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MITRE ATT&CK® Technique

T1614: System Location Discovery

Adversaries may gather information in an attempt to calculate the geographical location of a victim host. Adversaries may use the information from System Location Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.

Adversaries may attempt to infer the location of a system using various system checks, such as time zone, keyboard layout, and/or language settings.[1][2][3] Windows API functions such as GetLocaleInfoW can also be used to determine the locale of the host.[1] In cloud environments, an instance's availability zone may also be discovered by accessing the instance metadata service from the instance.[4][5]

Adversaries may also attempt to infer the location of a victim host using IP addressing, such as via online geolocation IP-lookup services.[6][2]

EnterpriseT1614TechniqueObject v1.1Modified
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

System Location Discovery is a reconnaissance behavior where malware or an operator tries to infer where a host or cloud instance is located using locale, language, keyboard, time zone, IP geolocation, or cloud metadata such as availability zone. Its business significance is that location can influence what the adversary does next, including whether to continue infection or choose specific follow-on actions. For leaders, this is not usually a high-impact event by itself, but it can be an early context signal that an intrusion is profiling the environment before deeper access or payload deployment.

Executive priority

Prioritize this as part of discovery-stage visibility and response readiness, especially for organizations with geographically segmented operations, cloud workloads, regulated data residency requirements, or critical infrastructure exposure. Executives should ask whether SOC and IR teams can distinguish normal software inventory/localization checks from suspicious host profiling, and whether cloud metadata access is monitored well enough to support incident reconstruction. Because the ATT&CK object has no official detection text, coverage should be validated rather than assumed.

Technical view

T1614 applies to IaaS, Linux, macOS, and Windows under the Discovery tactic. Defenders should validate telemetry for attempts to read system locale, language, keyboard layout, and time zone settings; Windows locale API usage such as GetLocaleInfoW where endpoint tooling exposes it; outbound requests to IP geolocation services; and access to cloud instance metadata services for availability zone or identity document information. Relationship context shows this behavior associated with multiple RATs, loaders, stealers, ransomware, and groups, plus the System Language Discovery sub-technique T1614.001. Treat it as a correlation signal: more meaningful when paired with execution, persistence, command-and-control, downloader, or ransomware-preparation activity than when observed alone.

Likely telemetry

  • Endpoint process, script, and command-line telemetry related to locale, language, keyboard, and time zone discovery
  • Endpoint API or behavioral telemetry showing Windows locale queries where available
  • Network, DNS, proxy, or EDR network telemetry for outbound IP geolocation lookups
  • Cloud workload telemetry for requests from instances to instance metadata services, including availability-zone or instance-identity-document access
  • Host inventory and configuration data needed to baseline legitimate localization checks

Detection direction

  • Use DET0043, if available in the local ATT&CK content set, as a starting point, but validate it against local telemetry because the official ATT&CK detection field for T1614 is not provided.
  • Baseline legitimate locale and metadata queries from operating systems, management agents, installers, browsers, and cloud agents to reduce false positives.
  • Tune for unusual parent processes, scripting runtimes, recently delivered binaries, or malware-like chains performing location checks shortly after execution.
  • Correlate external geolocation service access with suspicious process lineage or other discovery behavior; geolocation lookups alone can be benign.
  • In cloud environments, review whether metadata service access is visible from workloads and whether unusual metadata reads can be tied back to process or instance context.

Mitigation priorities

  • Establish endpoint and cloud logging coverage first; this technique is difficult to action without process, network, and cloud workload context.
  • Harden and monitor access to cloud instance metadata services according to provider guidance, especially for workloads that do not require metadata access.
  • Apply egress monitoring or policy controls for unnecessary outbound access to IP geolocation services, while accounting for legitimate application use.
  • Use application control, script control, and least-privilege execution policies to reduce opportunities for untrusted code to perform automated host profiling.
  • Document detection and response evidence for compliance programs that require proof of discovery-stage monitoring and incident reconstruction capability.
Additional notes and limits

The relationship set is useful because it shows T1614 appearing across many software families, including RATs, loaders, stealers, and ransomware-related tooling, and includes a related group with critical infrastructure context. That makes the technique valuable for enrichment and triage, but not for standalone attribution. The sub-technique T1614.001 narrows part of the behavior to system language discovery on Linux, macOS, and Windows.

