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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S0265: Kazuar

Kazuar is a fully featured, multi-platform backdoor Trojan written using the Microsoft .NET framework. [1]

EnterpriseS0265MalwareObject v1.4Modified
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S0265: Kazuar describes [Kazuar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0265) is a fully featured, multi-platform backdoor Trojan written using the Microsoft .NET framework. (Citation: Unit 42 Kazuar May 2017)

Executive priority

S0265: Kazuar is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S0265: Kazuar by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows, macOS), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S0265: Kazuar appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Kazuar

Kazuar is a fully featured, multi-platform backdoor Trojan written using the Microsoft .NET framework. [1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

31 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique

Kazuar adds a sub-key under several Registry run keys.[1]

EnterpriseT1105Ingress Tool Transfer

Kazuar downloads additional plug-ins to load on the victim’s machine, including the ability to upgrade and replace its own binary.[1]

EnterpriseT1485Data Destruction

Kazuar can overwrite files with random data before deleting them.[1]

EnterpriseT1070.004File DeletionSub-technique

Kazuar can delete files.[1]

EnterpriseT1027Obfuscated Files or Information

Kazuar is obfuscated using the open source ConfuserEx protector. Kazuar also obfuscates the name of created files/folders/mutexes and encrypts debug messages written to log files using the Rijndael cipher.[1]

EnterpriseT1132.001Standard EncodingSub-technique

Kazuar encodes communications to the C2 server in Base64.[1]

EnterpriseT1057Process Discovery

Kazuar obtains a list of running processes through WMI querying and the ps command.[1]

EnterpriseT1083File and Directory Discovery

Kazuar finds a specified directory, lists the files and metadata about those files.[1]

EnterpriseT1033System Owner/User Discovery

Kazuar gathers information on users.[1]

EnterpriseT1090.001Internal ProxySub-technique

Kazuar has used internal nodes on the compromised network for C2 communications.CitationAccenture HyperStack October 2020

EnterpriseT1069.001Local GroupsSub-technique

Kazuar gathers information about local groups and members.[1]

EnterpriseT1125Video Capture

Kazuar captures images from the webcam.[1]

EnterpriseT1059.004Unix ShellSub-technique

Kazuar uses /bin/bash to execute commands on the victim’s machine.[1]

EnterpriseT1055.001Dynamic-link Library InjectionSub-technique

If running in a Windows environment, Kazuar saves a DLL to disk that is injected into the explorer.exe process to execute the payload. Kazuar can also be configured to inject and execute within specific processes.[1]

EnterpriseT1071.002File Transfer ProtocolsSub-technique

Kazuar uses FTP and FTPS to communicate with the C2 server.[1]

EnterpriseT1543.003Windows ServiceSub-technique

Kazuar can install itself as a new service.[1]

EnterpriseT1082System Information Discovery

Kazuar gathers information on the system.[1]

EnterpriseT1102.002Bidirectional CommunicationSub-technique

Kazuar has used compromised WordPress blogs as C2 servers.[1]

EnterpriseT1008Fallback Channels

Kazuar can accept multiple URLs for C2 servers.[1]

EnterpriseT1071.001Web ProtocolsSub-technique

Kazuar uses HTTP and HTTPS to communicate with the C2 server. Kazuar can also act as a webserver and listen for inbound HTTP requests through an exposed API.[1]

EnterpriseT1010Application Window Discovery

Kazuar gathers information about opened windows.[1]

EnterpriseT1113Screen Capture

Kazuar captures screenshots of the victim’s screen.[1]

EnterpriseT1029Scheduled Transfer

Kazuar can sleep for a specific time and be set to communicate at specific intervals.[1]

EnterpriseT1680Local Storage Discovery

Kazuar gathers information on local drives.[1]

EnterpriseT1087.001Local AccountSub-technique

Kazuar gathers information on local groups and members on the victim’s machine.[1]

EnterpriseT1074.001Local Data StagingSub-technique

Kazuar stages command output and collected data in files before exfiltration.[1]

EnterpriseT1005Data from Local System

Kazuar uploads files from a specified directory to the C2 server.[1]

EnterpriseT1016System Network Configuration Discovery

Kazuar gathers information about network adapters.[1]

EnterpriseT1047Windows Management Instrumentation

Kazuar obtains a list of running processes through WMI querying.[1]

EnterpriseT1547.009Shortcut ModificationSub-technique

Kazuar adds a .lnk file to the Windows startup folder.[1]

EnterpriseT1059.003Windows Command ShellSub-technique

Kazuar uses cmd.exe to execute commands on the victim’s machine.[1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupEnterprise

G0010: Turla

Turla is a cyber espionage threat group that has been attributed to Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB). They have compromised victims in over 50 countries since at least 2004, spanning a range of industries including government, embassies, military, education, research and pharmaceutical companies. Turla is known for conducting watering hole and spearphishing campaigns, and leveraging in-house tools and malware, such as Uroburos.[1][2][3][4][5]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.4
Created
Modified
Raw hash
bbff460f30d56e3a...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.4Current bundlebbff460f30d5…
19.11.4Older bundlebbff460f30d5…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Unit 42 Kazuar May 2017

    Levene, B, et al. (2017, May 03). Kazuar: Multiplatform Espionage Backdoor with API Access. Retrieved July 17, 2018.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Kazuar

    (Citation: Unit 42 Kazuar May 2017)

  3. [3]
    mitre-attackS0265
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.