups and software entries that use Password Guessing, which supports prioritizing this behavior in threat models, but it should not be interpreted as evidence of active targeting in any specific environment.

This take is based only on the supplied ATT&CK STIX fields, external references, and relationships. It does not establish that any organization is exposed, compromised, or covered by detection. Actual risk depends on local service exposure, authentication architecture, password and MFA enforcement, logging configuration, retention, and SOC correlation maturity.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Password Guessing

Adversaries with no prior knowledge of legitimate credentials within the system or environment may guess passwords to attempt access to accounts. Without knowledge of the password for an account, an adversary may opt to systematically guess the password using a repetitive or iterative mechanism. An adversary may guess login credentials without prior knowledge of system or environment passwords during an operation by using a list of common passwords. Password guessing may or may not take into account the target's policies on password complexity or use policies that may lock accounts out after a number of failed attempts.

Guessing passwords can be a risky option because it could cause numerous authentication failures and account lockouts, depending on the organization's login failure policies. [1]

Typically, management services over commonly used ports are used when guessing passwords. Commonly targeted services include the following:

* SSH (22/TCP) * Telnet (23/TCP) * FTP (21/TCP) * NetBIOS / SMB / Samba (139/TCP & 445/TCP) * LDAP (389/TCP) * Kerberos (88/TCP) * RDP / Terminal Services (3389/TCP) * HTTP/HTTP Management Services (80/TCP & 443/TCP) * MSSQL (1433/TCP) * Oracle (1521/TCP) * MySQL (3306/TCP) * VNC (5900/TCP) * SNMP (161/UDP and 162/TCP/UDP)

In addition to management services, adversaries may "target single sign-on (SSO) and cloud-based applications utilizing federated authentication protocols," as well as externally facing email applications, such as Office 365.[2]. Further, adversaries may abuse network device interfaces (such as `wlanAPI`) to brute force accessible wifi-router(s) via wireless authentication protocols.[3]

In default environments, LDAP and Kerberos connection attempts are less likely to trigger events over SMB, which creates Windows "logon failure" event ID 4625.

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Related techniques

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

1 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1110Brute ForceThis object subtechnique of Brute Force.
Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupEnterprise

G1055: VOID MANTICORE

VOID MANTICORE is a threat group assessed to operate on behalf of Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS).[1] Active since at least mid-2022, VOID MANTICORE has targeted government entities, critical infrastructure, and private sector organizations across Albania, Israel, and the United States.[1][2] VOID MANTICORE conducts destructive cyber operations, combining wiper attacks with hack-and-leak campaigns. The group has operated under multiple public-facing personas, including HomeLand Justice in operations against Albania, Karma and Karma Below in campaigns targeting Israeli organizations, and Handala Hack, its current primary persona, which has claimed activity against Israeli and U.S. entities, including a March 2026 attack against Stryker Corporation.[1][3] VOID MANTICORE has been observed collaborating with Scarred Manticore, which has been linked to initial access operations preceding VOID MANTICORE’s activity.[4]

GroupEnterprise

G0007: APT28

APT28 is a threat group that has been attributed to Russia's General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) 85th Main Special Service Center (GTsSS) military unit 26165.[1][2] This group has been active since at least 2004.[3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13]

APT28 reportedly compromised the Hillary Clinton campaign, the Democratic National Committee, and the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee in 2016 in an attempt to interfere with the U.S. presidential election.[5] In 2018, the US indicted five GRU Unit 26165 officers associated with APT28 for cyber operations (including close-access operations) conducted between 2014 and 2018 against the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), the US Anti-Doping Agency, a US nuclear facility, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the Spiez Swiss Chemicals Laboratory, and other organizations.[14] Some of these were conducted with the assistance of GRU Unit 74455, which is also referred to as Sandworm Team.

