T1090.001: Internal Proxy
Adversaries may use an internal proxy to direct command and control traffic between two or more systems in a compromised environment. Many tools exist that enable traffic redirection through proxies or port redirection, including HTRAN, ZXProxy, and ZXPortMap. [1] Adversaries use internal proxies to manage command and control communications inside a compromised environment, to reduce the number of simultaneous outbound network connections, to provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths between infected systems to avoid suspicion. Internal proxy connections may use common peer-to-peer (p2p) networking protocols, such as SMB, to better blend in with the environment.
By using a compromised internal system as a proxy, adversaries may conceal the true destination of C2 traffic while reducing the need for numerous connections to external systems.
Security context for executives and security teams
Internal Proxy matters because it can turn one compromised host into a relay for command-and-control traffic across the environment. For leaders, the risk is not just an outbound connection to the internet; it is that trusted internal host-to-host paths may hide, concentrate, or preserve adversary communications across Windows, Linux, macOS, ESXi, and network-device environments.
Executive priority
Prioritize this as a resilience and visibility issue for command-and-control containment. Ask whether the SOC can distinguish normal internal service traffic from unusual peer-to-peer relay behavior, whether network boundaries have intrusion prevention coverage, and whether incident responders can quickly identify the internal system acting as a C2 pivot. This is especially material for environments with flat internal networks, trusted SMB-heavy traffic, critical infrastructure dependencies, or managed service/provider-style connectivity.
Technical view
ATT&CK provides no official detection text for T1090.001, but the relationship to DET0075 points defenders toward detecting internal proxy behavior via lateral host-to-host C2 relay. Validate analytics that correlate internal host-to-host sessions, unexpected port redirection or proxy-like behavior, reduced external egress concentrated through one compromised system, and C2-like patterns riding over trusted internal protocols such as SMB. Coverage should be checked across the listed platforms: ESXi, Linux, macOS, network devices, and Windows.
Likely telemetry
- East-west network flow records between internal hosts
- Firewall, proxy, IDS/IPS, and network boundary logs
- Host network connection telemetry from Windows, Linux, macOS, and ESXi where available
- Network device connection, session, and configuration logs
- SMB or other internal peer-to-peer protocol telemetry where collected
Detection direction
- Validate whether DET0075-style logic exists for lateral host-to-host C2 relay behavior rather than only direct outbound C2.
- Baseline normal internal service paths so alerts can focus on unusual internal systems acting as intermediaries or concentrating outbound traffic.
- Tune for false positives from legitimate proxies, jump hosts, remote administration tools, load balancers, backup systems, and vulnerability scanners.
- Look for mismatches between expected business role and network behavior, such as a workstation or appliance relaying traffic for multiple peers.
- Do not rely only on perimeter egress detection; this technique is specifically useful when adversaries hide C2 behind internal trusted communications.
Mitigation priorities
- Start with network intrusion prevention at boundaries as mapped by M1031, using signatures and controls to block known malicious or suspicious traffic where feasible.
- Segment internal networks and limit unnecessary peer-to-peer communication paths, especially where SMB or administrative protocols are broadly trusted.
- Restrict which systems are allowed to act as proxies, gateways, or management relays, and monitor exceptions.
- Ensure incident response playbooks include tracing relay chains from external egress back to the originating internal hosts.
- Use threat intelligence from ATT&CK relationships to inform hunts, but validate against local telemetry before making incident or attribution judgments.
Additional notes and limits
ATT&CK links this technique to the parent Proxy technique, one detection strategy, one mitigation, multiple campaigns, groups, and software entries including Cobalt Strike and several malware families. These relationships show the behavior is broadly relevant across espionage, financially motivated, and post-exploitation contexts, but they should be used as context for defensive prioritization rather than proof of current activity in any environment.