MITRE does not provide an official detection section for this technique in the supplied object. No mitigations are explicitly listed in the supplied fields. Local environment baselines are required because locale, time zone, language, geolocation, and cloud metadata checks can be routine in legitimate software and cloud operations.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

System Location Discovery

Adversaries may gather information in an attempt to calculate the geographical location of a victim host. Adversaries may use the information from System Location Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.

Adversaries may attempt to infer the location of a system using various system checks, such as time zone, keyboard layout, and/or language settings.[1][2][3] Windows API functions such as GetLocaleInfoW can also be used to determine the locale of the host.[1] In cloud environments, an instance's availability zone may also be discovered by accessing the instance metadata service from the instance.[4][5]

Adversaries may also attempt to infer the location of a victim host using IP addressing, such as via online geolocation IP-lookup services.[6][2]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Related techniques

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

1 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1614.001System Language DiscoverySub-techniqueSystem Language Discovery subtechnique of this object.
Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupEnterprise

G1008: SideCopy

SideCopy is a Pakistani threat group that has primarily targeted South Asian countries, including Indian and Afghani government personnel, since at least 2019. SideCopy's name comes from its infection chain that tries to mimic that of Sidewinder, a suspected Indian threat group.[1]

GroupEnterprise

G1017: Volt Typhoon

Volt Typhoon is a People's Republic of China (PRC) state-sponsored actor that has been active since at least 2021, primarily targeting critical infrastructure organizations in the US and its territories including Guam. Volt Typhoon's targeting and pattern of behavior have been assessed as pre-positioning to enable lateral movement to operational technology (OT) assets for potential destructive or disruptive attacks. Volt Typhoon has emphasized stealth in operations using web shells, living-off-the-land (LOTL) binaries, hands on keyboard activities, and stolen credentials.[1][2][3][4]. The group has leveraged compromised SOHO routers to proxy command and control traffic and obscure its infrastructure, activity associated with the KV botnet.[5].

Reporting indicates a separate initial access cluster, SYLVANITE, has been observed exploiting internet-facing edge devices and transferring access to Volt Typhoon, also tracked as VOLTZITE, for follow-on operations. [6]

MalwareEnterprise

S1138: Gootloader

Gootloader is a Javascript-based infection framework that has been used since at least 2020 as a delivery method for the Gootkit banking trojan, Cobalt Strike, REvil, and others. Gootloader operates on an "Initial Access as a Service" model and has leveraged SEO Poisoning to provide access to entities in multiple sectors worldwide including financial, military, automotive, pharmaceutical, and energy.[1][2]

Windows
MalwareEnterprise

S1153: Cuckoo Stealer

Cuckoo Stealer is a macOS malware with characteristics of spyware and an infostealer that has been in use since at least 2024. Cuckoo Stealer is a universal Mach-O binary that can run on Intel or ARM-based Macs and has been spread through trojanized versions of various potentially unwanted programs or PUP's such as converters, cleaners, and uninstallers.[1][2]

macOS
MalwareEnterprise

S9034: Tsundere Botnet

Tsundere Botnet is a botnet first reported in mid-2025 that is delivered via MSI installer or a PowerShell script. It leverages Node.js and JavaScript for payload delivery and execution, and uses smart contracts on the blockchain to host command and control (C2) addresses. Tsundere Botnet is attributed to a likely Russian-speaking threat actor.

