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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S0461: SDBbot

SDBbot is a backdoor with installer and loader components that has been used by TA505 since at least 2019.[1][2]

EnterpriseS0461MalwareObject v2.1Modified
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S0461: SDBbot describes [SDBbot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0461) is a backdoor with installer and loader components that has been used by [TA505](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0092) since at least 2019.(Citation: Proofpoint TA505 October 2019)(Citation: IBM TA505 April 2020)

Executive priority

S0461: SDBbot is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S0461: SDBbot by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S0461: SDBbot appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

SDBbot

SDBbot is a backdoor with installer and loader components that has been used by TA505 since at least 2019.[1][2]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

24 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1083File and Directory Discovery

SDBbot has the ability to get directory listings or drive information on a compromised host.[1]

EnterpriseT1070Indicator Removal

SDBbot has the ability to clean up and remove data structures from a compromised host.[1]

EnterpriseT1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

SDBbot has the ability to decrypt and decompress its payload to enable code execution.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1090Proxy

SDBbot has the ability to use port forwarding to establish a proxy between a target host and C2.[1]

EnterpriseT1546.011Application ShimmingSub-technique

SDBbot has the ability to use application shimming for persistence if it detects it is running as admin on Windows XP or 7, by creating a shim database to patch services.exe.[1]

EnterpriseT1055.001Dynamic-link Library InjectionSub-technique

SDBbot has the ability to inject a downloaded DLL into a newly created rundll32.exe process.[1]

EnterpriseT1218.011Rundll32Sub-technique

SDBbot has used rundll32.exe to execute DLLs.CitationKorean FSI TA505 2020

EnterpriseT1027.002Software PackingSub-technique

SDBbot has used a packed installer file.[2]

EnterpriseT1614System Location Discovery

SDBbot can collected the country code of a compromised machine.CitationKorean FSI TA505 2020

EnterpriseT1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique

SDBbot has the ability to add a value to the Registry Run key to establish persistence if it detects it is running with regular user privilege. [1][2]

EnterpriseT1005Data from Local System

SDBbot has the ability to access the file system on a compromised host.[1]

EnterpriseT1021.001Remote Desktop ProtocolSub-technique

SDBbot has the ability to use RDP to connect to victim's machines.[1]

EnterpriseT1105Ingress Tool Transfer

SDBbot has the ability to download a DLL from C2 to a compromised host.[1]

EnterpriseT1082System Information Discovery

SDBbot has the ability to identify the OS version, OS bit information and computer name.[1]CitationKorean FSI TA505 2020

EnterpriseT1125Video Capture

SDBbot has the ability to record video on a compromised host.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1546.012Image File Execution Options InjectionSub-technique

SDBbot has the ability to use image file execution options for persistence if it detects it is running with admin privileges on a Windows version newer than Windows 7.[1]

EnterpriseT1016System Network Configuration Discovery

SDBbot has the ability to determine the domain name and whether a proxy is configured on a compromised host.[1]

EnterpriseT1033System Owner/User Discovery

SDBbot has the ability to identify the user on a compromised host.[1]

EnterpriseT1095Non-Application Layer Protocol

SDBbot has the ability to communicate with C2 with TCP over port 443.[1]

EnterpriseT1041Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

SDBbot has sent collected data from a compromised host to its C2 servers.CitationKorean FSI TA505 2020

EnterpriseT1057Process Discovery

SDBbot can enumerate a list of running processes on a compromised machine.CitationKorean FSI TA505 2020

EnterpriseT1059.003Windows Command ShellSub-technique

SDBbot has the ability to use the command shell to execute commands on a compromised host.[1]

EnterpriseT1027Obfuscated Files or Information

SDBbot has the ability to XOR the strings for its installer component with a hardcoded 128 byte key.[1]

EnterpriseT1070.004File DeletionSub-technique

SDBbot has the ability to delete files from a compromised host.[1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupEnterprise

G0092: TA505

TA505 is a cyber criminal group that has been active since at least 2014. TA505 is known for frequently changing malware, driving global trends in criminal malware distribution, and ransomware campaigns involving Clop.[1][2][3][4][5]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
2.1
Created
Modified
Raw hash
6be836644f70a346...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.22.1Current bundle6be836644f70…
19.12.1Older bundle6be836644f70…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Proofpoint TA505 October 2019

    Schwarz, D. et al. (2019, October 16). TA505 Distributes New SDBbot Remote Access Trojan with Get2 Downloader. Retrieved May 29, 2020.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    IBM TA505 April 2020

    Frydrych, M. (2020, April 14). TA505 Continues to Infect Networks With SDBbot RAT. Retrieved May 29, 2020.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    mitre-attackS0461
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.