The official ATT&CK object does not provide detection guidance, so the take relies on the object description, platform list, tactic, DET0075 relationship, and M1031 mitigation relationship. Local architecture, allowed proxy paths, segmentation model, and telemetry retention will determine whether this behavior is detectable in practice.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Internal Proxy
Adversaries may use an internal proxy to direct command and control traffic between two or more systems in a compromised environment. Many tools exist that enable traffic redirection through proxies or port redirection, including HTRAN, ZXProxy, and ZXPortMap. [1] Adversaries use internal proxies to manage command and control communications inside a compromised environment, to reduce the number of simultaneous outbound network connections, to provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths between infected systems to avoid suspicion. Internal proxy connections may use common peer-to-peer (p2p) networking protocols, such as SMB, to better blend in with the environment.
By using a compromised internal system as a proxy, adversaries may conceal the true destination of C2 traffic while reducing the need for numerous connections to external systems.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Related techniques
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
Groups, software, and campaigns
G1047: Velvet Ant
Velvet Ant is a threat actor operating since at least 2021. Velvet Ant is associated with complex persistence mechanisms, the targeting of network devices and appliances during operations, and the use of zero day exploits.[1][2]
G1016: FIN13
G0126: Higaisa
Higaisa is a threat group suspected to have South Korean origins. Higaisa has targeted government, public, and trade organizations in North Korea; however, they have also carried out attacks in China, Japan, Russia, Poland, and other nations. Higaisa was first disclosed in early 2019 but is assessed to have operated as early as 2009.[1][2][3]
G0030: Lotus Blossom
Lotus Blossom is a long-standing threat group largely targeting various entities in Asia since at least 2009. In addition to government and related targets, Lotus Blossom has also targeted entities such as digital certificate issuers.[1][2][3]
G0041: Strider
G1017: Volt Typhoon
Volt Typhoon is a People's Republic of China (PRC) state-sponsored actor that has been active since at least 2021, primarily targeting critical infrastructure organizations in the US and its territories including Guam. Volt Typhoon's targeting and pattern of behavior have been assessed as pre-positioning to enable lateral movement to operational technology (OT) assets for potential destructive or disruptive attacks. Volt Typhoon has emphasized stealth in operations using web shells, living-off-the-land (LOTL) binaries, hands on keyboard activities, and stolen credentials.[1][2][3][4]. The group has leveraged compromised SOHO routers to proxy command and control traffic and obscure its infrastructure, activity associated with the KV botnet.[5].
Reporting indicates a separate initial access cluster, SYLVANITE, has been observed exploiting internet-facing edge devices and transferring access to Volt Typhoon, also tracked as VOLTZITE, for follow-on operations. [6]
G0010: Turla
Turla is a cyber espionage threat group that has been attributed to Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB). They have compromised victims in over 50 countries since at least 2004, spanning a range of industries including government, embassies, military, education, research and pharmaceutical companies. Turla is known for conducting watering hole and spearphishing campaigns, and leveraging in-house tools and malware, such as Uroburos.[1][2][3][4][5]
G0032: Lazarus Group
Lazarus Group is a North Korean state-sponsored cyber threat group attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB). [1] [2] Lazarus Group has been active since at least 2009 and is reportedly responsible for the November 2014 destructive wiper attack on Sony Pictures Entertainment, identified by Novetta as part of Operation Blockbuster. Malware used by Lazarus Group correlates to other reported campaigns, including Operation Flame, Operation 1Mission, Operation Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Days of Rain.[3]
North Korea’s cyber operations have shown a consistent pattern of adaptation, forming and reorganizing units as national priorities shift. These units frequently share personnel, infrastructure, malware, and tradecraft, making it difficult to attribute specific operations with high confidence. Public reporting often uses “Lazarus Group” as an umbrella term for multiple North Korean cyber operators conducting espionage, destructive attacks, and financially motivated campaigns.[4][5][6]
G0087: APT39
APT39 is one of several names for cyber espionage activity conducted by the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) through the front company Rana Intelligence Computing since at least 2014. APT39 has primarily targeted the travel, hospitality, academic, and telecommunications industries in Iran and across Asia, Africa, Europe, and North America to track individuals and entities considered to be a threat by the MOIS.[1][2][3][4][5]
S0556: Pay2Key
Pay2Key is a ransomware written in C++ that has been used by Fox Kitten since at least July 2020 including campaigns against Israeli companies. Pay2Key has been incorporated with a leak site to display stolen sensitive information to further pressure victims into payment.[1][2]
S0038: Duqu
S0023: CHOPSTICK
CHOPSTICK is a malware family of modular backdoors used by APT28. It has been used since at least 2012 and is usually dropped on victims as second-stage malware, though it has been used as first-stage malware in several cases. It has both Windows and Linux variants. [1] [2] [3] [4] It is tracked separately from the X-Agent for Android.
