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MITRE ATT&CK® Technique

T1556: Modify Authentication Process

Adversaries may modify authentication mechanisms and processes to access user credentials or enable otherwise unwarranted access to accounts. The authentication process is handled by mechanisms, such as the Local Security Authentication Server (LSASS) process and the Security Accounts Manager (SAM) on Windows, pluggable authentication modules (PAM) on Unix-based systems, and authorization plugins on MacOS systems, responsible for gathering, storing, and validating credentials. By modifying an authentication process, an adversary may be able to authenticate to a service or system without using Valid Accounts.

Adversaries may maliciously modify a part of this process to either reveal credentials or bypass authentication mechanisms. Compromised credentials or access may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access and remote desktop.

EnterpriseT1556TechniqueObject v3.0Modified
Discuss defensive coverageBack to ATT&CK
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceHigh

Modify Authentication Process matters because it targets the trust layer that decides who is allowed in. If an adversary can alter authentication components, they may capture credentials, bypass normal login controls, or preserve access without relying on ordinary valid account use. For leaders, this is an identity resilience issue across Windows, Linux, macOS, network devices, SaaS, IaaS, office suites, and identity providers—not just an endpoint hardening concern.

Executive priority

Prioritize this technique where authentication systems are business-critical: domain controllers, identity providers, VPN or remote access paths, cloud identity integrations, network devices, and externally reachable services. The key executive question is whether the organization can prove authentication mechanisms are hardened, monitored for unauthorized change, and recoverable during an incident. This also supports audit and compliance evidence because mitigations include account management, privileged account management, MFA, permission restriction, OS configuration, and auditing.

Technical view

ATT&CK maps T1556 to defense impairment, persistence, and credential access. SOC, detection engineering, and IR teams should validate monitoring for unauthorized changes to authentication components across the supported platforms. Relationship context shows sub-techniques for Windows domain controller authentication, password filter DLLs, network provider DLLs, reversible encryption, Linux/macOS PAM, network device authentication, MFA modification, hybrid identity, and conditional access policy modification. Because official detection text is not provided, teams should use DET0104, Detect Modification of Authentication Processes Across Platforms, as the ATT&CK-linked detection strategy and test coverage against local authentication architectures.

Likely telemetry

  • Windows security and system events related to authentication configuration, privileged process changes, registry changes, password filter DLLs, network provider DLLs, LSASS/SAM-adjacent activity, and domain controller configuration changes
  • Linux and macOS file integrity, package/configuration, and authentication logs covering PAM files, shared libraries, authorization plugins, and SSH-related authentication components
  • Identity provider, IaaS, SaaS, and office suite audit logs for MFA settings, conditional access policy changes, hybrid identity configuration changes, and privileged identity administration
  • Network device configuration, firmware or system image integrity evidence, authentication configuration changes, and administrative access logs
  • Privileged account activity logs showing who changed authentication controls, when, from where, and through which administrative path

Detection direction

  • Confirm that changes to authentication mechanisms generate alertable events, not just audit records retained for later review.
  • Tune detections around high-risk change points: domain controllers, identity providers, hybrid identity synchronization paths, MFA and conditional access controls, PAM configuration, authentication DLL registration, and network device authentication images or settings.
  • Correlate authentication-process changes with privileged account activity, new persistence indicators, unusual remote access success, and credential-access alerts.
  • Account for legitimate administrative maintenance, OS upgrades, identity policy changes, and network device patching as common false-positive sources; require change-ticket or approved-administrator context where available.
  • Treat absence of official ATT&CK detection text as a coverage gap to validate through local engineering and ATT&CK detection strategy DET0104 rather than assuming tool coverage.

