S1216: TriangleDB
TriangleDB is an Objective-C written implant deployed after Binary Validator and after root privileges are obtained during Operation Triangulation’s infection chain. Upon execution, TriangleDB communicates with the C2 server, relaying information about the victim device.[1]
Security context for executives and security teams
S1216: TriangleDB describes [TriangleDB](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1216) is an Objective-C written implant deployed after [Binary Validator](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1215) and after root privileges are obtained during [Operation Triangulation](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0054)’s infection chain. Upon execution, [TriangleDB](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1216) communicates with the C2 server, relaying information about the victim device.(Citation: SecureList OpTriangulation 21Jun2023)
Executive priority
S1216: TriangleDB is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate S1216: TriangleDB by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (iOS), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Detection direction
- Validate whether S1216: TriangleDB appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
TriangleDB
TriangleDB is an Objective-C written implant deployed after Binary Validator and after root privileges are obtained during Operation Triangulation’s infection chain. Upon execution, TriangleDB communicates with the C2 server, relaying information about the victim device.[1]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mobile | T1544 | Ingress Tool Transfer | TriangleDB has loaded additional modules stored in memory.[1] |
| Mobile | T1521.001 | Symmetric CryptographySub-technique | TriangleDB has encrypted data using 3DES.[1] |
| Mobile | T1644 | Out of Band Data | TriangleDB has used the Protobuf library for command and control communication.[1] |
| Mobile | T1634.001 | KeychainSub-technique | TriangleDB has extracted the device’s keychain.[1] |
| Mobile | T1630.002 | File DeletionSub-technique | TriangleDB has deleted an implant module or specified files.[1] |
| Mobile | T1418 | Software Discovery | TriangleDB has obtained a list of installed applications.[1] |
| Mobile | T1430 | Location Tracking | TriangleDB has monitored the device’s geolocation, which includes coordinates, altitude, bearing and speed.[1] |
| Mobile | T1424 | Process Discovery | TriangleDB has collected a list of running processes.[1] |
| Mobile | T1420 | File and Directory Discovery | TriangleDB has obtained a list of files using the `fts` API and has obtained files that match a specified regular expression.[1] |
| Mobile | T1521.002 | Asymmetric CryptographySub-technique | TriangleDB has encrypted data using RSA.[1] |
| Mobile | T1422 | System Network Configuration Discovery | TriangleDB has collected and sent information on the device’s IMEI, MEID, serial number and other device information.[1] |
| Mobile | T1533 | Data from Local System | TriangleDB has collected and exfiltrated files.[1] |
Groups, software, and campaigns
C0054: Operation Triangulation
Operation Triangulation is a mobile campaign targeting iOS devices.[1] The unidentified actors used zero-click exploits in iMessage attachments to gain Initial Access, then executed exploits and validators, such as Binary Validator before finally executing the TriangleDB implant.
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.0 | Current bundle | d9d21b41cef5… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Older bundle | d9d21b41cef5… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]SecureList OpTriangulation 21Jun2023
Kucherin, G., et al. (2023, June 21). Dissecting TriangleDB, a Triangulation spyware implant. Retrieved April 18, 2024.
Open source URL - [2]mitre-attackS1216Open source URL
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