S9010: GlassWorm
GlassWorm is a worm that propagated through supply chain attacks by compromising repository credentials from victim environments and having malicious payloads added to those compromised accounts for distribution to victims across the various development ecosystems.[1][2][3] GlassWorm has numerous variants, including Rust binaries, encrypted JavaScript and a variant leveraging invisible Unicode characters that made reverse engineering difficult.[4][1][5] GlassWorm has employed a unique command and control (C2) methodology using Solana blockchain.[6][1] GlassWorm was first reported in October 2025.[6][1][3]
S9023: HiddenFace
HiddenFace is a modular backdoor developed and used exclusively by MirrorFace since at least 2021. HiddenFace can communicate both actively and passively and has been used against political and academic targets.[1][2][3]
S0502: Drovorub
S0154: Cobalt Strike
Cobalt Strike is a commercial, full-featured, remote access tool that bills itself as “adversary simulation software designed to execute targeted attacks and emulate the post-exploitation actions of advanced threat actors”. Cobalt Strike’s interactive post-exploit capabilities cover the full range of ATT&CK tactics, all executed within a single, integrated system.[1]
In addition to its own capabilities, Cobalt Strike leverages the capabilities of other well-known tools such as Metasploit and Mimikatz.[1]
S1060: Mafalda
S0699: Mythic
S0141: Winnti for Windows
Winnti for Windows is a modular remote access Trojan (RAT) that has been used likely by multiple groups to carry out intrusions in various regions since at least 2010, including by one group referred to as the same name, Winnti Group.[1][2][3][4]. The Linux variant is tracked separately under Winnti for Linux.[5]
S0051: MiniDuke
S0512: FatDuke
C0024: SolarWinds Compromise
The SolarWinds Compromise was a sophisticated supply chain cyber operation conducted by APT29 that was discovered in mid-December 2020. APT29 used customized malware to inject malicious code into the SolarWinds Orion software build process that was later distributed through a normal software update; they also used password spraying, token theft, API abuse, spear phishing, and other supply chain attacks to compromise user accounts and leverage their associated access. Victims of this campaign included government, consulting, technology, telecom, and other organizations in North America, Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. This activity has been labled the StellarParticle campaign in industry reporting.[1] Industry reporting also initially referred to the actors involved in this campaign as UNC2452, NOBELIUM, Dark Halo, and SolarStorm.[2][3][4][5][1][6][7][8]
In April 2021, the US and UK governments attributed the SolarWinds Compromise to Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR); public statements included citations to APT29, Cozy Bear, and The Dukes.[9][10][11] The US government assessed that of the approximately 18,000 affected public and private sector customers of Solar Winds’ Orion product, a much smaller number were compromised by follow-on APT29 activity on their systems.[12]
C0014: Operation Wocao
Operation Wocao was a cyber espionage campaign that targeted organizations around the world, including in Brazil, China, France, Germany, Italy, Mexico, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The suspected China-based actors compromised government organizations and managed service providers, as well as aviation, construction, energy, finance, health care, insurance, offshore engineering, software development, and transportation companies.[1]
Security researchers assessed the Operation Wocao actors used similar TTPs and tools as APT20, suggesting a possible overlap. Operation Wocao was named after an observed command line entry by one of the threat actors, possibly out of frustration from losing webshell access.[1]
C0051: APT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign
APT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign was conducted by APT28 from early February 2022 to November 2024 against organizations and individuals with expertise on Ukraine. APT28 primarily leveraged living-off-the-land techniques, while leveraging the zero-day exploitation of CVE-2022-38028. Notably, APT28 leveraged Wi-Fi networks in close proximity to the intended target to gain initial access to the victim environment. By daisy-chaining multiple compromised organizations nearby the intended target, APT28 discovered dual-homed systems (with both a wired and wireless network connection) to enable Wi-Fi and use compromised credentials to connect to the victim network.[1]
All related ATT&CK context
Mitigation direction
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 1.2 | Current bundle | 3ac1c4465cde… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Trend Micro APT Attack Tools
Wilhoit, K. (2013, March 4). In-Depth Look: APT Attack Tools of the Trade. Retrieved December 2, 2015.