Mitigation priorities

  • Start with auditing: maintain evidence of authentication configuration baselines and review changes on all critical systems and identity platforms.
  • Restrict file, directory, and registry permissions around authentication components so only authorized administrative paths can modify them.
  • Strengthen privileged account and user account management with least privilege, lifecycle controls, and accountability for administrative changes.
  • Apply privileged process integrity and operating system configuration hardening where supported to reduce tampering with authentication-related processes and services.
  • Use MFA and strong password policies, while also monitoring for changes to MFA, reversible encryption, and conditional access controls because this technique can target those defenses directly.
Additional notes and limits

The relationship set broadens the practical scope from host authentication to identity-provider and cloud-connected authentication controls. ATT&CK also relates this technique to ArcaneDoor, FIN13, Ebury, Kessel, and SILENTTRINITY, indicating that multiple campaign, group, and software entries have used or are mapped to this behavior; this should inform threat-informed validation without implying current exposure in any specific environment.

Official detection text for T1556 is not provided. The supplied data identifies platforms, tactics, mitigations, a detection strategy relationship, and sub-technique context, but local architecture determines which authentication components exist and which telemetry is available. This take does not assert active exploitation, customer impact, or guaranteed detection coverage.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Modify Authentication Process

Adversaries may modify authentication mechanisms and processes to access user credentials or enable otherwise unwarranted access to accounts. The authentication process is handled by mechanisms, such as the Local Security Authentication Server (LSASS) process and the Security Accounts Manager (SAM) on Windows, pluggable authentication modules (PAM) on Unix-based systems, and authorization plugins on MacOS systems, responsible for gathering, storing, and validating credentials. By modifying an authentication process, an adversary may be able to authenticate to a service or system without using Valid Accounts.

Adversaries may maliciously modify a part of this process to either reveal credentials or bypass authentication mechanisms. Compromised credentials or access may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access and remote desktop.

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Related techniques

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

9 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1556.004Network Device AuthenticationSub-techniqueNetwork Device Authentication subtechnique of this object.
EnterpriseT1556.001Domain Controller AuthenticationSub-techniqueDomain Controller Authentication subtechnique of this object.
EnterpriseT1556.009Conditional Access PoliciesSub-techniqueConditional Access Policies subtechnique of this object.
EnterpriseT1556.008Network Provider DLLSub-techniqueNetwork Provider DLL subtechnique of this object.
EnterpriseT1556.002Password Filter DLLSub-techniquePassword Filter DLL subtechnique of this object.
EnterpriseT1556.006Multi-Factor AuthenticationSub-techniqueMulti-Factor Authentication subtechnique of this object.
EnterpriseT1556.007Hybrid IdentitySub-techniqueHybrid Identity subtechnique of this object.
EnterpriseT1556.005Reversible EncryptionSub-techniqueReversible Encryption subtechnique of this object.
EnterpriseT1556.003Pluggable Authentication ModulesSub-techniquePluggable Authentication Modules subtechnique of this object.
Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupEnterprise

G1016: FIN13

FIN13 is a financially motivated cyber threat group that has targeted the financial, retail, and hospitality industries in Mexico and Latin America, as early as 2016. FIN13 achieves its objectives by stealing intellectual property, financial data, mergers and acquisition information, or PII.[1][2]

MalwareEnterprise

S0377: Ebury

Ebury is an OpenSSH backdoor and credential stealer targeting Linux servers and container hosts developed by Windigo. Ebury is primarily installed through modifying shared libraries (`.so` files) executed by the legitimate OpenSSH program. First seen in 2009, Ebury has been used to maintain a botnet of servers, deploy additional malware, and steal cryptocurrency wallets, credentials, and credit card details.[1][2][3][4]

Linux
ToolEnterprise

S0692: SILENTTRINITY

SILENTTRINITY is an open source remote administration and post-exploitation framework primarily written in Python that includes stagers written in Powershell, C, and Boo. SILENTTRINITY was used in a 2019 campaign against Croatian government agencies by unidentified cyber actors.[1][2]

Windows
MalwareEnterprise

S0487: Kessel

Kessel is an advanced version of OpenSSH which acts as a custom backdoor, mainly acting to steal credentials and function as a bot. Kessel has been active since its C2 domain began resolving in August 2018.[1]

Linux
MalwareEnterprise

S9013: DRYHOOK

DRYHOOK is Python script used to steal credentials. DRYHOOK was first reported in January 2025, and has previously been leveraged by People's Republic of China (PRC) state-affiliated threat actors identified as UNC5221 and SYLVANITE.[1][2][3]

