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MITRE ATT&CK® Technique

T1610: Deploy Container

Adversaries may deploy a container into an environment to facilitate execution or evade defenses. In some cases, adversaries may deploy a new container to execute processes associated with a particular image or deployment, such as processes that execute or download malware. In others, an adversary may deploy a new container configured without network rules, user limitations, etc. to bypass existing defenses within the environment. In Kubernetes environments, an adversary may attempt to deploy a privileged or vulnerable container into a specific node in order to Escape to Host and access other containers running on the node. [1]

Containers can be deployed by various means, such as via Docker's create and start APIs or via a web application such as the Kubernetes dashboard or Kubeflow. [2][3][4] In Kubernetes environments, containers may be deployed through workloads such as ReplicaSets or DaemonSets, which can allow containers to be deployed across multiple nodes.[5] Adversaries may deploy containers based on retrieved or built malicious images or from benign images that download and execute malicious payloads at runtime.[6]

EnterpriseT1610TechniqueObject v2.0Modified
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

Deploy Container matters because a container platform can become an execution path, not just an application runtime. If an attacker or misused account can create new Docker or Kubernetes workloads, they may run a malicious image, launch a benign image that downloads payloads at runtime, or start a container with weak controls such as excessive privilege, missing network rules, or insufficient user limits. For leaders, the key question is whether container deployment is governed, logged, and reviewable across both control-plane interfaces and node-level activity.

Executive priority

Prioritize this where Kubernetes, Docker, dashboards, Kubeflow, ReplicaSets, DaemonSets, or similar workload mechanisms support production services. The business risk is loss of execution control in container environments, with possible follow-on risk to host escape scenarios noted by ATT&CK. This technique should drive budget and assurance questions around identity governance for deployment rights, segmentation and network access restrictions, audit evidence for workload creation, and incident response readiness for unauthorized or abnormal container launches.

Technical view

ATT&CK lists this as an execution technique for Containers. Validate whether SOC and IR teams can reconstruct container creation and start activity through Docker APIs, Kubernetes workload creation, dashboard or Kubeflow activity, and node-level runtime events. Pay particular attention to privileged or vulnerable containers, containers deployed to specific nodes, workloads that fan out across nodes such as ReplicaSets or DaemonSets, and containers based on newly retrieved, newly built, or otherwise unexpected images. Official ATT&CK detection text is not provided, but the supplied relationship to DET0249 points to behavior-chain detection across Docker and Kubernetes control and node planes.

Likely telemetry

  • Docker container create and start API or CLI activity
  • Kubernetes API audit records for pod and workload creation
  • Kubernetes Dashboard access and deployment activity where used
  • Kubeflow pipeline or workload execution records where used
  • ReplicaSet and DaemonSet creation or modification events

Detection direction

  • Inventory all approved paths for deploying containers, then confirm each path produces centrally retained audit records.
  • Correlate control-plane events with node-plane runtime evidence so a declared workload can be tied to the actual container, image, process, and node where it ran.
  • Tune for unusual deployment initiators, unexpected service accounts, new or rarely used images, privileged containers, weak user restrictions, missing network controls, and workloads deployed broadly through ReplicaSets or DaemonSets.
  • Review runtime-download patterns separately from image reputation because ATT&CK notes benign images may download and execute malicious payloads at runtime.
  • Account for false positives from CI/CD systems, cluster operators, autoscaling, and legitimate batch or pipeline workloads; baselining authorized deployment automation is critical.

Mitigation priorities

  • Apply user account management and least-privilege principles to restrict who and what can create or modify containers and workloads.
  • Limit access to container management interfaces and deployment services over the network to accounts and systems with a business requirement.
  • Use network segmentation to reduce the reach of newly deployed containers and to constrain lateral movement opportunities.
  • Audit container deployment activity, account permissions, workload configuration, and runtime behavior on a recurring basis to support both detection and compliance evidence.
  • Review deployment policies for privileged containers, weak user limitations, permissive network settings, risky mounts, and node placement that could support host escape scenarios described by ATT&CK.
Additional notes and limits

This take is based on ATT&CK T1610 Deploy Container, its external references, and supplied relationships. The technique is materially relevant to cloud-native and container operations because deployment authority can become execution authority. The most useful defensive assessment is not whether a tool can flag a container creation event, but whether the organization can prove who requested it, through which interface, what image and configuration were used, where it ran, and whether that behavior matched approved operational patterns.

