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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S1056: TianySpy

TianySpy is a mobile malware primarily spread by SMS phishing between September 30 and October 12, 2021. TianySpy is believed to have targeted credentials associated with membership websites of major Japanese telecommunication services.[1]

MobileS1056MalwareObject v1.0Modified
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Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S1056: TianySpy describes [TianySpy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1056) is a mobile malware primarily spread by SMS phishing between September 30 and October 12, 2021. [TianySpy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1056) is believed to have targeted credentials associated with membership websites of major Japanese telecommunication services.(Citation: trendmicro_tianyspy_0122)

Executive priority

S1056: TianySpy is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S1056: TianySpy by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Android, iOS), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S1056: TianySpy appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

TianySpy

TianySpy is a mobile malware primarily spread by SMS phishing between September 30 and October 12, 2021. TianySpy is believed to have targeted credentials associated with membership websites of major Japanese telecommunication services.[1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

9 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
MobileT1632.001Code Signing Policy ModificationSub-technique

TianySpy can install malicious configurations on iPhones to allow malware to be installed via Ad Hoc distribution.[1]

MobileT1417.002GUI Input CaptureSub-technique

TianySpy can utilize WebViews to display fake authentication pages that capture user credentials.[1]

MobileT1406Obfuscated Files or Information

TianySpy has encrypted C2 details, email addresses, and passwords.[1]

MobileT1426System Information Discovery

TianySpy can gather device UDIDs.[1]

MobileT1422.001Internet Connection DiscoverySub-technique

TianySpy can check to see if WiFi is enabled.[1]

MobileT1639Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol

TianySpy can exfiltrate collected user data, including credentials and authorized cookies, via email.[1]

MobileT1623Command and Scripting Interpreter

TianySpy can steal information via malicious JavaScript.[1]

MobileT1422System Network Configuration Discovery

TianySpy can check to see if Wi-Fi is enabled.[1]

MobileT1422.002Wi-Fi DiscoverySub-technique

TianySpy can check to see if Wi-Fi is enabled.[1]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · TechniqueT1632.001: Code Signing Policy ModificationMobileuses · TechniqueT1417.002: GUI Input CaptureMobileuses · TechniqueT1406: Obfuscated Files or InformationMobileuses · TechniqueT1426: System Information DiscoveryMobileuses · TechniqueT1422.001: Internet Connection DiscoveryMobileuses · TechniqueT1639: Exfiltration Over Alternative ProtocolMobileuses · TechniqueT1623: Command and Scripting InterpreterMobileuses · TechniqueT1422: System Network Configuration DiscoveryMobileuses · TechniqueT1422.002: Wi-Fi DiscoveryMobile
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
44782e7f80ade04e...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.0Current bundle44782e7f80ad…
19.11.0Older bundle44782e7f80ad…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    trendmicro_tianyspy_0122

    Trend Micro. (2022, January 25). TianySpy Malware Uses Smishing Disguised as Message From Telco. Retrieved January 11, 2023.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    mitre-attackS1056
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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