LinuxNetwork Devices
CampaignEnterprise

C0046: ArcaneDoor

ArcaneDoor is a campaign targeting networking devices from Cisco and other vendors between July 2023 and April 2024, primarily focused on government and critical infrastructure networks. ArcaneDoor is associated with the deployment of the custom backdoors Line Runner and Line Dancer. ArcaneDoor is attributed to a group referred to as UAT4356 or STORM-1849, and is assessed to be a state-sponsored campaign.[1][2]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

subtechnique of · TechniqueT1556.004: Network Device AuthenticationEnterprisesubtechnique of · TechniqueT1556.001: Domain Controller AuthenticationEnterprisemitigates · MitigationM1024: Restrict Registry PermissionsEnterprisemitigates · MitigationM1032: Multi-factor AuthenticationEnterprisesubtechnique of · TechniqueT1556.009: Conditional Access PoliciesEnterprisesubtechnique of · TechniqueT1556.008: Network Provider DLLEnterprisesubtechnique of · TechniqueT1556.002: Password Filter DLLEnterpriseuses · MalwareS0377: EburyEnterprisemitigates · MitigationM1027: Password PoliciesEnterpriseuses · ToolS0692: SILENTTRINITYEnterpriseuses · MalwareS0487: KesselEnterpriseuses · CampaignC0046: ArcaneDoorEnterprisemitigates · MitigationM1022: Restrict File and Directory PermissionsEnterprisesubtechnique of · TechniqueT1556.006: Multi-Factor AuthenticationEnterprisesubtechnique of · TechniqueT1556.007: Hybrid IdentityEnterpriseuses · MalwareS9013: DRYHOOKEnterprisesubtechnique of · TechniqueT1556.005: Reversible EncryptionEnterprisedetects · Detection StrategyDET0104: Detect Modification of Authentication Processes Across PlatformsEnterprisemitigates · MitigationM1018: User Account ManagementEnterprisemitigates · MitigationM1026: Privileged Account ManagementEnterpriseuses · GroupG1016: FIN13Enterprisesubtechnique of · TechniqueT1556.003: Pluggable Authentication ModulesEnterprisemitigates · MitigationM1025: Privileged Process IntegrityEnterprisemitigates · MitigationM1047: AuditEnterprise
Mitigations

Mitigation direction

MitigationEnterprise

M1024: Restrict Registry Permissions

Restricting registry permissions involves configuring access control settings for sensitive registry keys and hives to ensure that only authorized users or processes can make modifications. By limiting access, organizations can prevent unauthorized changes that adversaries might use for persistence, privilege escalation, or defense evasion. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures:

Review and Adjust Permissions on Critical Keys

- Regularly review permissions on keys such as `Run`, `RunOnce`, and `Services` to ensure only authorized users have write access. - Use tools like `icacls` or `PowerShell` to automate permission adjustments.

Enable Registry Auditing

- Enable auditing on sensitive keys to log access attempts. - Use Event Viewer or SIEM solutions to analyze logs and detect suspicious activity. - Example Audit Policy: `auditpol /set /subcategory:"Registry" /success:enable /failure:enable`

Protect Credential-Related Hives

- Limit access to hives like `SAM`,`SECURITY`, and `SYSTEM` to prevent credential dumping or other unauthorized access. - Use LSA Protection to add an additional security layer for credential storage.

Restrict Registry Editor Usage

- Use Group Policy to restrict access to regedit.exe for non-administrative users. - Block execution of registry editing tools on endpoints where they are unnecessary.

Deploy Baseline Configuration Tools

- Use tools like Microsoft Security Compliance Toolkit or CIS Benchmarks to apply and maintain secure registry configurations.

*Tools for Implementation*

Registry Permission Tools:

- Registry Editor (regedit): Built-in tool to manage registry permissions. - PowerShell: Automate permissions and manage keys. `Set-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run" -Name "KeyName" -Value "Value"` - icacls: Command-line tool to modify ACLs.

Monitoring Tools:

- Sysmon: Monitor and log registry events. - Event Viewer: View registry access logs.