A variant named DinDoor has been linked to MuddyWater operations and uses the Deno runtime for execution rather than Node.js.[1][2][3][4]

LinuxmacOSWindows
MalwareEnterprise

S1111: DarkGate

DarkGate first emerged in 2018 and has evolved into an initial access and data gathering tool associated with various criminal cyber operations. Written in Delphi and named "DarkGate" by its author, DarkGate is associated with credential theft, cryptomining, cryptotheft, and pre-ransomware actions.[1] DarkGate use increased significantly starting in 2022 and is under active development by its author, who provides it as a Malware-as-a-Service offering.[2]

Windows
MalwareEnterprise

S1124: SocGholish

SocGholish is a JavaScript-based loader malware that has been used since at least 2017. It has been observed in use against multiple sectors globally for initial access, primarily through drive-by-downloads masquerading as software updates. SocGholish is operated by Mustard Tempest and its access has been sold to groups including Indrik Spider for downloading secondary RAT and ransomware payloads.[1][2][3][4]

Windows
MalwareEnterprise

S1248: XORIndex Loader

XORIndex Loader is a XOR-encoded loader that collects host data, decodes follow-on scripts and acts as a downloader for the BeaverTail malware. XORIndex Loader was first reported in June 2025. XORIndex Loader has been leveraged by North Korea-affiliated threat actors identified as Contagious Interview. XORIndex Loader has been delivered to victims through code repository sites utilizing typo squatting naming conventions of various npm packages.[1]

Windows
MalwareEnterprise

S9030: SameCoin

SameCoin is a multi-platform wiper with Windows and Android versions that has been used by WIRTE to target entities in the Middle East including in Israel.[1]

WindowsAndroid
MalwareEnterprise

S9019: PureCrypter

PureCrypter is a fully-featured malware loader, developed by a threat actor called “PureCoder," that has been in use since at least 2021 to distribute a variety of remote access trojans and information stealers.[1]

Windows
Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
1.1
Created
Modified
Raw hash
fa863d2a8b0022b5...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(1)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.11.1Current bundlefa863d2a8b00…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

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    Kandji Cuckoo April 2024

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    Open source URL
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    Ernesto Fernández Provecho, Pham Duy Phuc, Ciana Driscoll & Vinoo Thomas. (2023, November 21). The Continued Evolution of the DarkGate Malware-as-a-Service. Retrieved February 9, 2024.

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    Open source URL
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    CISA. (2018, December 18). Analysis Report (AR18-352A) Quasar Open-Source Remote Administration Tool. Retrieved August 1, 2022.

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    Check Point. (2024, November 12). Hamas-affiliated Threat Actor WIRTE Continues its Middle East Operations and Moves to Disruptive Activity. Retrieved April 20, 2026.

    Open source URL
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    Zscaler PureCrypter JUN 2022

    Dumont, R. (2022, June 13). Technical Analysis of PureCrypter: A Fully-Functional Loader Distributing Remote Access Trojans and Information Stealers. Retrieved April 16, 2026.

    Open source URL
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    Korean FSI TA505 2020

    Financial Security Institute. (2020, February 28). Profiling of TA505 Threat Group That Continues to Attack the Financial Sector. Retrieved July 14, 2022.

    Open source URL
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    ESET RedLine Stealer November 2024

    Alexandre Cote Cyr. (2024, November 8). Life on a crooked RedLine: Analyzing the infamous infostealer’s backend. Retrieved September 17, 2025.

    Open source URL
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    Kroll RedLine Stealer August 2024

    George Glass. (2024, August 14). REDLINESTEALER Malware Driving the Initial Access Broker Market. Retrieved September 17, 2025.

    Open source URL
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    Proofpoint RedLine Stealer March 2020

    Proofpoint Threat Insight Team, Jeremy H, Axel F. (2020, March 16). New Redline Password Stealer Malware. Retrieved September 17, 2025.

    Open source URL
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    McAfee RedLine Stealer April 2024

    Mohansundaram M, Neil Tyagi. (2024, April 17). Redline Stealer: A Novel Approach. Retrieved September 17, 2025.

    Open source URL
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    S2W Racoon 2022

    S2W TALON. (2022, June 16). Raccoon Stealer is Back with a New Version. Retrieved August 1, 2024.