- [2]Sygnia VelvetAnt 2024A
Sygnia Team. (2024, June 3). China-Nexus Threat Group ‘Velvet Ant’ Abuses F5 Load Balancers for Persistence. Retrieved March 14, 2025.
Open source URL - [3]ClearkSky Fox Kitten February 2020
ClearSky. (2020, February 16). Fox Kitten – Widespread Iranian Espionage-Offensive Campaign. Retrieved December 21, 2020.
Open source URL - [4]Check Point Pay2Key November 2020
Check Point. (2020, November 6). Ransomware Alert: Pay2Key. Retrieved January 4, 2021.
Open source URL - [5]Symantec W32.Duqu
Symantec Security Response. (2011, November). W32.Duqu: The precursor to the next Stuxnet. Retrieved September 17, 2015.
Open source URL - [6]CrowdStrike StellarParticle January 2022
CrowdStrike. (2022, January 27). Early Bird Catches the Wormhole: Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign. Retrieved February 7, 2022.
Open source URL - [7]Symantec RAINDROP January 2021
Symantec Threat Hunter Team. (2021, January 18). Raindrop: New Malware Discovered in SolarWinds Investigation. Retrieved January 19, 2021.
Open source URL - [8]ESET Sednit Part 2
ESET. (2016, October). En Route with Sednit - Part 2: Observing the Comings and Goings. Retrieved November 21, 2016.
- [9]Koi Glassworm InvisibleCode October 2025
Idan Dardikman. (2025, October 18). GlassWorm: First Self-Propagating Worm Using Invisible Code Hits OpenVSX Marketplace. Retrieved April 10, 2026.
Open source URL - [10]Trend Micro Earth Kasha NOV 2024
Trend Micro. (2024, November 19). Spot the Difference: Earth Kasha's New LODEINFO Campaign And The Correlation Analysis With The APT10 Umbrella. Retrieved April 17, 2026.
Open source URL - [11]Sygnia Elephant Beetle Jan 2022
Sygnia Incident Response Team. (2022, January 5). TG2003: ELEPHANT BEETLE UNCOVERING AN ORGANIZED FINANCIAL-THEFT OPERATION. Retrieved February 9, 2023.
Open source URL - [12]NSA/FBI Drovorub August 2020
NSA/FBI. (2020, August). Russian GRU 85th GTsSS Deploys Previously Undisclosed Drovorub Malware. Retrieved August 25, 2020.
Open source URL - [13]cobaltstrike manual
Strategic Cyber LLC. (2017, March 14). Cobalt Strike Manual. Retrieved May 24, 2017.
Open source URL - [14]Cobalt Strike Manual 4.3 November 2020
Strategic Cyber LLC. (2020, November 5). Cobalt Strike: Advanced Threat Tactics for Penetration Testers. Retrieved April 13, 2021.
Open source URL - [15]Zscaler Higaisa 2020
Singh, S. Singh, A. (2020, June 11). The Return on the Higaisa APT. Retrieved March 2, 2021.
Open source URL - [16]SentinelLabs Metador Technical Appendix Sept 2022
SentinelLabs. (2022, September 22). Metador Technical Appendix. Retrieved April 4, 2023.
Open source URL - [17]Mythc Documentation
Thomas, C. (n.d.). Mythc Documentation. Retrieved March 25, 2022.
Open source URL - [18]Cisco LotusBlossom 2025
Joey Chen, Cisco Talos. (2025, February 27). Lotus Blossom espionage group targets multiple industries with different versions of Sagerunex and hacking tools. Retrieved March 15, 2025.