MITRE did not provide official detection guidance for this object. Telemetry and control recommendations therefore rely on the ATT&CK description, cited deployment mechanisms, and supplied mitigation and detection-strategy relationships. Local platform architecture, enabled audit settings, orchestrator configuration, and CI/CD design are required to determine actual exposure or coverage.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Deploy Container

Adversaries may deploy a container into an environment to facilitate execution or evade defenses. In some cases, adversaries may deploy a new container to execute processes associated with a particular image or deployment, such as processes that execute or download malware. In others, an adversary may deploy a new container configured without network rules, user limitations, etc. to bypass existing defenses within the environment. In Kubernetes environments, an adversary may attempt to deploy a privileged or vulnerable container into a specific node in order to Escape to Host and access other containers running on the node. [1]

Containers can be deployed by various means, such as via Docker's create and start APIs or via a web application such as the Kubernetes dashboard or Kubeflow. [2][3][4] In Kubernetes environments, containers may be deployed through workloads such as ReplicaSets or DaemonSets, which can allow containers to be deployed across multiple nodes.[5] Adversaries may deploy containers based on retrieved or built malicious images or from benign images that download and execute malicious payloads at runtime.[6]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupEnterprise

G0139: TeamTNT

TeamTNT is a threat group that has primarily targeted cloud and containerized environments. The group as been active since at least October 2019 and has mainly focused its efforts on leveraging cloud and container resources to deploy cryptocurrency miners in victim environments.[1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9]

MalwareEnterprise

S0599: Kinsing

Kinsing is Golang-based malware that runs a cryptocurrency miner and attempts to spread itself to other hosts in the victim environment. [1][2][3]

ContainersLinux
ToolEnterprise

S0683: Peirates

Peirates is a post-exploitation Kubernetes exploitation framework with a focus on gathering service account tokens for lateral movement and privilege escalation. The tool is written in GoLang and publicly available on GitHub.[1]

Containers
MalwareEnterprise

S0600: Doki

Doki is a backdoor that uses a unique Dogecoin-based Domain Generation Algorithm and was first observed in July 2020. Doki was used in conjunction with the ngrok Mining Botnet in a campaign that targeted Docker servers in cloud platforms. [1]

LinuxContainers
Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Mitigations

Mitigation direction

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
2.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
b11989e0758bfe3d...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(1)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.12.0Current bundleb11989e0758b…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    AppSecco Kubernetes Namespace Breakout 2020

    Abhisek Datta. (2020, March 18). Kubernetes Namespace Breakout using Insecure Host Path Volume — Part 1. Retrieved January 16, 2024.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Docker Container

    DockerDocs. (n.d.). Retrieved December 8, 2025.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    Kubernetes Dashboard

    The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). Kubernetes Web UI (Dashboard). Retrieved March 29, 2021.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    Kubeflow Pipelines

    The Kubeflow Authors. (n.d.). Overview of Kubeflow Pipelines. Retrieved March 29, 2021.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    Kubernetes Workload Management

    Kubernetes. (n.d.). Workload Management. Retrieved March 28, 2024.

    Open source URL
  6. [6]
    Aqua Build Images on Hosts

    Assaf Morag. (2020, July 15). Threat Alert: Attackers Building Malicious Images on Your Hosts. Retrieved March 29, 2021.

    Open source URL
  7. [7]
    Aqua Kinsing April 2020

    Singer, G. (2020, April 3). Threat Alert: Kinsing Malware Attacks Targeting Container Environments. Retrieved April 1, 2021.

    Open source URL
  8. [8]
    Kubernetes RBAC

    Kubernetes. (n.d.). Role Based Access Control Good Practices. Retrieved March 8, 2023.

    Open source URL
  9. [9]
    Intezer TeamTNT September 2020

    Fishbein, N. (2020, September 8). Attackers Abusing Legitimate Cloud Monitoring Tools to Conduct Cyber Attacks. Retrieved September 22, 2021.

    Open source URL
  10. [10]
    Trend Micro TeamTNT

    Fiser, D. Oliveira, A. (n.d.). Tracking the Activities of TeamTNT A Closer Look at a Cloud-Focused Malicious Actor Group. Retrieved September 22, 2021.

    Open source URL
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    Cisco Talos Intelligence Group

    Darin Smith. (2022, April 21). TeamTNT targeting AWS, Alibaba. Retrieved August 4, 2022.

    Open source URL
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    Kubernetes Hardening Guide

    National Security Agency, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. (2022, March). Kubernetes Hardening Guide. Retrieved April 1, 2022.

    Open source URL
  13. [13]
    Peirates GitHub

    InGuardians. (2022, January 5). Peirates GitHub. Retrieved February 8, 2022.

    Open source URL
  14. [14]
    Intezer Doki July 20

    Fishbein, N., Kajiloti, M.. (2020, July 28). Watch Your Containers: Doki Infecting Docker Servers in the Cloud. Retrieved March 30, 2021.

    Open source URL
  15. [15]
    Docker Daemon Socket Protect

    Docker. (n.d.). Protect the Docker Daemon Socket. Retrieved March 29, 2021.

    Open source URL
  16. [16]
    Kubernetes API Control Access

    The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). Controlling Access to The Kubernetes API. Retrieved March 29, 2021.

    Open source URL
  17. [17]
    Kubernetes Cloud Native Security

    Kubernetes. (n.d.). Overview of Cloud Native Security. Retrieved March 8, 2023.