GroupEnterprise

G0016: APT29

APT29 is threat group that has been attributed to Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR).[1][2] They have operated since at least 2008, often targeting government networks in Europe and NATO member countries, research institutes, and think tanks. APT29 reportedly compromised the Democratic National Committee starting in the summer of 2015.[3][4][5][6]

In April 2021, the US and UK governments attributed the SolarWinds Compromise to the SVR; public statements included citations to APT29, Cozy Bear, and The Dukes.[7][8] Industry reporting also referred to the actors involved in this campaign as UNC2452, NOBELIUM, StellarParticle, Dark Halo, and SolarStorm.[9][10][11][12][13][14]

MalwareEnterprise

S0367: Emotet

Emotet is a modular malware variant which is primarily used as a downloader for other malware variants such as TrickBot and IcedID. Emotet first emerged in June 2014, initially targeting the financial sector, and has expanded to multiple verticals over time.[1]

Windows
MalwareEnterprise

S0374: SpeakUp

SpeakUp is a Trojan backdoor that targets both Linux and OSX devices. It was first observed in January 2019. [1]

LinuxmacOS
ToolEnterprise

S0488: CrackMapExec

CrackMapExec, or CME, is a post-exploitation tool developed in Python and designed for penetration testing against networks. CrackMapExec collects Active Directory information to conduct lateral movement through targeted networks.[1]

Windows
MalwareEnterprise

S0532: Lucifer

Lucifer is a crypto miner and DDoS hybrid malware that leverages well-known exploits to spread laterally on Windows platforms.[1]

Windows
MalwareEnterprise

S0453: Pony

Pony is a credential stealing malware, though has also been used among adversaries for its downloader capabilities. The source code for Pony Loader 1.0 and 2.0 were leaked online, leading to their use by various threat actors.[1]

Windows
MalwareEnterprise

S0341: Xbash

Xbash is a malware family that has targeted Linux and Microsoft Windows servers. The malware has been tied to the Iron Group, a threat actor group known for previous ransomware attacks. Xbash was developed in Python and then converted into a self-contained Linux ELF executable by using PyInstaller.[1]

WindowsLinux
Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Mitigations

Mitigation direction

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
1.7
Created
Modified
Raw hash
6b30f9682b42b911...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(1)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.11.7Current bundle6b30f9682b42…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Cylance Cleaver

    Cylance. (2014, December). Operation Cleaver. Retrieved September 14, 2017.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    US-CERT TA18-068A 2018

    US-CERT. (2018, March 27). TA18-068A Brute Force Attacks Conducted by Cyber Actors. Retrieved October 2, 2019.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    Trend Micro Emotet 2020

    Cybercrime & Digital Threat Team. (2020, February 13). Emotet Now Spreads via Wi-Fi. Retrieved February 16, 2022.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    FireEye Periscope March 2018

    FireEye. (2018, March 16). Suspected Chinese Cyber Espionage Group (TEMP.Periscope) Targeting U.S. Engineering and Maritime Industries. Retrieved April 11, 2018.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    Domain Tools Handala Hack Karma Homeland Justice MOIS April 2026

    DomainTools Investigations. (2026, April 6). Handala: MOIS Linked Cyber Influence Ecosystem Threat Intelligence Assessment. Retrieved April 20, 2026.

    Open source URL
  6. [6]
    Malwarebytes Emotet Dec 2017

    Smith, A.. (2017, December 22). Protect your network from Emotet Trojan with Malwarebytes Endpoint Security. Retrieved January 17, 2019.

    Open source URL
  7. [7]
    Symantec Emotet Jul 2018

    Symantec. (2018, July 18). The Evolution of Emotet: From Banking Trojan to Threat Distributor. Retrieved March 25, 2019.

    Open source URL
  8. [8]
    US-CERT Emotet Jul 2018

    US-CERT. (2018, July 20). Alert (TA18-201A) Emotet Malware. Retrieved March 25, 2019.

    Open source URL
  9. [9]
    Secureworks Emotet Nov 2018

    Mclellan, M.. (2018, November 19). Lazy Passwords Become Rocket Fuel for Emotet SMB Spreader. Retrieved March 25, 2019.

    Open source URL
  10. [10]
    CIS Emotet Dec 2018

    CIS. (2018, December 12). MS-ISAC Security Primer- Emotet. Retrieved March 25, 2019.

    Open source URL
  11. [11]
    Binary Defense Emotes Wi-Fi Spreader

    Binary Defense. (n.d.). Emotet Evolves With new Wi-Fi Spreader. Retrieved September 8, 2023.

    Open source URL
  12. [12]
    CheckPoint SpeakUp Feb 2019

    Check Point Research. (2019, February 4). SpeakUp: A New Undetected Backdoor Linux Trojan. Retrieved April 17, 2019.