Open source URL - [19]Novetta Winnti April 2015
Novetta Threat Research Group. (2015, April 7). Winnti Analysis. Retrieved February 8, 2017.
Open source URL - [20]Kaspersky ProjectSauron Blog
Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2016, August 8). ProjectSauron: top level cyber-espionage platform covertly extracts encrypted government comms. Retrieved August 17, 2016.
Open source URL - [21]ESET Dukes October 2019
Faou, M., Tartare, M., Dupuy, T. (2019, October). OPERATION GHOST. Retrieved September 23, 2020.
Open source URL - [22]Accenture HyperStack October 2020
Accenture. (2020, October). Turla uses HyperStack, Carbon, and Kazuar to compromise government entity. Retrieved December 2, 2020.
Open source URL - [23]FireEye APT30
FireEye Labs. (2015, April). APT30 AND THE MECHANICS OF A LONG-RUNNING CYBER ESPIONAGE OPERATION. Retrieved November 17, 2024.
Open source URL - [24]Cybereason Sliver Undated
Cybereason Global SOC and Incident Response Team. (n.d.). Sliver C2 Leveraged by Many Threat Actors. Retrieved March 24, 2025.
Open source URL - [25]Microsoft Volt Typhoon May 2023
Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2023, May 24). Volt Typhoon targets US critical infrastructure with living-off-the-land techniques. Retrieved July 27, 2023.
Open source URL - [26]CISA AA24-038A PRC Critical Infrastructure February 2024
CISA et al.. (2024, February 7). PRC State-Sponsored Actors Compromise and Maintain Persistent Access to U.S. Critical Infrastructure. Retrieved May 15, 2024.
Open source URL - [27]University of Birmingham C2
Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
Open source URL - [28]Kaspersky ToddyCat June 2022
Dedola, G. (2022, June 21). APT ToddyCat. Retrieved January 3, 2024.
Open source URL - [29]Kaspersky ToddyCat Check Logs October 2023
Dedola, G. et al. (2023, October 12). ToddyCat: Keep calm and check logs. Retrieved January 3, 2024.
Open source URL - [30]Talos TinyTurla September 2021
Cisco Talos. (2021, September 21). TinyTurla - Turla deploys new malware to keep a secret backdoor on victim machines. Retrieved December 2, 2021.
Open source URL - [31]ESET InvisiMole June 2018
Hromcová, Z. (2018, June 07). InvisiMole: Surprisingly equipped spyware, undercover since 2013. Retrieved July 10, 2018.
Open source URL - [32]Kaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021
Vyacheslav Kopeytsev and Seongsu Park. (2021, February 25). Lazarus targets defense industry with ThreatNeedle. Retrieved October 27, 2021.
Open source URL - [33]FoxIT Wocao December 2019
Dantzig, M. v., Schamper, E. (2019, December 19). Operation Wocao: Shining a light on one of China’s hidden hacking groups. Retrieved October 8, 2020.
Open source URL - [34]Symantec Troll Stealer 2024
Symantec Threat Hunter Team. (2024, May 16). Springtail: New Linux Backdoor Added to Toolkit. Retrieved January 17, 2025.
Open source URL - [35]Novetta-Axiom
Novetta. (n.d.). Operation SMN: Axiom Threat Actor Group Report. Retrieved November 12, 2014.
Open source URL - [36]Zscaler
Sudeep Singh. (2025, April 16). Latest Mustang Panda Arsenal: ToneShell and StarProxy | P1. Retrieved July 21, 2025.
Open source URL - [37]CrowdStrike BRICKSTORM WARP PANDA UNC5221 December 2025
CrowdStrike. (2025, December 4). Unveiling WARP PANDA: A New Sophisticated China-Nexus Adversary. Retrieved April 16, 2026.
Open source URL - [38]CISA BRICKSTORM UNC5221 AR25-338A February 2026
DHS/CISA. (2026, February 11). AR25-338A: BRICKSTORM Backdoor. Retrieved April 16, 2026.
Open source URL - [39]Picus Security BRICKSTORM UNC5221 October 2025
Huseyin Can Yuceel. (2025, October 1). BRICKSTORM Malware: UNC5221 Targets Tech and Legal Sectors in the United States. Retrieved April 16, 2026.
