S1060: Mafalda

S1060: Mafalda describes [Mafalda](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1060) is a flexible interactive implant that has been used by [Metador](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1013). Security researchers assess the [Mafalda](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1060) name may be inspired by an Argentinian cartoon character that has been popular as a means of political commentary since the 1960s. (Citation: SentinelLabs Metador Sept 2022)

Executive priority

S1060: Mafalda is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S1060: Mafalda by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

Validate whether S1060: Mafalda appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.

Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Mafalda

Mafalda is a flexible interactive implant that has been used by Metador. Security researchers assess the Mafalda name may be inspired by an Argentinian cartoon character that has been popular as a means of political commentary since the 1960s. [1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

Filter related techniques36 rows

Domain	ID	Name	Relationship / procedure
Enterprise	T1205.001	Port KnockingSub-technique	Mafalda can use port-knocking to authenticate itself to another implant called Cryshell to establish an indirect connection to the C2 server.[1]CitationSentinelLabs Metador Technical Appendix Sept 2022
Enterprise	T1134.003	Make and Impersonate TokenSub-technique	Mafalda can create a token for a different user.CitationSentinelLabs Metador Technical Appendix Sept 2022
Enterprise	T1133	External Remote Services	Mafalda can establish an SSH connection from a compromised host to a server.CitationSentinelLabs Metador Technical Appendix Sept 2022
Enterprise	T1685.005	Clear Windows Event LogsSub-technique	Mafalda can delete Windows Event logs by invoking the `OpenEventLogW` and `ClearEventLogW` functions.[1]
Enterprise	T1132.001	Standard EncodingSub-technique	Mafalda can encode data using Base64 prior to exfiltration.CitationSentinelLabs Metador Technical Appendix Sept 2022
Enterprise	T1059.003	Windows Command ShellSub-technique	Mafalda can execute shell commands using `cmd.exe`.CitationSentinelLabs Metador Technical Appendix Sept 2022
Enterprise	T1112	Modify Registry	Mafalda can manipulate the system registry on a compromised host.CitationSentinelLabs Metador Technical Appendix Sept 2022
Enterprise	T1552.004	Private KeysSub-technique	Mafalda can collect a Chrome encryption key used to protect browser cookies.[1]
Enterprise	T1569.002	Service ExecutionSub-technique	Mafalda can create a remote service, let it run once, and then delete it.CitationSentinelLabs Metador Technical Appendix Sept 2022
Enterprise	T1095	Non-Application Layer Protocol	Mafalda can use raw TCP for C2.[1]
Enterprise	T1074.001	Local Data StagingSub-technique	Mafalda can place retrieved files into a destination directory.[1]
Enterprise	T1005	Data from Local System	Mafalda can collect files and information from a compromised host.[1]
Enterprise	T1140	Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information	Mafalda can decrypt files and data.[1]
Enterprise	T1059.001	PowerShellSub-technique	Mafalda can execute PowerShell commands on a compromised machine.CitationSentinelLabs Metador Technical Appendix Sept 2022
Enterprise	T1090.001	Internal ProxySub-technique	Mafalda can create a named pipe to listen for and send data to a named pipe-based C2 server.CitationSentinelLabs Metador Technical Appendix Sept 2022
Enterprise	T1057	Process Discovery	Mafalda can enumerate running processes on a machine.[1]
Enterprise	T1056	Input Capture	Mafalda can conduct mouse event logging.CitationSentinelLabs Metador Technical Appendix Sept 2022
Enterprise	T1071.001	Web ProtocolsSub-technique	Mafalda can use HTTP for C2.[1]
Enterprise	T1049	System Network Connections Discovery	Mafalda can use the `GetExtendedTcpTable` function to retrieve information about established TCP connections.[1]
Enterprise	T1012	Query Registry	Mafalda can enumerate Registry keys with all subkeys and values.CitationSentinelLabs Metador Technical Appendix Sept 2022
Enterprise	T1217	Browser Information Discovery	Mafalda can collect the contents of the `%USERPROFILE%\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\LocalState` file.[1]
Enterprise	T1113	Screen Capture	Mafalda can take a screenshot of the target machine and save it to a file.[1]
Enterprise	T1041	Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	Mafalda can send network system data and files to its C2 server.[1]
Enterprise	T1573.001	Symmetric CryptographySub-technique	Mafalda can encrypt its C2 traffic with RC4.[1]
Enterprise	T1082	System Information Discovery	Mafalda can collect the computer name of a compromised host.[1]CitationSentinelLabs Metador Technical Appendix Sept 2022
Enterprise	T1105	Ingress Tool Transfer	Mafalda can download additional files onto the compromised host.CitationSentinelLabs Metador Technical Appendix Sept 2022
Enterprise	T1016	System Network Configuration Discovery	Mafalda can use the `GetAdaptersInfo` function to retrieve information about network adapters and the `GetIpNetTable` function to retrieve the IPv4 to physical network address mapping table.[1]
Enterprise	T1033	System Owner/User Discovery	Mafalda can collect the username from a compromised host.CitationSentinelLabs Metador Technical Appendix Sept 2022
Enterprise	T1680	Local Storage Discovery	Mafalda can enumerate all drives on a compromised host.[1]CitationSentinelLabs Metador Technical Appendix Sept 2022
Enterprise	T1134	Access Token Manipulation	Mafalda can use `AdjustTokenPrivileges()` to elevate privileges.CitationSentinelLabs Metador Technical Appendix Sept 2022
Enterprise	T1106	Native API	Mafalda can use a variety of API calls.[1]
Enterprise	T1083	File and Directory Discovery	Mafalda can search for files and directories.[1]
Enterprise	T1622	Debugger Evasion	Mafalda can search for debugging tools on a compromised host.CitationSentinelLabs Metador Technical Appendix Sept 2022
Enterprise	T1518.001	Security Software DiscoverySub-technique	Mafalda can search for a variety of security software programs, EDR systems, and malware analysis tools.[1]CitationSentinelLabs Metador Technical Appendix Sept 2022
Enterprise	T1027.013	Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique	Mafalda has been obfuscated and contains encrypted functions.[1]
Enterprise	T1003.001	LSASS MemorySub-technique	Mafalda can dump password hashes from `LSASS.exe`.CitationSentinelLabs Metador Technical Appendix Sept 2022

