S9019: PureCrypter
PureCrypter is a fully-featured malware loader, developed by a threat actor called “PureCoder," that has been in use since at least 2021 to distribute a variety of remote access trojans and information stealers.[1]
Security context for executives and security teams
S9019: PureCrypter describes PureCrypter is a fully-featured malware loader, developed by a threat actor called “PureCoder," that has been in use since at least 2021 to distribute a variety of remote access trojans and information stealers.(Citation: Zscaler PureCrypter JUN 2022)
Executive priority
S9019: PureCrypter is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate S9019: PureCrypter by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether S9019: PureCrypter appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
PureCrypter
PureCrypter is a fully-featured malware loader, developed by a threat actor called “PureCoder," that has been in use since at least 2021 to distribute a variety of remote access trojans and information stealers.[1]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1057 | Process Discovery | PureCrypter can enumerate processes on compromised hosts.CitationCheck Point Blind Eagle MAR 2025 |
| Enterprise | T1082 | System Information Discovery | PureCrypter can enumerate a targeted system's SerialNumber and Version.[1]CitationCheck Point Blind Eagle MAR 2025 |
| Enterprise | T1480.002 | Mutual ExclusionSub-technique | PureCrypter code contains a global mutex.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1673 | Virtual Machine Discovery | PureCrypter can identify virtual machines by querying the WMI object Win32_ComputerSystem for manufacturer and model and check it against the regular expression Microsoft|VMWare|Virtual.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1102 | Web Service | PureCrypter can use Telegram or Discord to send infection status messages.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1685 | Disable or Modify Tools | PureCrypter has executed `Set-MpPreference -ExclusionPath` to exclude files or folders from Windows Defender scans.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1033 | System Owner/User Discovery | PureCrypter can retrieve the username from targeted machines.CitationCheck Point Blind Eagle MAR 2025 |
| Enterprise | T1036.005 | Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationSub-technique | PureCrypter has used multiple file names to appear legitimate such as firefox\firefox.exe, Google\chrome.exe, and Taskmgr.exe.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1140 | Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information | PureCrypter can decrypt downloaded resources and parse internal files to determine its settings.[1]CitationCheck Point Blind Eagle MAR 2025 |
| Enterprise | T1614 | System Location Discovery | PureCrypter can use `kernel32!GetGeoInfo` to determine system location.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1518.001 | Security Software DiscoverySub-technique | PureCrypter can identify installed antivirus solutions.CitationCheck Point Blind Eagle MAR 2025 |
| Enterprise | T1622 | Debugger Evasion | PureCrypter has the ability to call `CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent`.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1053.005 | Scheduled TaskSub-technique | PureCrypter can maintain persistence with scheduled tasks.CitationCheck Point Blind Eagle MAR 2025 |
| Enterprise | T1573.002 | Asymmetric CryptographySub-technique | PureCrypter can send a TLS 1.2 encrypted infection message via Discord webhook.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1547.001 | Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique | PureCrypter can set multiple Registry Run keys to establish persistence.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1480 | Execution Guardrails | PureCrypter code contains an ExclusionRegionNames option where it can compare the results of `kernel32!GetGeoInfo` with a list of regions.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | PureCrypter can download additional payloads for execution on the compromised host.[1]CitationCheck Point Blind Eagle MAR 2025 |
| Enterprise | T1059.001 | PowerShellSub-technique | PureCrypter can execute PowerShell commands to exclude files from EDR and to self-delete.[1]CitationCheck Point Blind Eagle MAR 2025 |
| Enterprise | T1573.001 | Symmetric CryptographySub-technique | PureCrypter can use AES to encrypt system information sent to the C2.CitationCheck Point Blind Eagle MAR 2025 |
| Enterprise | T1036.008 | Masquerade File TypeSub-technique | PureCrypter has used a .NET downloader named 63342221.BAT and has used .jpg, .png, and .log as false extensions for malicious files.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1055 | Process Injection | PureCrypter can inject its final stage into another process on the targeted system.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1564.003 | Hidden WindowSub-technique | PureCrypter can set `ProcessWindowStyle.Hidden` to hide windows on victim machines.CitationCheck Point Blind Eagle MAR 2025 |
| Enterprise | T1070.004 | File DeletionSub-technique | PureCrypter can execute a PowerShell command to self-delete.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1678 | Delay Execution | PureCrypter has the ability to delay for a specified number of seconds before execution.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1027.016 | Junk Code InsertionSub-technique | PureCrypter can insert junk code to avoid detection.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1027.013 | Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique | PureCrypter has used SmartAssembly and NET-Reactor for string encryption and control flow obfuscation.[1]CitationCheck Point Blind Eagle MAR 2025 |
Groups, software, and campaigns
G0099: APT-C-36
APT-C-36 is a suspected South American threat group that has engaged in espionage and financially motivated operations since at least 2018. APT-C-36 has targeted government institutions and entities in the financial, energy, and professional manufacturing sectors across Colombia and other Latin American countries.[1][2][3][4]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.0 | Current bundle | 99d6c6644886… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Older bundle | 99d6c6644886… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Zscaler PureCrypter JUN 2022
Dumont, R. (2022, June 13). Technical Analysis of PureCrypter: A Fully-Functional Loader Distributing Remote Access Trojans and Information Stealers. Retrieved April 16, 2026.
Open source URL - [2]mitre-attackS9019Open source URL
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