Open source URL - [40]Google UNC5221 BRICKSTORM SPAWNCHIMERA April 2024
Matt Lin, Austin Larsen, John Wolfram, Ashley Pearson, Josh Murchie, Lukasz Lamparski, Joseph Pisano, Ryan Hall, Ron Craft, Shawn Crew, Billy Wong, Tyler McLellan. (2024, April 4). Cutting Edge, Part 4: Ivanti Connect Secure VPN Post-Exploitation Lateral Movement Case Studies. Retrieved April 16, 2026.
Open source URL - [41]NVISO BRICKSTORM April 2025
NVISO Incident Response. (2025, April 1). BRICKSTORM Backdoor Analysis: A Persistent Espionage Threat to European Industries. Retrieved April 16, 2026.
Open source URL - [42]Google BRICKSTORM September 2025
Sarah Yoder, John Wolfram, Ashley Pearson, Doug Bienstock, Josh Madeley, Josh Murchie, Brad Slaybaugh, Matt Lin, Geoff Carstairs, Austin Larsen. (2025, September 24). Another BRICKSTORM: Stealthy Backdoor Enabling Espionage into Tech and Legal Sectors. Retrieved April 16, 2026.
Open source URL - [43]FireEye APT39 Jan 2019
Hawley et al. (2019, January 29). APT39: An Iranian Cyber Espionage Group Focused on Personal Information. Retrieved February 19, 2019.
Open source URL - [44]BitDefender Chafer May 2020
Rusu, B. (2020, May 21). Iranian Chafer APT Targeted Air Transportation and Government in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Retrieved May 22, 2020.
Open source URL - [45]Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien February 2011
Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien 2011, February W32.Stuxnet Dossier (Version 1.4) Retrieved November 17, 2024.
Open source URL - [46]Nearest Neighbor Volexity
Koessel, Sean. Adair, Steven. Lancaster, Tom. (2024, November 22). The Nearest Neighbor Attack: How A Russian APT Weaponized Nearby Wi-Fi Networks for Covert Access. Retrieved February 25, 2025.
Open source URL - [47]Trend Micro APT Attack Tools
Wilhoit, K. (2013, March 4). In-Depth Look: APT Attack Tools of the Trade. Retrieved December 2, 2015.
- [48]Trend Micro APT Attack Tools
Wilhoit, K. (2013, March 4). In-Depth Look: APT Attack Tools of the Trade. Retrieved December 2, 2015.
- [49]University of Birmingham C2
Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
Open source URL - [50]University of Birmingham C2
Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
Open source URL - [51]mitre-attackT1090.001Open source URL
- [52]mitre-attackT1090.001Open source URL
- [53]mitre-attackT1090.001Open source URL
- [54]Sygnia VelvetAnt 2024A
Sygnia Team. (2024, June 3). China-Nexus Threat Group ‘Velvet Ant’ Abuses F5 Load Balancers for Persistence. Retrieved March 14, 2025.
Open source URL - [55]Check Point Pay2Key November 2020
Check Point. (2020, November 6). Ransomware Alert: Pay2Key. Retrieved January 4, 2021.
Open source URL - [56]ClearkSky Fox Kitten February 2020
ClearSky. (2020, February 16). Fox Kitten – Widespread Iranian Espionage-Offensive Campaign. Retrieved December 21, 2020.
Open source URL - [57]Symantec W32.Duqu
Symantec Security Response. (2011, November). W32.Duqu: The precursor to the next Stuxnet. Retrieved September 17, 2015.
Open source URL - [58]CrowdStrike StellarParticle January 2022
CrowdStrike. (2022, January 27). Early Bird Catches the Wormhole: Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign. Retrieved February 7, 2022.
Open source URL - [59]Symantec RAINDROP January 2021
Symantec Threat Hunter Team. (2021, January 18). Raindrop: New Malware Discovered in SolarWinds Investigation. Retrieved January 19, 2021.
Open source URL - [60]ESET Sednit Part 2
ESET. (2016, October). En Route with Sednit - Part 2: Observing the Comings and Goings. Retrieved November 21, 2016.
