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MITRE ATT&CK® Group

G0092: TA505

TA505 is a cyber criminal group that has been active since at least 2014. TA505 is known for frequently changing malware, driving global trends in criminal malware distribution, and ransomware campaigns involving Clop.[1][2][3][4][5]

EnterpriseG0092GroupObject v3.0Modified
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Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

G0092: TA505 describes [TA505](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0092) is a cyber criminal group that has been active since at least 2014. [TA505](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0092) is known for frequently changing malware, driving global trends in criminal malware distribution, and ransomware campaigns involving [Clop](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0611).(Citation: Proofpoint TA505 Sep 2017)(Citation: Proofpoint TA505 June 2018)(Citation: Proofpoint TA505 Jan 2019)(Citation: NCC Group TA505)(Citation: Korean FSI TA505 2020)

Executive priority

G0092: TA505 is an official MITRE ATT&CK group. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate G0092: TA505 by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (the platforms named in the official object), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata

Detection direction

  • Validate whether G0092: TA505 appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

TA505

TA505 is a cyber criminal group that has been active since at least 2014. TA505 is known for frequently changing malware, driving global trends in criminal malware distribution, and ransomware campaigns involving Clop.[1][2][3][4][5]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

34 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1087.003Email AccountSub-technique

TA505 has used the tool EmailStealer to steal and send lists of e-mail addresses to a remote server.CitationTrend Micro TA505 June 2019

EnterpriseT1583.001DomainsSub-technique

TA505 has registered domains to impersonate services such as Dropbox to distribute malware.[5]

EnterpriseT1553.005Mark-of-the-Web BypassSub-technique

TA505 has used .iso files to deploy malicious .lnk files.CitationTrendMicro TA505 Aug 2019

EnterpriseT1218.007MsiexecSub-technique

TA505 has used msiexec to download and execute malicious Windows Installer files.CitationCybereason TA505 April 2019CitationDeep Instinct TA505 Apr 2019CitationTrend Micro TA505 June 2019

EnterpriseT1112Modify Registry

TA505 has used malware to disable Windows Defender through modification of the Registry.[5]

EnterpriseT1588.002ToolSub-technique

TA505 has used a variety of tools in their operations, including AdFind, BloodHound, Mimikatz, and PowerSploit.[4]

EnterpriseT1204.002Malicious FileSub-technique

TA505 has used lures to get users to enable content in malicious attachments and execute malicious files contained in archives. For example, TA505 makes their malware look like legitimate Microsoft Word documents, .pdf and/or .lnk files. [1][2][3]CitationCybereason TA505 April 2019CitationProofPoint SettingContent-ms July 2018CitationProofpoint TA505 Mar 2018CitationTrend Micro TA505 June 2019CitationProofpoint TA505 October 2019[6]

EnterpriseT1568.001Fast Flux DNSSub-technique

TA505 has used fast flux to mask botnets by distributing payloads across multiple IPs.CitationTrend Micro TA505 June 2019

EnterpriseT1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique

TA505 has password-protected malicious Word documents.[1]

EnterpriseT1027.002Software PackingSub-technique

TA505 has used UPX to obscure malicious code.[6]

EnterpriseT1552.001Credentials In FilesSub-technique

TA505 has used malware to gather credentials from FTP clients and Outlook.[1]

EnterpriseT1059.005Visual BasicSub-technique

TA505 has used VBS for code execution.[1][2]CitationTrend Micro TA505 June 2019[6]

EnterpriseT1059.007JavaScriptSub-technique

TA505 has used JavaScript for code execution.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1204.001Malicious LinkSub-technique

TA505 has used lures to get users to click links in emails and attachments. For example, TA505 makes their malware look like legitimate Microsoft Word documents, .pdf and/or .lnk files. [1][2][3]CitationCybereason TA505 April 2019CitationProofPoint SettingContent-ms July 2018CitationProofpoint TA505 Mar 2018CitationTrend Micro TA505 June 2019CitationProofpoint TA505 October 2019

EnterpriseT1608.001Upload MalwareSub-technique

TA505 has staged malware on actor-controlled domains.[5]

