S0031: BACKSPACE

S0031: BACKSPACE describes [BACKSPACE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0031) is a backdoor used by [APT30](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0013) that dates back to at least 2005. (Citation: FireEye APT30)

Executive priority

S0031: BACKSPACE is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S0031: BACKSPACE by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

Validate whether S0031: BACKSPACE appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.

Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

BACKSPACE

BACKSPACE is a backdoor used by APT30 that dates back to at least 2005. [1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

Filter related techniques14 rows

Domain	ID	Name	Relationship / procedure
Enterprise	T1082	System Information Discovery	During its initial execution, BACKSPACE extracts operating system information from the infected host.[1]
Enterprise	T1112	Modify Registry	BACKSPACE is capable of deleting Registry keys, sub-keys, and values on a victim system.[1]
Enterprise	T1059.003	Windows Command ShellSub-technique	Adversaries can direct BACKSPACE to execute from the command line on infected hosts, or have BACKSPACE create a reverse shell.[1]
Enterprise	T1012	Query Registry	BACKSPACE is capable of enumerating and making modifications to an infected system's Registry.[1]
Enterprise	T1071.001	Web ProtocolsSub-technique	BACKSPACE uses HTTP as a transport to communicate with its command server.[1]
Enterprise	T1057	Process Discovery	BACKSPACE may collect information about running processes.[1]
Enterprise	T1132.002	Non-Standard EncodingSub-technique	Newer variants of BACKSPACE will encode C2 communications with a custom system.[1]
Enterprise	T1090.001	Internal ProxySub-technique	The "ZJ" variant of BACKSPACE allows "ZJ link" infections with Internet access to relay traffic from "ZJ listen" to a command server.[1]
Enterprise	T1547.001	Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique	BACKSPACE achieves persistence by creating a shortcut to itself in the CSIDL_STARTUP directory.[1]
Enterprise	T1041	Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	Adversaries can direct BACKSPACE to upload files to the C2 Server.[1]
Enterprise	T1083	File and Directory Discovery	BACKSPACE allows adversaries to search for files.[1]
Enterprise	T1104	Multi-Stage Channels	BACKSPACE attempts to avoid detection by checking a first stage command and control server to determine if it should connect to the second stage server, which performs "louder" interactions with the malware.[1]
Enterprise	T1547.009	Shortcut ModificationSub-technique	BACKSPACE achieves persistence by creating a shortcut to itself in the CSIDL_STARTUP directory.[1]
Enterprise	T1686	Disable or Modify System Firewall	The "ZR" variant of BACKSPACE will check to see if known host-based firewalls are installed on the infected systems. BACKSPACE will attempt to establish a C2 channel, then will examine open windows to identify a pop-up from the firewall software and will simulate a mouse-click to allow the connection to proceed.[1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

G0013: APT30

APT30 is a threat group suspected to be associated with the Chinese government. While Naikon shares some characteristics with APT30, the two groups do not appear to be exact matches.[1][2]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release: 19.2
Object version: 1.1
Created: May 31, 2017, 21:32 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Modified: Nov 17, 2024, 15:05 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Raw hash: aa81b2df2b072fa5...

Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(3)

Release	Bundle imported	Object version	Modified	Status	Raw hash
20.0	Oct 15, 2026, 14:21 UTC (UTC+00:00)	1.1	Nov 17, 2024, 15:05 UTC (UTC+00:00)	Older bundle	`aa81b2df2b07…`
19.2	Aug 6, 2026, 02:58 UTC (UTC+00:00)	1.1	Nov 17, 2024, 15:05 UTC (UTC+00:00)	Current bundle	`aa81b2df2b07…`
19.1	Jul 14, 2026, 09:14 UTC (UTC+00:00)	1.1	Nov 17, 2024, 15:05 UTC (UTC+00:00)	Older bundle	`aa81b2df2b07…`

Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSON Open MITRE-hosted copy

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

[1]
FireEye APT30
FireEye Labs. (2015, April). APT30 AND THE MECHANICS OF A LONG-RUNNING CYBER ESPIONAGE OPERATION. Retrieved November 17, 2024.
Open source URL
[2]
mitre-attackS0031
Open source URL

Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

Official MITRE ATT&CK site Official STIX data repository MITRE ATT&CK terms of use