Policy Management Tools:

- Group Policy Management Console (GPMC): Enforce registry permissions via GPOs. - Microsoft Endpoint Manager: Deploy configuration baselines for registry permissions.

MitigationEnterprise

M1032: Multi-factor Authentication

Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) enhances security by requiring users to provide at least two forms of verification to prove their identity before granting access. These factors typically include:

- *Something you know*: Passwords, PINs. - *Something you have*: Physical tokens, smartphone authenticator apps. - *Something you are*: Biometric data such as fingerprints, facial recognition, or retinal scans.

Implementing MFA across all critical systems and services ensures robust protection against account takeover and unauthorized access. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures:

Identity and Access Management (IAM):

- Use IAM solutions like Azure Active Directory, Okta, or AWS IAM to enforce MFA policies for all user logins, especially for privileged roles. - Enable conditional access policies to enforce MFA for risky sign-ins (e.g., unfamiliar devices, geolocations). - Enable Conditional Access policies to only allow logins from trusted devices, such as those enrolled in Intune or joined via Hybrid/Entra.

Authentication Tools and Methods:

- Use authenticator applications such as Google Authenticator, Microsoft Authenticator, or Authy for time-based one-time passwords (TOTP). - Deploy hardware-based tokens like YubiKey, RSA SecurID, or smart cards for additional security. - Enforce biometric authentication for compatible devices and applications.

Secure Legacy Systems:

- Integrate MFA solutions with older systems using third-party tools like Duo Security or Thales SafeNet. - Enable RADIUS/NPS servers to facilitate MFA for VPNs, RDP, and other network logins.

Monitoring and Alerting:

- Use SIEM tools to monitor failed MFA attempts, login anomalies, or brute-force attempts against MFA systems. - Implement alerts for suspicious MFA activities, such as repeated failed codes or new device registrations.

Training and Policy Enforcement:

- Educate employees on the importance of MFA and secure authenticator usage. - Enforce policies that require MFA on all critical systems, especially for remote access, privileged accounts, and cloud applications.

MitigationEnterprise

M1027: Password Policies

Set and enforce secure password policies for accounts to reduce the likelihood of unauthorized access. Strong password policies include enforcing password complexity, requiring regular password changes, and preventing password reuse. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures:

Windows Systems:

- Use Group Policy Management Console (GPMC) to configure: - Minimum password length (e.g., 12+ characters). - Password complexity requirements. - Password history (e.g., disallow last 24 passwords). - Account lockout duration and thresholds.

Linux Systems:

- Configure Pluggable Authentication Modules (PAM): - Use `pam_pwquality` to enforce complexity and length requirements. - Implement `pam_tally2` or `pam_faillock` for account lockouts. - Use `pwunconv` to disable password reuse.

Password Managers:

- Enforce usage of enterprise password managers (e.g., Bitwarden, 1Password, LastPass) to generate and store strong passwords.

Password Blacklisting:

- Use tools like Have I Been Pwned password checks or NIST-based blacklist solutions to prevent users from setting compromised passwords.

Regular Auditing:

- Periodically audit password policies and account configurations to ensure compliance using tools like LAPS (Local Admin Password Solution) and vulnerability scanners.

*Tools for Implementation*

Windows:

- Group Policy Management Console (GPMC): Enforce password policies. - Microsoft Local Administrator Password Solution (LAPS): Enforce random, unique admin passwords.

Linux/macOS:

- PAM Modules (pam_pwquality, pam_tally2, pam_faillock): Enforce password rules. - Lynis: Audit password policies and system configurations.

Cross-Platform:

- Password Managers (Bitwarden, 1Password, KeePass): Manage and enforce strong passwords. - Have I Been Pwned API: Prevent the use of breached passwords. - NIST SP 800-63B compliant tools: Enforce password guidelines and blacklisting.

MitigationEnterprise

M1022: Restrict File and Directory Permissions

Restricting file and directory permissions involves setting access controls at the file system level to limit which users, groups, or processes can read, write, or execute files. By configuring permissions appropriately, organizations can reduce the attack surface for adversaries seeking to access sensitive data, plant malicious code, or tamper with system files.