- [61]Koi Glassworm InvisibleCode October 2025
Idan Dardikman. (2025, October 18). GlassWorm: First Self-Propagating Worm Using Invisible Code Hits OpenVSX Marketplace. Retrieved April 10, 2026.
Open source URL - [62]Trend Micro Earth Kasha NOV 2024
Trend Micro. (2024, November 19). Spot the Difference: Earth Kasha's New LODEINFO Campaign And The Correlation Analysis With The APT10 Umbrella. Retrieved April 17, 2026.
Open source URL - [63]Sygnia Elephant Beetle Jan 2022
Sygnia Incident Response Team. (2022, January 5). TG2003: ELEPHANT BEETLE UNCOVERING AN ORGANIZED FINANCIAL-THEFT OPERATION. Retrieved February 9, 2023.
Open source URL - [64]NSA/FBI Drovorub August 2020
NSA/FBI. (2020, August). Russian GRU 85th GTsSS Deploys Previously Undisclosed Drovorub Malware. Retrieved August 25, 2020.
Open source URL - [65]Cobalt Strike Manual 4.3 November 2020
Strategic Cyber LLC. (2020, November 5). Cobalt Strike: Advanced Threat Tactics for Penetration Testers. Retrieved April 13, 2021.
Open source URL - [66]cobaltstrike manual
Strategic Cyber LLC. (2017, March 14). Cobalt Strike Manual. Retrieved May 24, 2017.
Open source URL - [67]Zscaler Higaisa 2020
Singh, S. Singh, A. (2020, June 11). The Return on the Higaisa APT. Retrieved March 2, 2021.
Open source URL - [68]SentinelLabs Metador Technical Appendix Sept 2022
SentinelLabs. (2022, September 22). Metador Technical Appendix. Retrieved April 4, 2023.
Open source URL - [69]Mythc Documentation
Thomas, C. (n.d.). Mythc Documentation. Retrieved March 25, 2022.
Open source URL - [70]Cisco LotusBlossom 2025
Joey Chen, Cisco Talos. (2025, February 27). Lotus Blossom espionage group targets multiple industries with different versions of Sagerunex and hacking tools. Retrieved March 15, 2025.
Open source URL - [71]Novetta Winnti April 2015
Novetta Threat Research Group. (2015, April 7). Winnti Analysis. Retrieved February 8, 2017.
Open source URL - [72]Kaspersky ProjectSauron Blog
Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2016, August 8). ProjectSauron: top level cyber-espionage platform covertly extracts encrypted government comms. Retrieved August 17, 2016.
Open source URL - [73]ESET Dukes October 2019
Faou, M., Tartare, M., Dupuy, T. (2019, October). OPERATION GHOST. Retrieved September 23, 2020.
Open source URL - [74]ESET Dukes October 2019
Faou, M., Tartare, M., Dupuy, T. (2019, October). OPERATION GHOST. Retrieved September 23, 2020.
Open source URL - [75]ESET Dukes October 2019
Faou, M., Tartare, M., Dupuy, T. (2019, October). OPERATION GHOST. Retrieved September 23, 2020.
Open source URL - [76]Accenture HyperStack October 2020
Accenture. (2020, October). Turla uses HyperStack, Carbon, and Kazuar to compromise government entity. Retrieved December 2, 2020.
Open source URL - [77]FireEye APT30
FireEye Labs. (2015, April). APT30 AND THE MECHANICS OF A LONG-RUNNING CYBER ESPIONAGE OPERATION. Retrieved November 17, 2024.
Open source URL - [78]Cybereason Sliver Undated
Cybereason Global SOC and Incident Response Team. (n.d.). Sliver C2 Leveraged by Many Threat Actors. Retrieved March 24, 2025.
Open source URL - [79]CISA AA24-038A PRC Critical Infrastructure February 2024
CISA et al.. (2024, February 7). PRC State-Sponsored Actors Compromise and Maintain Persistent Access to U.S. Critical Infrastructure. Retrieved May 15, 2024.
Open source URL - [80]Microsoft Volt Typhoon May 2023
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