S0481: Ragnar Locker
Ragnar Locker is a ransomware that has been in use since at least December 2019.[1][2]
Security context for executives and security teams
S0481: Ragnar Locker describes [Ragnar Locker](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0481) is a ransomware that has been in use since at least December 2019.(Citation: Sophos Ragnar May 2020)(Citation: Cynet Ragnar Apr 2020)
Executive priority
S0481: Ragnar Locker is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate S0481: Ragnar Locker by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether S0481: Ragnar Locker appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Ragnar Locker
Ragnar Locker is a ransomware that has been in use since at least December 2019.[1][2]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1486 | Data Encrypted for Impact | Ragnar Locker encrypts files on the local machine and mapped drives prior to displaying a note demanding a ransom.[1][2] |
| Enterprise | T1490 | Inhibit System Recovery | Ragnar Locker can delete volume shadow copies using |
| Enterprise | T1685 | Disable or Modify Tools | Ragnar Locker has attempted to terminate/stop processes and services associated with endpoint security products.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1569.002 | Service ExecutionSub-technique | Ragnar Locker has used sc.exe to execute a service that it creates.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1059.003 | Windows Command ShellSub-technique | Ragnar Locker has used cmd.exe and batch scripts to execute commands.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1564.006 | Run Virtual InstanceSub-technique | Ragnar Locker has used VirtualBox and a stripped Windows XP virtual machine to run itself. The use of a shared folder specified in the configuration enables Ragnar Locker to encrypt files on the host operating system, including files on any mapped drives.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1489 | Service Stop | Ragnar Locker has attempted to stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1614 | System Location Discovery | Before executing malicious code, Ragnar Locker checks the Windows API |
| Enterprise | T1218.010 | Regsvr32Sub-technique | Ragnar Locker has used regsvr32.exe to execute components of VirtualBox.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1543.003 | Windows ServiceSub-technique | Ragnar Locker has used sc.exe to create a new service for the VirtualBox driver.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1218.007 | MsiexecSub-technique | Ragnar Locker has been delivered as an unsigned MSI package that was executed with |
| Enterprise | T1218.011 | Rundll32Sub-technique | Ragnar Locker has used rundll32.exe to execute components of VirtualBox.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1120 | Peripheral Device Discovery | Ragnar Locker may attempt to connect to removable drives and mapped network drives.[1] |
Groups, software, and campaigns
G0061: FIN8
FIN8 is a financially motivated threat group that has been active since at least January 2016, and known for targeting organizations in the hospitality, retail, entertainment, insurance, technology, chemical, and financial sectors. In June 2021, security researchers detected FIN8 switching from targeting point-of-sale (POS) devices to distributing a number of ransomware variants.[1][2][3][4]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.2 | Current bundle | 6aa3a3fac6c5… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.2 | Older bundle | 6aa3a3fac6c5… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Sophos Ragnar May 2020
SophosLabs. (2020, May 21). Ragnar Locker ransomware deploys virtual machine to dodge security. Retrieved June 29, 2020.
Open source URL - [2]Cynet Ragnar Apr 2020
Gold, B. (2020, April 27). Cynet Detection Report: Ragnar Locker Ransomware. Retrieved June 29, 2020.
Open source URL - [3]mitre-attackS0481Open source URL
Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.