    Open source URL
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    Socket GlassWorm January 2026

    Kirill Boychenko. (2026, January 31). GlassWorm Loader Hits Open VSX via Developer Account Compromise. Retrieved April 10, 2026.

    Open source URL
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    Kaspersky Transparent Tribe August 2020

    Dedola, G. (2020, August 20). Transparent Tribe: Evolution analysis, part 1. Retrieved September 2, 2021.

    Open source URL
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    Malwarebytes Saint Bot April 2021

    Hasherezade. (2021, April 6). A deep dive into Saint Bot, a new downloader. Retrieved June 9, 2022.

    Open source URL
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    Palo Alto Unit 42 OutSteel SaintBot February 2022

    Unit 42. (2022, February 25). Spear Phishing Attacks Target Organizations in Ukraine, Payloads Include the Document Stealer OutSteel and the Downloader SaintBot. Retrieved June 9, 2022.

    Open source URL
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    Group IB GrimAgent July 2021

    Priego, A. (2021, July). THE BROTHERS GRIM: THE REVERSING TALE OF GRIMAGENT MALWARE USED BY RYUK. Retrieved September 19, 2024.

    Open source URL
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    Socket HexEval BeaverTail Contagious Interview June 2025

    Kirill Boychenko. (2025, June 25). Another Wave: North Korean Contagious Interview Campaign Drops 35 New Malicious npm Packages. Retrieved October 19, 2025.

    Open source URL
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    PaloAlto ContagiousInterview BeaverTail InvisibleFerret November 2023

    Unit 42. (2023, November 21). Hacking Employers and Seeking Employment: Two Job-Related Campaigns Bear Hallmarks of North Korean Threat Actors. Retrieved October 17, 2025.

    Open source URL
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    ESET Contagious Interview BeaverTail InvisibleFerret February 2025

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    Open source URL
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    Palo Alto Ashen Lepus DEC 2025

    Unit 42. (2025, December 11). Hamas-Affiliated Ashen Lepus Targets Middle Eastern Diplomatic Entities With New AshTag Malware Suite. Retrieved April 20, 2026.

    Open source URL
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    BlackBerry Amadey 2020

    Kasuya, M. (2020, January 8). Threat Spotlight: Amadey Bot Targets Non-Russian Users. Retrieved July 14, 2022.

    Open source URL
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    Fortinet Remcos Campaign NOV 2024

    Zhang, X. (2024, November 8). New Campaign Uses Remcos RAT to Exploit Victims. Retrieved April 16, 2026.

    Open source URL
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    CISA AA24-038A PRC Critical Infrastructure February 2024

    CISA et al.. (2024, February 7). PRC State-Sponsored Actors Compromise and Maintain Persistent Access to U.S. Critical Infrastructure. Retrieved May 15, 2024.

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    Amazon. (n.d.). Instance identity documents. Retrieved April 2, 2021.

    Open source URL
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    Bleepingcomputer RAT malware 2020

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    FBI. (2020, November 19). Indicators of Compromise Associated with Ragnar Locker Ransomware. Retrieved September 12, 2024.

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    Socket HexEval BeaverTail Contagious Interview June 2025

    Kirill Boychenko. (2025, June 25). Another Wave: North Korean Contagious Interview Campaign Drops 35 New Malicious npm Packages. Retrieved October 19, 2025.

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    ESET Contagious Interview BeaverTail InvisibleFerret February 2025

    Matej Havranek. (2025, February 20). DeceptiveDevelopment targets freelance developers. Retrieved October 17, 2025.

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    PaloAlto ContagiousInterview BeaverTail InvisibleFerret November 2023

    Unit 42. (2023, November 21). Hacking Employers and Seeking Employment: Two Job-Related Campaigns Bear Hallmarks of North Korean Threat Actors. Retrieved October 17, 2025.

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    Palo Alto Ashen Lepus DEC 2025

    Unit 42. (2025, December 11). Hamas-Affiliated Ashen Lepus Targets Middle Eastern Diplomatic Entities With New AshTag Malware Suite. Retrieved April 20, 2026.

    Open source URL
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