S9034: Tsundere Botnet
Tsundere Botnet is a botnet first reported in mid-2025 that is delivered via MSI installer or a PowerShell script. It leverages Node.js and JavaScript for payload delivery and execution, and uses smart contracts on the blockchain to host command and control (C2) addresses. Tsundere Botnet is attributed to a likely Russian-speaking threat actor.
A variant named DinDoor has been linked to MuddyWater operations and uses the Deno runtime for execution rather than Node.js.[1][2][3][4]
Security context for executives and security teams
S9034: Tsundere Botnet describes [Tsundere Botnet](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9034) is a botnet first reported in mid-2025 that is delivered via MSI installer or a PowerShell script. It leverages Node.js and JavaScript for payload delivery and execution, and uses smart contracts on the blockchain to host command and control (C2) addresses. [Tsundere Botnet](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9034) is attributed to a likely Russian-speaking threat actor. A variant named DinDoor has been linked to [MuddyWater](https://attack.mitre.org/groups...
Executive priority
S9034: Tsundere Botnet is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate S9034: Tsundere Botnet by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Linux, macOS, Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether S9034: Tsundere Botnet appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Tsundere Botnet
Tsundere Botnet is a botnet first reported in mid-2025 that is delivered via MSI installer or a PowerShell script. It leverages Node.js and JavaScript for payload delivery and execution, and uses smart contracts on the blockchain to host command and control (C2) addresses. Tsundere Botnet is attributed to a likely Russian-speaking threat actor.
A variant named DinDoor has been linked to MuddyWater operations and uses the Deno runtime for execution rather than Node.js.[1][2][3][4]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1567.002 | Exfiltration to Cloud StorageSub-technique | Tsundere Botnet’s variant DinDoor has used Rclone to access a Wasabi server.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1480 | Execution Guardrails | Tsundere Botnet has checked the victim machine’s location to avoid infecting in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) region.[4] |
| Enterprise | T1071.001 | Web ProtocolsSub-technique | Tsundere Botnet has obtained the WebSocket C2 address by making remote procedure call (RPC) APIs to Ethereum blockchain nodes.[4][3] |
| Enterprise | T1614 | System Location Discovery | Tsundere Botnet has checked the victim machine’s location by obtaining the culture name of the machine.[4] |
| Enterprise | T1195.001 | Compromise Software Dependencies and Development ToolsSub-technique | Tsundere Botnet has used the Node Package Manager (npm) to download malicious packages and to deliver the payload.[4] |
| Enterprise | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | Tsundere Botnet’s loader component has downloaded the zip file node-v18.17.0-win-x64.zip from the official Node.js website, as well as pm2, a Node.js process management tool.[4] |
| Enterprise | T1102.001 | Dead Drop ResolverSub-technique | Tsundere Botnet has obtained the C2 address from Ethereum blockchain nodes.[4][3] |
| Enterprise | T1547.001 | Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique | Tsundere Botnet has created a value in the `HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run` Registry key, ensuring that it is run at login.[4][3] |
| Enterprise | T1027.013 | Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique | Tsundere Botnet’s loader contained AES-CBC/PKCS7 encrypted blobs, which were descrypted and written to disk.[3] |
| Enterprise | T1059.007 | JavaScriptSub-technique | Tsundere Botnet has the ability to run JavaScript code from the C2 server. Additionally, Tsundere Botnet has used Node.js to execute JavaScript code for the loader component.[4] |
| Enterprise | T1059.001 | PowerShellSub-technique | Tsundere Botnet has been distributed via a PowerShell script.[4][3] |
| Enterprise | T1027.010 | Command ObfuscationSub-technique | Tsundere Botnet’s MSI installer has Base64-encoded command execution.[4] |
| Enterprise | T1082 | System Information Discovery | Tsundere Botnet has collected the machine’s MAC address, total memory, GPU information and other system information.[4] |
| Enterprise | T1036.005 | Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationSub-technique | Tsundere Botnet has disguised its MSI installer as a fake installer for popular games and software.[4] |
| Enterprise | T1218.007 | MsiexecSub-technique | Tsundere Botnet has been distributed via an MSI installer.[4] |
| Enterprise | T1140 | Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information | Tsundere Botnet’s loader has decrypted obfuscated JavaScript files using the AES-256 CBC algorithm, a build-specific key, and initialization vector.[4][3] |
| Enterprise | T1564.003 | Hidden WindowSub-technique | Tsundere Botnet’s MSI installer has used `-WindowStyle Hidden` to hide Tsundere Botnet’s execution from the user.[4] |
Groups, software, and campaigns
G0069: MuddyWater
MuddyWater is a cyber espionage group assessed to be a subordinate element within Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS).[1] Since at least 2017, MuddyWater has targeted a range of government and private organizations across sectors, including telecommunications, local government, finance, defense, and oil and natural gas organizations, in the Middle East (specifically the UAE and Saudi Arabia), Asia, Africa, Europe, and North America. MuddyWater has reused domains dating back to October 2025, and has a preference for NameCheap and Hosterdaddy Private Limited (AS136557). In late 2025 and early 2026, MuddyWater used commercial satellite internet (i.e., Starlink) for command and control (C2) communication. [2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.0 | Current bundle | f6ead6b804a9… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Older bundle | f6ead6b804a9… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Checkpoint_MOISCyberCrime_Mar2026
CheckPoint Research. (2026, March 10). Iranian MOIS Actors & the Cyber Crime Connection. Retrieved March 12, 2026.
Open source URL - [2]SOCRadar_MuddyWaterDindoor_Mar2026
SOCRadar. (2026, March 9). MuddyWater Uses Dindoor Malware Targeting U.S. Networks. Retrieved March 12, 2026.
Open source URL - [3]CAL_MuddyWater_Mar2026
Ctrl-Alt-Intel. (2026, March 4). MuddyWater Exposed: Inside an Iranian APT operation . Retrieved April 6, 2026.
Open source URL - [4]SecureListUbiedo_Tsundere_Nov2025
Ubiedo, L. (2025, November 20). Blockchain and Node.js abused by Tsundere: an emerging botnet. Retrieved April 6, 2026.
Open source URL - [5]DinDoor
(Citation: Checkpoint_MOISCyberCrime_Mar2026)
- [6]mitre-attackS9034Open source URL
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