Enforce Least Privilege Permissions:

- Remove unnecessary write permissions on sensitive files and directories. - Use file ownership and groups to control access for specific roles.

Example (Windows): Right-click the shared folder → Properties → Security tab → Adjust permissions for NTFS ACLs.

Harden File Shares:

- Disable anonymous access to shared folders. - Enforce NTFS permissions for shared folders on Windows.

Example: Set permissions to restrict write access to critical files, such as system executables (e.g., `/bin` or `/sbin` on Linux). Use tools like `chown` and `chmod` to assign file ownership and limit access.

On Linux, apply: `chmod 750 /etc/sensitive.conf` `chown root:admin /etc/sensitive.conf`

File Integrity Monitoring (FIM):

- Use tools like Tripwire, Wazuh, or OSSEC to monitor changes to critical file permissions.

Audit File System Access:

- Enable auditing to track permission changes or unauthorized access attempts. - Use auditd (Linux) or Event Viewer (Windows) to log activities.

Restrict Startup Directories:

- Configure permissions to prevent unauthorized writes to directories like `C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu`.

Example: Restrict write access to critical directories like `/etc/`, `/usr/local/`, and Windows directories such as `C:\Windows\System32`.

- On Windows, use icacls to modify permissions: `icacls "C:\Windows\System32" /inheritance:r /grant:r SYSTEM:(OI)(CI)F` - On Linux, monitor permissions using tools like `lsattr` or `auditd`.

MitigationEnterprise

M1018: User Account Management

User Account Management involves implementing and enforcing policies for the lifecycle of user accounts, including creation, modification, and deactivation. Proper account management reduces the attack surface by limiting unauthorized access, managing account privileges, and ensuring accounts are used according to organizational policies. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures:

Enforcing the Principle of Least Privilege

- Implementation: Assign users only the minimum permissions required to perform their job functions. Regularly audit accounts to ensure no excess permissions are granted. - Use Case: Reduces the risk of privilege escalation by ensuring accounts cannot perform unauthorized actions.

Implementing Strong Password Policies

- Implementation: Enforce password complexity requirements (e.g., length, character types). Require password expiration every 90 days and disallow password reuse. - Use Case: Prevents adversaries from gaining unauthorized access through password guessing or brute force attacks.

Managing Dormant and Orphaned Accounts

- Implementation: Implement automated workflows to disable accounts after a set period of inactivity (e.g., 30 days). Remove orphaned accounts (e.g., accounts without an assigned owner) during regular account audits. - Use Case: Eliminates dormant accounts that could be exploited by attackers.

Account Lockout Policies

- Implementation: Configure account lockout thresholds (e.g., lock accounts after five failed login attempts). Set lockout durations to a minimum of 15 minutes. - Use Case: Mitigates automated attack techniques that rely on repeated login attempts.

Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) for High-Risk Accounts

- Implementation: Require MFA for all administrative accounts and high-risk users. Use MFA mechanisms like hardware tokens, authenticator apps, or biometrics. - Use Case: Prevents unauthorized access, even if credentials are stolen.

Restricting Interactive Logins

- Implementation: Restrict interactive logins for privileged accounts to specific secure systems or management consoles. Use group policies to enforce logon restrictions. - Use Case: Protects sensitive accounts from misuse or exploitation.

*Tools for Implementation*

Built-in Tools:

- Microsoft Active Directory (AD): Centralized account management and RBAC enforcement. - Group Policy Object (GPO): Enforce password policies, logon restrictions, and account lockout policies.

Identity and Access Management (IAM) Tools:

- Okta: Centralized user provisioning, MFA, and SSO integration. - Microsoft Azure Active Directory: Provides advanced account lifecycle management, role-based access, and conditional access policies.

Privileged Account Management (PAM): - CyberArk, BeyondTrust, Thycotic: Manage and monitor privileged account usage, enforce session recording, and JIT access.

MitigationEnterprise

M1026: Privileged Account Management

Privileged Account Management focuses on implementing policies, controls, and tools to securely manage privileged accounts (e.g., SYSTEM, root, or administrative accounts). This includes restricting access, limiting the scope of permissions, monitoring privileged account usage, and ensuring accountability through logging and auditing.This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures:

Account Permissions and Roles:

- Implement RBAC and least privilege principles to allocate permissions securely. - Use tools like Active Directory Group Policies to enforce access restrictions.