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

G1013: Metador

Metador is a suspected cyber espionage group that was first reported in September 2022. Metador has targeted a limited number of telecommunication companies, internet service providers, and universities in the Middle East and Africa. Security researchers named the group Metador based on the "I am meta" string in one of the group's malware samples and the expectation of Spanish-language responses from C2 servers.[1]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release: 19.2
Object version: 1.2
Created: Jan 26, 2023, 01:21 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Modified: Oct 21, 2025, 22:47 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Raw hash: a42b5039b3df6ea9...

Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)

Release	Bundle imported	Object version	Modified	Status	Raw hash
19.2	Aug 6, 2026, 02:58 UTC (UTC+00:00)	1.2	Oct 21, 2025, 22:47 UTC (UTC+00:00)	Current bundle	`a42b5039b3df…`
19.1	Jul 14, 2026, 09:14 UTC (UTC+00:00)	1.2	Oct 21, 2025, 22:47 UTC (UTC+00:00)	Older bundle	`a42b5039b3df…`

Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSON Open MITRE-hosted copy

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

[1]
SentinelLabs Metador Sept 2022
Ehrlich, A., et al. (2022, September). THE MYSTERY OF METADOR | AN UNATTRIBUTED THREAT HIDING IN TELCOS, ISPS, AND UNIVERSITIES. Retrieved January 23, 2023.
Open source URL
[2]
mitre-attackS1060
Open source URL

Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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