    Open source URL
  18. [18]
    Microsoft AKS Azure AD 2023

    Microsoft. (2023, February 27). AKS-managed Azure Active Directory integration. Retrieved March 8, 2023.

    Open source URL
  19. [19]
    AppSecco Kubernetes Namespace Breakout 2020

    Abhisek Datta. (2020, March 18). Kubernetes Namespace Breakout using Insecure Host Path Volume — Part 1. Retrieved January 16, 2024.

    Open source URL
  20. [20]
    AppSecco Kubernetes Namespace Breakout 2020

    Abhisek Datta. (2020, March 18). Kubernetes Namespace Breakout using Insecure Host Path Volume — Part 1. Retrieved January 16, 2024.

    Open source URL
  21. [21]
    Aqua Build Images on Hosts

    Assaf Morag. (2020, July 15). Threat Alert: Attackers Building Malicious Images on Your Hosts. Retrieved March 29, 2021.

    Open source URL
  22. [22]
    Aqua Build Images on Hosts

    Assaf Morag. (2020, July 15). Threat Alert: Attackers Building Malicious Images on Your Hosts. Retrieved March 29, 2021.

    Open source URL
  23. [23]
    Docker Container

    DockerDocs. (n.d.). Retrieved December 8, 2025.

    Open source URL
  24. [24]
    Docker Container

    DockerDocs. (n.d.). Retrieved December 8, 2025.

    Open source URL
  25. [25]
    Kubeflow Pipelines

    The Kubeflow Authors. (n.d.). Overview of Kubeflow Pipelines. Retrieved March 29, 2021.

    Open source URL
  26. [26]
    Kubeflow Pipelines

    The Kubeflow Authors. (n.d.). Overview of Kubeflow Pipelines. Retrieved March 29, 2021.

    Open source URL
  27. [27]
    Kubernetes Dashboard

    The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). Kubernetes Web UI (Dashboard). Retrieved March 29, 2021.

    Open source URL
  28. [28]
    Kubernetes Dashboard

    The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). Kubernetes Web UI (Dashboard). Retrieved March 29, 2021.

    Open source URL
  29. [29]
    Kubernetes Workload Management

    Kubernetes. (n.d.). Workload Management. Retrieved March 28, 2024.

    Open source URL
  30. [30]
    Kubernetes Workload Management

    Kubernetes. (n.d.). Workload Management. Retrieved March 28, 2024.

    Open source URL
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    mitre-attackT1610
    Open source URL
  32. [32]
    mitre-attackT1610
    Open source URL
  33. [33]
    mitre-attackT1610
    Open source URL
  34. [34]
    Aqua Kinsing April 2020

    Singer, G. (2020, April 3). Threat Alert: Kinsing Malware Attacks Targeting Container Environments. Retrieved April 1, 2021.

    Open source URL
  35. [35]
    Kubernetes RBAC

    Kubernetes. (n.d.). Role Based Access Control Good Practices. Retrieved March 8, 2023.

    Open source URL
  36. [36]
    Cisco Talos Intelligence Group

    Darin Smith. (2022, April 21). TeamTNT targeting AWS, Alibaba. Retrieved August 4, 2022.

    Open source URL
  37. [37]
    Intezer TeamTNT September 2020

    Fishbein, N. (2020, September 8). Attackers Abusing Legitimate Cloud Monitoring Tools to Conduct Cyber Attacks. Retrieved September 22, 2021.

    Open source URL
  38. [38]
    Trend Micro TeamTNT

    Fiser, D. Oliveira, A. (n.d.). Tracking the Activities of TeamTNT A Closer Look at a Cloud-Focused Malicious Actor Group. Retrieved September 22, 2021.

    Open source URL
  39. [39]
    Kubernetes Hardening Guide

    National Security Agency, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. (2022, March). Kubernetes Hardening Guide. Retrieved April 1, 2022.

    Open source URL
  40. [40]
    Peirates GitHub

    InGuardians. (2022, January 5). Peirates GitHub. Retrieved February 8, 2022.

    Open source URL
  41. [41]
    Intezer Doki July 20

    Fishbein, N., Kajiloti, M.. (2020, July 28). Watch Your Containers: Doki Infecting Docker Servers in the Cloud. Retrieved March 30, 2021.

    Open source URL
  42. [42]
    Docker Daemon Socket Protect

    Docker. (n.d.). Protect the Docker Daemon Socket. Retrieved March 29, 2021.

    Open source URL
  43. [43]
    Kubernetes API Control Access

    The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). Controlling Access to The Kubernetes API. Retrieved March 29, 2021.

    Open source URL
  44. [44]
    Kubernetes Cloud Native Security

    Kubernetes. (n.d.). Overview of Cloud Native Security. Retrieved March 8, 2023.

    Open source URL
  45. [45]
    Microsoft AKS Azure AD 2023

    Microsoft. (2023, February 27). AKS-managed Azure Active Directory integration. Retrieved March 8, 2023.

    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.