S1240: RedLine Stealer
RedLine Stealer is an information-stealer malware variant first identified in 2020.[1][2][3] RedLine Stealer is a Malware as a Service (MaaS) and was reportedly sold as either a one-time purchase or a monthly subscription service.[1][4] Information obtained from RedLine Stealer has been known to be sold on the deep and dark web to Initial Access Brokers (IABs), who use or resell the stolen credentials for further intrusions.[5][4]
Security context for executives and security teams
S1240: RedLine Stealer describes [RedLine Stealer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1240) is an information-stealer malware variant first identified in 2020.(Citation: ESET RedLine Stealer November 2024)(Citation: Proofpoint RedLine Stealer March 2020)(Citation: Splunk RedLine Stealer June 2023) [RedLine Stealer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1240) is a Malware as a Service (MaaS) and was reportedly sold as either a one-time purchase or a monthly subscription service.(Citation: ESET RedLine Stealer November 2024)(Citation: Veriti RedLine St...
Executive priority
S1240: RedLine Stealer is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate S1240: RedLine Stealer by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether S1240: RedLine Stealer appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
RedLine Stealer
RedLine Stealer is an information-stealer malware variant first identified in 2020.[1][2][3] RedLine Stealer is a Malware as a Service (MaaS) and was reportedly sold as either a one-time purchase or a monthly subscription service.[1][4] Information obtained from RedLine Stealer has been known to be sold on the deep and dark web to Initial Access Brokers (IABs), who use or resell the stolen credentials for further intrusions.[5][4]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1553.002 | Code SigningSub-technique | RedLine Stealer has used both valid certificates and self-signed digital certificates to appear legitimate.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1685 | Disable or Modify Tools | RedLine Stealer can disable security software and update services.[3] |
| Enterprise | T1033 | System Owner/User Discovery | RedLine Stealer has obtained the username from the victim’s machine.[2][3][4] |
| Enterprise | T1518.001 | Security Software DiscoverySub-technique | RedLine Stealer has identified installed antivirus software on the system.[5][4] |
| Enterprise | T1012 | Query Registry | RedLine Stealer can query the Windows Registry.CitationMcAfee RedLine Stealer April 2024 |
| Enterprise | T1113 | Screen Capture | RedLine Stealer can capture screenshots on a compromised host.CitationMcAfee RedLine Stealer April 2024[3] |
| Enterprise | T1204.002 | Malicious FileSub-technique | RedLine Stealer malware has been executed through the download of malicious files.[1][5][4] RedLine Stealer has also lured users to install malware with an Install Wizard interface.CitationMcAfee RedLine Stealer April 2024 |
| Enterprise | T1657 | Financial Theft | |
| Enterprise | T1087.001 | Local AccountSub-technique | RedLine Stealer has collected account information from the victim’s machine.[2][3] |
| Enterprise | T1036 | Masquerading | RedLine Stealer malware has masqueraded as legitimate software such as "PDF Converter Software" which has been distributed through poisoned search engine results often resembling legitimate software lures with the combination of typo squatted domains.[5] |
| Enterprise | T1027.002 | Software PackingSub-technique | RedLine Stealer has used obfuscation tools such as DNGuard and Boxed App to pack their code.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1614 | System Location Discovery | RedLine Stealer has gathered detailed information about victims’ systems, such as IP addresses, and geolocation.[1][5][2] RedLine Stealer has also checked the IP from where it was being executed and leveraged an opensource geolocation IP-lookup service. CitationMcAfee RedLine Stealer April 2024 |
| Enterprise | T1027.013 | Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique | RedLine Stealer has encrypted and encoded configuration data with Base64 and XOR functions.[3] |
| Enterprise | T1614.001 | System Language DiscoverySub-technique | RedLine Stealer can retrieve system default language and time zone.[3] |
| Enterprise | T1102 | Web Service | RedLine Stealer has leveraged legitimate file sharing web services to host malicious payloads.[2][3] |
| Enterprise | T1016 | System Network Configuration Discovery | RedLine Stealer can enumeate information about victims’ systems including IP addresses.[5] |
