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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S0023: CHOPSTICK

CHOPSTICK is a malware family of modular backdoors used by APT28. It has been used since at least 2012 and is usually dropped on victims as second-stage malware, though it has been used as first-stage malware in several cases. It has both Windows and Linux variants. [1] [2] [3] [4] It is tracked separately from the X-Agent for Android.

EnterpriseS0023MalwareObject v2.3Modified
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S0023: CHOPSTICK describes [CHOPSTICK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0023) is a malware family of modular backdoors used by [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007). It has been used since at least 2012 and is usually dropped on victims as second-stage malware, though it has been used as first-stage malware in several cases. It has both Windows and Linux variants. (Citation: FireEye APT28) (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2) (Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017) (Citation: DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018) It is tracked separately from the...

Executive priority

S0023: CHOPSTICK is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S0023: CHOPSTICK by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows, Linux), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S0023: CHOPSTICK appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

CHOPSTICK

CHOPSTICK is a malware family of modular backdoors used by APT28. It has been used since at least 2012 and is usually dropped on victims as second-stage malware, though it has been used as first-stage malware in several cases. It has both Windows and Linux variants. [1] [2] [3] [4] It is tracked separately from the X-Agent for Android.

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

19 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1008Fallback Channels

CHOPSTICK can switch to a new C2 channel if the current one is broken.[2]

EnterpriseT1092Communication Through Removable Media

Part of APT28's operation involved using CHOPSTICK modules to copy itself to air-gapped machines, using files written to USB sticks to transfer data and command traffic.[1][2]CitationMicrosoft SIR Vol 19

EnterpriseT1090.001Internal ProxySub-technique

CHOPSTICK used a proxy server between victims and the C2 server.[2]

EnterpriseT1059Command and Scripting Interpreter

CHOPSTICK is capable of performing remote command execution.CitationCrowdstrike DNC June 2016[2]

EnterpriseT1071.003Mail ProtocolsSub-technique

Various implementations of CHOPSTICK communicate with C2 over SMTP and POP3.[2]

EnterpriseT1071.001Web ProtocolsSub-technique

Various implementations of CHOPSTICK communicate with C2 over HTTP.[2]

EnterpriseT1112Modify Registry

CHOPSTICK may modify Registry keys to store RC4 encrypted configuration information.[1]

EnterpriseT1497Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion

CHOPSTICK includes runtime checks to identify an analysis environment and prevent execution on it.[1]

EnterpriseT1113Screen Capture

CHOPSTICK has the capability to capture screenshots.[4]

EnterpriseT1105Ingress Tool Transfer

CHOPSTICK is capable of performing remote file transmission.CitationCrowdstrike DNC June 2016

EnterpriseT1518.001Security Software DiscoverySub-technique

CHOPSTICK checks for antivirus and forensics software.[1]

EnterpriseT1083File and Directory Discovery

An older version of CHOPSTICK has a module that monitors all mounted volumes for files with the extensions .doc, .docx, .pgp, .gpg, .m2f, or .m2o.[2]

EnterpriseT1027.011Fileless StorageSub-technique

CHOPSTICK may store RC4 encrypted configuration information in the Windows Registry.[1]

EnterpriseT1056.001KeyloggingSub-technique

CHOPSTICK is capable of performing keylogging.CitationCrowdstrike DNC June 2016[2][4]

EnterpriseT1091Replication Through Removable Media

Part of APT28's operation involved using CHOPSTICK modules to copy itself to air-gapped machines and using files written to USB sticks to transfer data and command traffic.[1]CitationMicrosoft SIR Vol 19CitationSecureworks IRON TWILIGHT Active Measures March 2017

EnterpriseT1568.002Domain Generation AlgorithmsSub-technique

CHOPSTICK can use a DGA for Fallback Channels, domains are generated by concatenating words from lists.CitationESET Sednit 2017 Activity

EnterpriseT1573.001Symmetric CryptographySub-technique

CHOPSTICK encrypts C2 communications with RC4.[2]

EnterpriseT1573.002Asymmetric CryptographySub-technique

CHOPSTICK encrypts C2 communications with TLS.[2]

EnterpriseT1012Query Registry

CHOPSTICK provides access to the Windows Registry, which can be used to gather information.[1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupEnterprise

G0007: APT28

APT28 is a threat group that has been attributed to Russia's General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) 85th Main Special Service Center (GTsSS) military unit 26165.[1][2] This group has been active since at least 2004.[3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13]

APT28 reportedly compromised the Hillary Clinton campaign, the Democratic National Committee, and the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee in 2016 in an attempt to interfere with the U.S. presidential election.[5] In 2018, the US indicted five GRU Unit 26165 officers associated with APT28 for cyber operations (including close-access operations) conducted between 2014 and 2018 against the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), the US Anti-Doping Agency, a US nuclear facility, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the Spiez Swiss Chemicals Laboratory, and other organizations.[14] Some of these were conducted with the assistance of GRU Unit 74455, which is also referred to as Sandworm Team.

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
2.3
Created
Modified
Raw hash
cf98a4d31aaa9622...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.22.3Current bundlecf98a4d31aaa…
19.12.3Older bundlecf98a4d31aaa…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    FireEye APT28

    FireEye. (2015). APT28: A WINDOW INTO RUSSIA’S CYBER ESPIONAGE OPERATIONS?. Retrieved August 19, 2015.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    ESET Sednit Part 2

    ESET. (2016, October). En Route with Sednit - Part 2: Observing the Comings and Goings. Retrieved November 21, 2016.

  3. [3]
    FireEye APT28 January 2017

    FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence. (2017, January 11). APT28: At the Center of the Storm. Retrieved November 17, 2024.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018

    Mueller, R. (2018, July 13). Indictment - United States of America vs. VIKTOR BORISOVICH NETYKSHO, et al. Retrieved November 17, 2024.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    Backdoor.SofacyX

    (Citation: Symantec APT28 Oct 2018)

  6. [6]
    CHOPSTICK

    (Citation: FireEye APT28) (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2) (Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017)

  7. [7]
    SPLM

    (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2) (Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017)

  8. [8]
    Symantec APT28 Oct 2018

    Symantec Security Response. (2018, October 04). APT28: New Espionage Operations Target Military and Government Organizations. Retrieved November 14, 2018.

    Open source URL
  9. [9]
    X-Agent

    (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2) (Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017)

  10. [10]
    Xagent

    (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2) (Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017)

  11. [11]
    mitre-attackS0023
    Open source URL
  12. [12]
    webhp

    (Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017)

Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.