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MITRE ATT&CK® Technique

T1426: System Information Discovery

Adversaries may attempt to get detailed information about a device’s operating system and hardware, including versions, patches, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not to fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.

On Android, much of this information is programmatically accessible to applications through the `android.os.Build` class. [1] iOS is much more restrictive with what information is visible to applications. Typically, applications will only be able to query the device model and which version of iOS it is running.

MobileT1426TechniqueObject v1.2Modified
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Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

T1426: System Information Discovery describes Adversaries may attempt to get detailed information about a device’s operating system and hardware, including versions, patches, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from [System Information Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1426) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not to fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. On Android, much of this information is programmatically accessible to applications through the `android.os.Build`...

Executive priority

T1426: System Information Discovery is an official MITRE ATT&CK technique. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate T1426: System Information Discovery by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (discovery), supported platforms (Android, iOS), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Endpoint process, command-line, and script execution logs

Detection direction

  • Validate whether T1426: System Information Discovery appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

System Information Discovery

Adversaries may attempt to get detailed information about a device’s operating system and hardware, including versions, patches, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not to fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.

On Android, much of this information is programmatically accessible to applications through the `android.os.Build` class. [1] iOS is much more restrictive with what information is visible to applications. Typically, applications will only be able to query the device model and which version of iOS it is running.

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Related techniques

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

1 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
MobileT1419Device Type DiscoveryDevice Type Discovery revoked by this object.
Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupMobile

G0112: Windshift

Windshift is a threat group that has been active since at least 2017, targeting specific individuals for surveillance in government departments and critical infrastructure across the Middle East.[1][2][3]

MalwareMobile

S0288: KeyRaider

KeyRaider is malware that steals Apple account credentials and other data from jailbroken iOS devices. It also has ransomware functionality. [1]

MalwareMobile

S1083: Chameleon

Chameleon is an Android banking trojan that can leverage Android’s Accessibility Services to perform malicious activities. Believed to have been first active in January 2023, Chameleon has been observed targeting users in Australia and Poland by masquerading as official applications. A new variant of Chameleon has expanded its targets to include Android users in the United Kingdom and Italy.[1][2]

Android
MalwareMobile

S9005: DocSwap

DocSwap is an Android malware first identified in 2025, and attributed to Kimsuky. DocSwap’s name is a combination of its Korean name “문서열람 인증 앱” (Document Viewing Authentication App) and a phishing page masquerading as CoinSwap at the C2 address. Based on DocSwap’s name and Korean-language strings, DocSwap potentially targets mobile device users in South Korea. Several variants of DocSwap exist; one of the latest samples indicates that the adversary added a native decryption function that decrypts an internal APK.[1][2]

Android
MalwareMobile

S0418: ViceLeaker

ViceLeaker is a spyware framework, capable of extensive surveillance and data exfiltration operations, primarily targeting devices belonging to Israeli citizens.[1][2]

Android
MalwareMobile

S0540: Asacub

Asacub is a banking trojan that attempts to steal money from victims’ bank accounts. It attempts to do this by initiating a wire transfer via SMS message from compromised devices.[1]

Android
MalwareMobile

S1056: TianySpy

TianySpy is a mobile malware primarily spread by SMS phishing between September 30 and October 12, 2021. TianySpy is believed to have targeted credentials associated with membership websites of major Japanese telecommunication services.[1]

AndroidiOS
Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · MalwareS0318: XLoader for AndroidMobileuses · MalwareS0288: KeyRaiderMobileuses · MalwareS1083: ChameleonMobileuses · MalwareS0535: Golden CupMobileuses · MalwareS0463: INSOMNIAMobileuses · MalwareS0555: CHEMISTGAMESMobileuses · MalwareS0525: Android/AdDisplay.AshasMobileuses · MalwareS9005: DocSwapMobileuses · MalwareS0418: ViceLeakerMobilerevoked by · TechniqueT1419: Device Type DiscoveryMobileuses · MalwareS0490: XLoader for iOSMobileuses · MalwareS0540: AsacubMobileuses · MalwareS1056: TianySpyMobileuses · MalwareS0507: eSurvMobileuses · MalwareS0422: AnubisMobileuses · MalwareS1077: HornbillMobileuses · MalwareS1094: BRATAMobileuses · MalwareS1062: S.O.V.A.Mobileuses · MalwareS1082: SunbirdMobileuses · MalwareS0506: ViperRATMobileuses · GroupG0112: WindshiftMobileuses · MalwareS0505: Desert ScorpionMobileuses · MalwareS0420: DvmapMobileuses · MalwareS0529: CarbonStealMobile
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
20.0
Object version
1.2
Created
Modified
Raw hash
aae030f3c1998ed6...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(3)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
20.01.2Current bundleaae030f3c199…
19.21.2Older bundleaae030f3c199…
19.11.2Older bundleaae030f3c199…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Android-Build

    Android. (n.d.). Build. Retrieved December 21, 2016.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    NIST Mobile Threat CatalogueAPP-12
    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    mitre-attackT1426
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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