Credential Security:

- Deploy password vaulting tools like CyberArk, HashiCorp Vault, or KeePass for secure storage and rotation of credentials. - Enforce password policies for complexity, uniqueness, and expiration using tools like Microsoft Group Policy Objects (GPO).

Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA):

- Enforce MFA for all privileged accounts using Duo Security, Okta, or Microsoft Azure AD MFA.

Privileged Access Management (PAM):

- Use PAM solutions like CyberArk, BeyondTrust, or Thycotic to manage, monitor, and audit privileged access.

Auditing and Monitoring:

- Integrate activity monitoring into your SIEM (e.g., Splunk or QRadar) to detect and alert on anomalous privileged account usage.

Just-In-Time Access:

- Deploy JIT solutions like Azure Privileged Identity Management (PIM) or configure ephemeral roles in AWS and GCP to grant time-limited elevated permissions.

*Tools for Implementation*

Privileged Access Management (PAM):

- CyberArk, BeyondTrust, Thycotic, HashiCorp Vault.

Credential Management:

- Microsoft LAPS (Local Admin Password Solution), Password Safe, HashiCorp Vault, KeePass.

Multi-Factor Authentication:

- Duo Security, Okta, Microsoft Azure MFA, Google Authenticator.

Linux Privilege Management:

- sudo configuration, SELinux, AppArmor.

Just-In-Time Access:

- Azure Privileged Identity Management (PIM), AWS IAM Roles with session constraints, GCP Identity-Aware Proxy.

MitigationEnterprise

M1025: Privileged Process Integrity

Privileged Process Integrity focuses on defending highly privileged processes (e.g., system services, antivirus, or authentication processes) from tampering, injection, or compromise by adversaries. These processes often interact with critical components, making them prime targets for techniques like code injection, privilege escalation, and process manipulation. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures:

Protected Process Mechanisms:

- Enable RunAsPPL on Windows systems to protect LSASS and other critical processes. - Use registry modifications to enforce protected process settings: `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\RunAsPPL`

Anti-Injection and Memory Protection:

- Enable Control Flow Guard (CFG), DEP, and ASLR to protect against process memory tampering. - Deploy endpoint protection tools that actively block process injection attempts.

Code Signing Validation:

- Implement policies for Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC) or AppLocker to enforce execution of signed binaries. - Ensure critical processes are signed with valid certificates.

Access Controls:

- Use DACLs and MIC to limit which users and processes can interact with privileged processes. - Disable unnecessary debugging capabilities for high-privileged processes.

Kernel-Level Protections:

- Ensure Kernel Patch Protection (PatchGuard) is enabled on Windows systems. - Leverage SELinux or AppArmor on Linux to enforce kernel-level security policies.

*Tools for Implementation*

Protected Process Light (PPL):

- RunAsPPL (Windows) - Windows Defender Credential Guard

Code Integrity and Signing:

- Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC) - AppLocker - SELinux/AppArmor (Linux)

Memory Protection:

- Control Flow Guard (CFG), Data Execution Prevention (DEP), ASLR

Process Isolation/Sandboxing:

- Firejail (Linux Sandbox) - Windows Sandbox - QEMU/KVM-based isolation

Kernel Protection:

- PatchGuard (Windows Kernel Patch Protection) - SELinux (Mandatory Access Control for Linux) - AppArmor

MitigationEnterprise

M1047: Audit

Auditing is the process of recording activity and systematically reviewing and analyzing the activity and system configurations. The primary purpose of auditing is to detect anomalies and identify potential threats or weaknesses in the environment. Proper auditing configurations can also help to meet compliance requirements. The process of auditing encompasses regular analysis of user behaviors and system logs in support of proactive security measures.

Auditing is applicable to all systems used within an organization, from the front door of a building to accessing a file on a fileserver. It is considered more critical for regulated industries such as, healthcare, finance and government where compliance requirements demand stringent tracking of user and system activates.This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures:

System Audit:

- Use Case: Regularly assess system configurations to ensure compliance with organizational security policies. - Implementation: Use tools to scan for deviations from established benchmarks.