    Open source URL
  13. [13]
    Microsoft STRONTIUM New Patterns Cred Harvesting Sept 2020

    Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC). (2020, September 10). STRONTIUM: Detecting new patterns in credential harvesting. Retrieved September 11, 2020.

    Open source URL
  14. [14]
    Cybersecurity Advisory GRU Brute Force Campaign July 2021

    NSA, CISA, FBI, NCSC. (2021, July). Russian GRU Conducting Global Brute Force Campaign to Compromise Enterprise and Cloud Environments. Retrieved July 26, 2021.

    Open source URL
  15. [15]
    CME Github September 2018

    byt3bl33d3r. (2018, September 8). SMB: Command Reference. Retrieved July 17, 2020.

    Open source URL
  16. [16]
    ESET Hermetic Wizard March 2022

    ESET. (2022, March 1). IsaacWiper and HermeticWizard: New wiper and worm targetingUkraine. Retrieved April 10, 2022.

    Open source URL
  17. [17]
    NIST 800-63-3

    Grassi, P., et al. (2017, December 1). SP 800-63-3, Digital Identity Guidelines. Retrieved January 16, 2019.

    Open source URL
  18. [18]
    Microsoft Common Conditional Access Policies

    Microsoft. (2022, December 14). Conditional Access templates. Retrieved February 21, 2023.

    Open source URL
  19. [19]
    Okta Block Anonymizing Services

    Moussa Diallo and Brett Winterford. (2024, April 26). How to Block Anonymizing Services using Okta. Retrieved May 28, 2024.

    Open source URL
  20. [20]
    Mandiant APT29 Microsoft 365 2022

    Douglas Bienstock. (2022, August 18). You Can’t Audit Me: APT29 Continues Targeting Microsoft 365. Retrieved February 23, 2023.

    Open source URL
  21. [21]
    Unit 42 Lucifer June 2020

    Hsu, K. et al. (2020, June 24). Lucifer: New Cryptojacking and DDoS Hybrid Malware Exploiting High and Critical Vulnerabilities to Infect Windows Devices. Retrieved November 16, 2020.

    Open source URL
  22. [22]
    Malwarebytes Pony April 2016

    hasherezade. (2016, April 11). No money, but Pony! From a mail to a trojan horse. Retrieved May 21, 2020.

    Open source URL
  23. [23]
    Unit42 Xbash Sept 2018

    Xiao, C. (2018, September 17). Xbash Combines Botnet, Ransomware, Coinmining in Worm that Targets Linux and Windows. Retrieved November 14, 2018.

    Open source URL
  24. [24]
    Trend Micro Xbash Sept 2018

    Trend Micro. (2018, September 19). New Multi-Platform Xbash Packs Obfuscation, Ransomware, Coinminer, Worm and Botnet. Retrieved June 4, 2019.

    Open source URL
  25. [25]
    ANSSI Sandworm January 2021

    ANSSI. (2021, January 27). SANDWORM INTRUSION SET CAMPAIGN TARGETING CENTREON SYSTEMS. Retrieved March 30, 2021.

    Open source URL
  26. [26]
    Cylance Cleaver

    Cylance. (2014, December). Operation Cleaver. Retrieved September 14, 2017.

    Open source URL
  27. [27]
    Cylance Cleaver

    Cylance. (2014, December). Operation Cleaver. Retrieved September 14, 2017.

    Open source URL
  28. [28]
    Trend Micro Emotet 2020

    Cybercrime & Digital Threat Team. (2020, February 13). Emotet Now Spreads via Wi-Fi. Retrieved February 16, 2022.

    Open source URL
  29. [29]
    Trend Micro Emotet 2020

    Cybercrime & Digital Threat Team. (2020, February 13). Emotet Now Spreads via Wi-Fi. Retrieved February 16, 2022.

    Open source URL
  30. [30]
    US-CERT TA18-068A 2018

    US-CERT. (2018, March 27). TA18-068A Brute Force Attacks Conducted by Cyber Actors. Retrieved October 2, 2019.

    Open source URL
  31. [31]
    US-CERT TA18-068A 2018

    US-CERT. (2018, March 27). TA18-068A Brute Force Attacks Conducted by Cyber Actors. Retrieved October 2, 2019.

