S0318: XLoader for Android
XLoader for Android is a malicious Android app first observed targeting Japan, Korea, China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong in 2018. It has more recently been observed targeting South Korean users as a pornography application.[1][2] It is tracked separately from the XLoader for iOS.
Security context for executives and security teams
S0318: XLoader for Android describes [XLoader for Android](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0318) is a malicious Android app first observed targeting Japan, Korea, China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong in 2018. It has more recently been observed targeting South Korean users as a pornography application.(Citation: TrendMicro-XLoader-FakeSpy)(Citation: TrendMicro-XLoader) It is tracked separately from the [XLoader for iOS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0490).
Executive priority
S0318: XLoader for Android is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate S0318: XLoader for Android by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Android), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Detection direction
- Validate whether S0318: XLoader for Android appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
XLoader for Android
XLoader for Android is a malicious Android app first observed targeting Japan, Korea, China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong in 2018. It has more recently been observed targeting South Korean users as a pornography application.[1][2] It is tracked separately from the XLoader for iOS.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mobile | T1426 | System Information Discovery | XLoader for Android collects the device’s Android ID and serial number.[1] |
| Mobile | T1429 | Audio Capture | XLoader for Android covertly records phone calls.[2] |
| Mobile | T1636.004 | SMS MessagesSub-technique | XLoader for Android collects SMS messages.[2] |
| Mobile | T1406 | Obfuscated Files or Information | XLoader for Android loads an encrypted DEX code payload.[2] |
| Mobile | T1481.001 | Dead Drop ResolverSub-technique | XLoader for Android has fetched its C2 address from encoded Twitter names, as well as Instagram and Tumblr.[1] |
| Mobile | T1655.001 | Match Legitimate Name or LocationSub-technique | XLoader for Android has masqueraded as an Android security application.[1] |
| Mobile | T1626.001 | Device Administrator PermissionsSub-technique | XLoader for Android requests Android Device Administrator access.[2] |
| Mobile | T1422 | System Network Configuration Discovery | XLoader for Android collects the device’s IMSI and ICCID.[1] |
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 2.0 | Current bundle | 331c321b8e33… | ||
| 19.1 | 2.0 | Older bundle | 331c321b8e33… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]TrendMicro-XLoader-FakeSpy
Hiroaki, H., Wu, L., Wu, L.. (2019, April 2). XLoader Disguises as Android Apps, Has FakeSpy Links. Retrieved July 20, 2020.
Open source URL - [2]TrendMicro-XLoader
Lorin Wu. (2018, April 19). XLoader Android Spyware and Banking Trojan Distributed via DNS Spoofing. Retrieved July 6, 2018.
Open source URL - [3]XLoader for Android
(Citation: TrendMicro-XLoader)
- [4]mitre-attackS0318Open source URL
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