EnterpriseT1218.011Rundll32Sub-technique

TA505 has leveraged rundll32.exe to execute malicious DLLs.CitationCybereason TA505 April 2019CitationDeep Instinct TA505 Apr 2019

EnterpriseT1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

TA505 has decrypted packed DLLs with an XOR key.[4]

EnterpriseT1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersSub-technique

TA505 has used malware to gather credentials from Internet Explorer.[1]

EnterpriseT1027.010Command ObfuscationSub-technique

TA505 has used base64 encoded PowerShell commands.CitationCybereason TA505 April 2019CitationDeep Instinct TA505 Apr 2019

EnterpriseT1069Permission Groups Discovery

TA505 has used TinyMet to enumerate members of privileged groups.[6] TA505 has also run net group /domain.CitationTrend Micro TA505 June 2019

EnterpriseT1105Ingress Tool Transfer

TA505 has downloaded additional malware to execute on victim systems.CitationCybereason TA505 April 2019CitationDeep Instinct TA505 Apr 2019CitationProofPoint SettingContent-ms July 2018

EnterpriseT1588.001MalwareSub-technique

TA505 has used malware such as Azorult and Cobalt Strike in their operations.[4]

EnterpriseT1078.002Domain AccountsSub-technique

TA505 has used stolen domain admin accounts to compromise additional hosts.[6]

EnterpriseT1553.002Code SigningSub-technique

TA505 has signed payloads with code signing certificates from Thawte and Sectigo.CitationCybereason TA505 April 2019CitationDeep Instinct TA505 Apr 2019CitationTrend Micro TA505 June 2019

EnterpriseT1486Data Encrypted for Impact

TA505 has used a wide variety of ransomware, such as Clop, Locky, Jaff, Bart, Philadelphia, and GlobeImposter, to encrypt victim files and demand a ransom payment.[1]

EnterpriseT1059.001PowerShellSub-technique

TA505 has used PowerShell to download and execute malware and reconnaissance scripts.[1]CitationProofPoint SettingContent-ms July 2018CitationCybereason TA505 April 2019CitationDeep Instinct TA505 Apr 2019

EnterpriseT1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentSub-technique

TA505 has used spearphishing emails with malicious attachments to initially compromise victims.[1][2][3]CitationCybereason TA505 April 2019CitationProofPoint SettingContent-ms July 2018CitationProofpoint TA505 Mar 2018CitationTrend Micro TA505 June 2019CitationProofpoint TA505 October 2019[6]

EnterpriseT1106Native API

TA505 has deployed payloads that use Windows API calls on a compromised host.[5]

EnterpriseT1566.002Spearphishing LinkSub-technique

TA505 has sent spearphishing emails containing malicious links.[1][3]CitationTrend Micro TA505 June 2019CitationProofpoint TA505 October 2019

EnterpriseT1685Disable or Modify Tools

TA505 has used malware to disable Windows Defender.[5]

EnterpriseT1559.002Dynamic Data ExchangeSub-technique

TA505 has leveraged malicious Word documents that abused DDE.[2]

EnterpriseT1055.001Dynamic-link Library InjectionSub-technique

TA505 has been seen injecting a DLL into winword.exe.[6]

EnterpriseT1071.001Web ProtocolsSub-technique

TA505 has used HTTP to communicate with C2 nodes.[6]

EnterpriseT1059.003Windows Command ShellSub-technique

TA505 has executed commands using cmd.exe.CitationTrend Micro TA505 June 2019

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

MalwareEnterprise

S0611: Clop

Clop is a ransomware family that was first observed in February 2019 and has been used against retail, transportation and logistics, education, manufacturing, engineering, automotive, energy, financial, aerospace, telecommunications, professional and legal services, healthcare, and high tech industries. Clop is a variant of the CryptoMix ransomware.[1][2][3]

Windows
MalwareEnterprise

S0344: Azorult

Azorult is a commercial Trojan that is used to steal information from compromised hosts. Azorult has been observed in the wild as early as 2016. In July 2018, Azorult was seen used in a spearphishing campaign against targets in North America. Azorult has been seen used for cryptocurrency theft. [1][2]

Windows
ToolEnterprise

S0002: Mimikatz

Mimikatz is a credential dumper capable of obtaining plaintext Windows account logins and passwords, along with many other features that make it useful for testing the security of networks. [1] [2]