    Open source URL
  32. [32]
    mitre-attackT1110.001
    Open source URL
  33. [33]
    mitre-attackT1110.001
    Open source URL
  34. [34]
    mitre-attackT1110.001
    Open source URL
  35. [35]
    FireEye Periscope March 2018

    FireEye. (2018, March 16). Suspected Chinese Cyber Espionage Group (TEMP.Periscope) Targeting U.S. Engineering and Maritime Industries. Retrieved April 11, 2018.

    Open source URL
  36. [36]
    Domain Tools Handala Hack Karma Homeland Justice MOIS April 2026

    DomainTools Investigations. (2026, April 6). Handala: MOIS Linked Cyber Influence Ecosystem Threat Intelligence Assessment. Retrieved April 20, 2026.

    Open source URL
  37. [37]
    Binary Defense Emotes Wi-Fi Spreader

    Binary Defense. (n.d.). Emotet Evolves With new Wi-Fi Spreader. Retrieved September 8, 2023.

    Open source URL
  38. [38]
    CIS Emotet Dec 2018

    CIS. (2018, December 12). MS-ISAC Security Primer- Emotet. Retrieved March 25, 2019.

    Open source URL
  39. [39]
    Malwarebytes Emotet Dec 2017

    Smith, A.. (2017, December 22). Protect your network from Emotet Trojan with Malwarebytes Endpoint Security. Retrieved January 17, 2019.

    Open source URL
  40. [40]
    Secureworks Emotet Nov 2018

    Mclellan, M.. (2018, November 19). Lazy Passwords Become Rocket Fuel for Emotet SMB Spreader. Retrieved March 25, 2019.

    Open source URL
  41. [41]
    Symantec Emotet Jul 2018

    Symantec. (2018, July 18). The Evolution of Emotet: From Banking Trojan to Threat Distributor. Retrieved March 25, 2019.

    Open source URL
  42. [42]
    US-CERT Emotet Jul 2018

    US-CERT. (2018, July 20). Alert (TA18-201A) Emotet Malware. Retrieved March 25, 2019.

    Open source URL
  43. [43]
    CheckPoint SpeakUp Feb 2019

    Check Point Research. (2019, February 4). SpeakUp: A New Undetected Backdoor Linux Trojan. Retrieved April 17, 2019.

    Open source URL
  44. [44]
    Cybersecurity Advisory GRU Brute Force Campaign July 2021

    NSA, CISA, FBI, NCSC. (2021, July). Russian GRU Conducting Global Brute Force Campaign to Compromise Enterprise and Cloud Environments. Retrieved July 26, 2021.

    Open source URL
  45. [45]
    Microsoft STRONTIUM New Patterns Cred Harvesting Sept 2020

    Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC). (2020, September 10). STRONTIUM: Detecting new patterns in credential harvesting. Retrieved September 11, 2020.

    Open source URL
  46. [46]
    CME Github September 2018

    byt3bl33d3r. (2018, September 8). SMB: Command Reference. Retrieved July 17, 2020.

    Open source URL
  47. [47]
    ESET Hermetic Wizard March 2022

    ESET. (2022, March 1). IsaacWiper and HermeticWizard: New wiper and worm targetingUkraine. Retrieved April 10, 2022.

    Open source URL
  48. [48]
    NIST 800-63-3

    Grassi, P., et al. (2017, December 1). SP 800-63-3, Digital Identity Guidelines. Retrieved January 16, 2019.

    Open source URL
  49. [49]
    Microsoft Common Conditional Access Policies

    Microsoft. (2022, December 14). Conditional Access templates. Retrieved February 21, 2023.

    Open source URL
  50. [50]
    Okta Block Anonymizing Services

    Moussa Diallo and Brett Winterford. (2024, April 26). How to Block Anonymizing Services using Okta. Retrieved May 28, 2024.

    Open source URL
  51. [51]
    Mandiant APT29 Microsoft 365 2022

    Douglas Bienstock. (2022, August 18). You Can’t Audit Me: APT29 Continues Targeting Microsoft 365. Retrieved February 23, 2023.

    Open source URL
  52. [52]
    Unit 42 Lucifer June 2020

    Hsu, K. et al. (2020, June 24). Lucifer: New Cryptojacking and DDoS Hybrid Malware Exploiting High and Critical Vulnerabilities to Infect Windows Devices. Retrieved November 16, 2020.

    Open source URL
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