S0529: CarbonSteal
CarbonSteal is one of a family of four surveillanceware tools that share a common C2 infrastructure. CarbonSteal primarily deals with audio surveillance. [1]
Security context for executives and security teams
S0529: CarbonSteal describes [CarbonSteal](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0529) is one of a family of four surveillanceware tools that share a common C2 infrastructure. [CarbonSteal](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0529) primarily deals with audio surveillance. (Citation: Lookout Uyghur Campaign)
Executive priority
S0529: CarbonSteal is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate S0529: CarbonSteal by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Android), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Detection direction
- Validate whether S0529: CarbonSteal appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
CarbonSteal
CarbonSteal is one of a family of four surveillanceware tools that share a common C2 infrastructure. CarbonSteal primarily deals with audio surveillance. [1]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mobile | T1521.002 | Asymmetric CryptographySub-technique | CarbonSteal has performed rudimentary SSL certificate validation to verify C2 server authenticity before establishing a SSL connection.[1] |
| Mobile | T1418 | Software Discovery | CarbonSteal has looked for specific applications, such as MiCode.[1] |
| Mobile | T1655.001 | Match Legitimate Name or LocationSub-technique | CarbonSteal has impersonated several apps, including official Google apps, chat apps, VPN apps, and popular games.[1] |
| Mobile | T1575 | Native API | CarbonSteal has seen native libraries used in some reported samples [1] |
| Mobile | T1616 | Call Control | CarbonSteal can silently accept an incoming phone call.[1] |
| Mobile | T1407 | Download New Code at Runtime | CarbonSteal can dynamically load additional functionality.[1] |
| Mobile | T1426 | System Information Discovery | CarbonSteal has gathered device metadata, including model, manufacturer, SD card size, disk usage, memory, CPU, and serial number.[1] |
| Mobile | T1422 | System Network Configuration Discovery | CarbonSteal has collected device network information, including 16-bit GSM Cell Identity, 16-bit Location Area Code, Mobile Country Code (MCC), and Mobile Network Code (MNC). CarbonSteal has also called `netcfg` to get stats.[1] |
| Mobile | T1430 | Location Tracking | CarbonSteal can access the device’s location and track the device over time.[1] |
| Mobile | T1429 | Audio Capture | CarbonSteal can remotely capture device audio.[1] |
| Mobile | T1420 | File and Directory Discovery | CarbonSteal has searched device storage for various files, including .amr files (audio recordings) and superuser binaries.[1] |
| Mobile | T1409 | Stored Application Data | CarbonSteal can collect notes and data from the MiCode app.[1] |
| Mobile | T1406 | Obfuscated Files or Information | CarbonSteal has used incorrect file extensions and encryption to hide most of its assets, including secondary APKs, configuration files, and JAR or DEX files.[1] |
| Mobile | T1636.004 | SMS MessagesSub-technique | CarbonSteal can access the device’s SMS and MMS messages.[1] |
| Mobile | T1644 | Out of Band Data | CarbonSteal has used specially crafted SMS messages to control the target device.[1] |
| Mobile | T1422.001 | Internet Connection DiscoverySub-technique | CarbonSteal has gathered device metadata, including model, manufacturer, SD card size, disk usage, memory, CPU, and serial number.[1] |
| Mobile | T1630.002 | File DeletionSub-technique | CarbonSteal has deleted call log entries coming from known C2 sources.[1] |
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.1 | Current bundle | 0954875c1d43… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.1 | Older bundle | 0954875c1d43… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Lookout Uyghur Campaign
A. Kumar, K. Del Rosso, J. Albrecht, C. Hebeisen. (2020, June 1). Mobile APT Surveillance Campaigns Targeting Uyghurs - A collection of long-running Android tooling connected to a Chinese mAPT actor. Retrieved November 10, 2020.
Open source URL - [2]mitre-attackS0529Open source URL
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