Windows
MalwareEnterprise

S0384: Dridex

Dridex is a prolific banking Trojan that first appeared in 2014. By December 2019, the US Treasury estimated Dridex had infected computers in hundreds of banks and financial institutions in over 40 countries, leading to more than $100 million in theft. Dridex was created from the source code of the Bugat banking Trojan (also known as Cridex).[1][2][3]

Windows
MalwareEnterprise

S0266: TrickBot

TrickBot is a Trojan spyware program written in C++ that first emerged in September 2016 as a possible successor to Dyre. TrickBot was developed and initially used by Wizard Spider for targeting banking sites in North America, Australia, and throughout Europe; it has since been used against all sectors worldwide as part of "big game hunting" ransomware campaigns.[1][2][3][4]

Windows
MalwareEnterprise

S0154: Cobalt Strike

Cobalt Strike is a commercial, full-featured, remote access tool that bills itself as “adversary simulation software designed to execute targeted attacks and emulate the post-exploitation actions of advanced threat actors”. Cobalt Strike’s interactive post-exploit capabilities cover the full range of ATT&CK tactics, all executed within a single, integrated system.[1]

In addition to its own capabilities, Cobalt Strike leverages the capabilities of other well-known tools such as Metasploit and Mimikatz.[1]

LinuxmacOSWindows
Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · ToolS0552: AdFindEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1087.003: Email AccountEnterpriseuses · MalwareS0611: ClopEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1583.001: DomainsEnterpriseuses · MalwareS0344: AzorultEnterpriseuses · MalwareS0381: FlawedAmmyyEnterpriseuses · ToolS0002: MimikatzEnterpriseuses · MalwareS0384: DridexEnterpriseuses · MalwareS0266: TrickBotEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1553.005: Mark-of-the-Web BypassEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1218.007: MsiexecEnterpriseuses · MalwareS0460: Get2Enterpriseuses · TechniqueT1112: Modify RegistryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1588.002: ToolEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1204.002: Malicious FileEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1568.001: Fast Flux DNSEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1027.013: Encrypted/Encoded FileEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1027.002: Software PackingEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1552.001: Credentials In FilesEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1059.005: Visual BasicEnterpriseuses · MalwareS0383: FlawedGraceEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1059.007: JavaScriptEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1204.001: Malicious LinkEnterpriseuses · MalwareS0154: Cobalt StrikeEnterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
20.0
Object version
3.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
f951dee919a7c96b...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(3)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
20.03.0Current bundlef951dee919a7…
19.23.0Older bundlef951dee919a7…
19.13.0Older bundle7fb924ac7a47…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Proofpoint TA505 Sep 2017

    Proofpoint Staff. (2017, September 27). Threat Actor Profile: TA505, From Dridex to GlobeImposter. Retrieved May 28, 2019.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Proofpoint TA505 June 2018

    Proofpoint Staff. (2018, June 8). TA505 shifts with the times. Retrieved May 28, 2019.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    Proofpoint TA505 Jan 2019

    Schwarz, D. and Proofpoint Staff. (2019, January 9). ServHelper and FlawedGrace - New malware introduced by TA505. Retrieved May 28, 2019.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    NCC Group TA505

    Terefos, A. (2020, November 18). TA505: A Brief History of Their Time. Retrieved July 14, 2022.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    Korean FSI TA505 2020

    Financial Security Institute. (2020, February 28). Profiling of TA505 Threat Group That Continues to Attack the Financial Sector. Retrieved July 14, 2022.

    Open source URL
  6. [6]
    IBM TA505 April 2020

    Frydrych, M. (2020, April 14). TA505 Continues to Infect Networks With SDBbot RAT. Retrieved May 29, 2020.

    Open source URL
  7. [7]
    CHIMBORAZO

    (Citation: Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023)

  8. [8]
    Hive0065

    (Citation: IBM TA505 April 2020)

  9. [9]
    Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023

    Microsoft . (2023, July 12). How Microsoft names threat actors. Retrieved November 17, 2023.

    Open source URL
  10. [10]
    Spandex Tempest

    (Citation: Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023)

  11. [11]
    mitre-attackG0092
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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