| Enterprise | T1059.011 | LuaSub-technique | RedLine Stealer malware has leveraged Lua bytecode to perform malicious behavior.CitationMcAfee RedLine Stealer April 2024 |
| Enterprise | T1005 | Data from Local System | RedLine Stealer has collected data stored locally including chat logs and files associated with chat services such as Steam, Discord, and Telegram.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | RedLine Stealer has the ability download additional payloads.[5][4] |
| Enterprise | T1132.001 | Standard EncodingSub-technique | RedLine Stealer has used Base64 to encode command and control traffic.CitationMcAfee RedLine Stealer April 2024 |
| Enterprise | T1539 | Steal Web Session Cookie | RedLine Stealer has stolen browser cookies and settings.[1][5][2][3] |
| Enterprise | T1217 | Browser Information Discovery | RedLine Stealer can collect information from browsers and browser extensions.[3] |
| Enterprise | T1555 | Credentials from Password Stores | RedLine Stealer has obtained credentials from VPN services, FTP clients and Instant Messenger (IM)/Chat clients.[5][2][3] |
| Enterprise | T1555.003 | Credentials from Web BrowsersSub-technique | RedLine Stealer was designed to steal sensitive information from web browsers, including credit card details, saved credentials, and autocomplete data.[1] RedLine Stealer can also gather credentials from several browsers.[5][2][3] |
| Enterprise | T1140 | Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information | RedLine Stealer has decoded its payload prior to execution.[3] |
| Enterprise | T1041 | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel | RedLine Stealer has sent victim data to its C2 server or RedLine panel server.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1218.007 | MsiexecSub-technique | RedLine Stealer has been installed via MSI Installer.CitationMcAfee RedLine Stealer April 2024 |
| Enterprise | T1082 | System Information Discovery | RedLine Stealer can collect information about the local system.[5][2][3][4] |
| Enterprise | T1071.001 | Web ProtocolsSub-technique | RedLine Stealer has utilized HTTP for C2 communications.CitationMcAfee RedLine Stealer April 2024 RedLine Stealer has also conducted C2 communications to hardcoded C2 servers over HTTPS.[1][3] RedLine Stealer has leveraged SOAP protocol for C2 communications.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1480 | Execution Guardrails | RedLine Stealer has built in settings to not operate based on geolocation or country of the victim host.[1][2] |
| Enterprise | T1053.005 | Scheduled TaskSub-technique | RedLine Stealer has achieved persistence via scheduled tasks.CitationMcAfee RedLine Stealer April 2024 |
| Enterprise | T1497 | Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion | RedLine Stealer has an anti-sandbox technique that requires the malware to consistently check with the C2 server, if the communication fails RedLine Stealer will not continue execution.[3] |
| Enterprise | T1027.010 | Command ObfuscationSub-technique | RedLine Stealer has obfuscated scripts within text files used in execution.CitationMcAfee RedLine Stealer April 2024 |
| Enterprise | T1059.003 | Windows Command ShellSub-technique | RedLine Stealer has executed windows cmd using `ErrorHandler.cmd` to create scheduled tasks.CitationMcAfee RedLine Stealer April 2024 |
| Enterprise | T1518 | Software Discovery | RedLine Stealer can get a list of programs on the victim device.[3] |
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.0 | Current bundle | 9db7b3a9008e… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Older bundle | 9db7b3a9008e… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]ESET RedLine Stealer November 2024
Alexandre Cote Cyr. (2024, November 8). Life on a crooked RedLine: Analyzing the infamous infostealer’s backend. Retrieved September 17, 2025.
Open source URL - [2]Proofpoint RedLine Stealer March 2020
Proofpoint Threat Insight Team, Jeremy H, Axel F. (2020, March 16). New Redline Password Stealer Malware. Retrieved September 17, 2025.
Open source URL - [3]Splunk RedLine Stealer June 2023
Splunk Threat Research Team. (2023, June 1). Do Not Cross The 'RedLine' Stealer: Detections and Analysis. Retrieved September 17, 2025.
Open source URL - [4]Veriti RedLine Stealer MAAS April 2023
Yair Herling. (2023, April 4). From ChatGPT to RedLine Stealer: The Dark Side of OpenAI and Google Bard. Retrieved September 17, 2025.
Open source URL - [5]Kroll RedLine Stealer August 2024
George Glass. (2024, August 14). REDLINESTEALER Malware Driving the Initial Access Broker Market. Retrieved September 17, 2025.
Open source URL - [6]mitre-attackS1240Open source URL
Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.