Permission Audits:

- Use Case: Review file and folder permissions to minimize the risk of unauthorized access or privilege escalation. - Implementation: Run access reviews to identify users or groups with excessive permissions.

Software Audits:

- Use Case: Identify outdated, unsupported, or insecure software that could serve as an attack vector. - Implementation: Use inventory and vulnerability scanning tools to detect outdated versions and recommend secure alternatives.

Configuration Audits:

- Use Case: Evaluate system and network configurations to ensure secure settings (e.g., disabled SMBv1, enabled MFA). - Implementation: Implement automated configuration scanning tools like SCAP (Security Content Automation Protocol) to identify non-compliant systems.

Network Audits:

- Use Case: Examine network traffic, firewall rules, and endpoint communications to identify unauthorized or insecure connections. - Implementation: Utilize tools such as Wireshark, or Zeek to monitor and log suspicious network behavior.

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
3.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
cebad3044733d46f...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(1)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.13.0Current bundlecebad3044733…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    ESET Ebury Feb 2014

    M.Léveillé, M.. (2014, February 21). An In-depth Analysis of Linux/Ebury. Retrieved April 19, 2019.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    store_pwd_rev_enc

    Microsoft. (2021, October 28). Store passwords using reversible encryption. Retrieved January 3, 2022.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    GitHub SILENTTRINITY Modules July 2019

    Salvati, M. (2019, August 6). SILENTTRINITY Modules. Retrieved March 24, 2022.

    Open source URL
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    ESET ForSSHe December 2018

    Dumont, R., M.Léveillé, M., Porcher, H. (2018, December 1). THE DARK SIDE OF THE FORSSHE A landscape of OpenSSH backdoors. Retrieved July 16, 2020.

    Open source URL
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    Cisco ArcaneDoor 2024

    Cisco Talos. (2024, April 24). ArcaneDoor - New espionage-focused campaign found targeting perimeter network devices. Retrieved January 6, 2025.

    Open source URL
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    Google UNC5221 Ivanti January 2025

    John Wolfram, Josh Murchie, Matt Lin, Daniel Ainsworth, Robert Wallace, Dimiter Andonov, Dhanesh Kizhakkinan, Jacob Thompson. (2025, January 8). Ivanti Connect Secure VPN Targeted in New Zero-Day Exploitation. Retrieved April 14, 2026.

    Open source URL
  7. [7]
    Picus Security UNC5221 Ivanti May 2025

    Sila Ozeren Hacioglu. (2025, May 5). UNC5221’s Latest Exploit: Weaponizing CVE-2025-22457 in Ivanti Connect Secure. Retrieved April 13, 2026.

    Open source URL
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    TechNet Credential Theft

    Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Attractive Accounts for Credential Theft. Retrieved June 3, 2016.

    Open source URL
  9. [9]
    TechNet Least Privilege

    Microsoft. (2016, April 16). Implementing Least-Privilege Administrative Models. Retrieved June 3, 2016.

    Open source URL
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    Microsoft Securing Privileged Access

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    Open source URL
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    MagicWeb

    Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center, Microsoft Detection and Response Team, Microsoft 365 Defender Research Team . (2022, August 24). MagicWeb: NOBELIUM’s post-compromise trick to authenticate as anyone. Retrieved September 28, 2022.

    Open source URL
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    Mandiant FIN13 Aug 2022

    Ta, V., et al. (2022, August 8). FIN13: A Cybercriminal Threat Actor Focused on Mexico. Retrieved February 9, 2023.

    Open source URL
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    Microsoft LSA

    Microsoft. (2013, July 31). Configuring Additional LSA Protection. Retrieved February 13, 2015.

    Open source URL
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    Mandiant Azure AD Backdoors

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    Open source URL
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    EnableMPRNotifications

    Microsoft. (2023, January 26). Policy CSP - WindowsLogon. Retrieved March 30, 2023.

    Open source URL
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    Open source URL
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    Open source URL
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    mitre-attackT1556
    Open source URL
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