S0633: Sliver
Security context for executives and security teams
S0633: Sliver describes [Sliver](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0633) is an open source, cross-platform, red team command and control (C2) framework written in Golang. [Sliver](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0633) includes its own package manager, "armory," for staging and downloading additional tools and payloads to the primary C2 framework.(Citation: Bishop Fox Sliver Framework August 2019)(Citation: Cybereason Sliver Undated)
Executive priority
S0633: Sliver is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate S0633: Sliver by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows, Linux, macOS), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether S0633: Sliver appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Sliver
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1027 | Obfuscated Files or Information | Sliver obfuscates configuration and other static files using native Go libraries such as `garble` and `gobfuscate` to inhibit configuration analysis and static detection.CitationMicrosoft Sliver 2022 |
| Enterprise | T1055 | Process Injection | |
| Enterprise | T1083 | File and Directory Discovery | Sliver can enumerate files on a target system.CitationGitHub Sliver File System August 2021 |
| Enterprise | T1027.004 | Compile After DeliverySub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1001.002 | SteganographySub-technique | Sliver can encode binary data into a .PNG file for C2 communication.CitationGitHub Sliver HTTP |
| Enterprise | T1134 | Access Token Manipulation | |
| Enterprise | T1059.001 | PowerShellSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1071.004 | DNSSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1027.013 | Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1573.002 | Asymmetric CryptographySub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1090.001 | Internal ProxySub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1016 | System Network Configuration Discovery | Sliver has the ability to gather network configuration information.CitationGitHub Sliver Ifconfig |
| Enterprise | T1113 | Screen Capture | Sliver can take screenshots of the victim’s active display.CitationGitHub Sliver Screen |
| Enterprise | T1071.001 | Web ProtocolsSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | |
| Enterprise | T1573.001 | Symmetric CryptographySub-technique | Sliver can use AES-GCM-256 to encrypt a session key for C2 message exchange.CitationGitHub Sliver Encryption |
| Enterprise | T1071 | Application Layer Protocol | |
| Enterprise | T1558.001 | Golden TicketSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1041 | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel | Sliver can exfiltrate files from the victim using the |
| Enterprise | T1548.002 | Bypass User Account ControlSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1132.001 | Standard EncodingSub-technique | Sliver can use standard encoding techniques like gzip and hex to ASCII to encode the C2 communication payload.CitationGitHub Sliver HTTP |
| Enterprise | T1003.001 | LSASS MemorySub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1049 | System Network Connections Discovery | Sliver can collect network connection information.CitationGitHub Sliver Netstat |
Groups, software, and campaigns
G1021: Cinnamon Tempest
Cinnamon Tempest is a China-based threat group that has been active since at least 2021 deploying multiple strains of ransomware based on the leaked Babuk source code. Cinnamon Tempest does not operate their ransomware on an affiliate model or purchase access but appears to act independently in all stages of the attack lifecycle. Based on victimology, the short lifespan of each ransomware variant, and use of malware attributed to government-sponsored threat groups, Cinnamon Tempest may be motivated by intellectual property theft or cyberespionage rather than financial gain.[1][2][3][4]
G0127: TA551
G0016: APT29
APT29 is threat group that has been attributed to Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR).[1][2] They have operated since at least 2008, often targeting government networks in Europe and NATO member countries, research institutes, and think tanks. APT29 reportedly compromised the Democratic National Committee starting in the summer of 2015.[3][4][5][6]
In April 2021, the US and UK governments attributed the SolarWinds Compromise to the SVR; public statements included citations to APT29, Cozy Bear, and The Dukes.[7][8] Industry reporting also referred to the actors involved in this campaign as UNC2452, NOBELIUM, StellarParticle, Dark Halo, and SolarStorm.[9][10][11][12][13][14]
C0018: C0018
C0018 was a month-long ransomware intrusion that successfully deployed AvosLocker onto a compromised network. The unidentified actors gained initial access to the victim network through an exposed server and used a variety of open-source tools prior to executing AvosLocker.[1][2]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(3)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 20.0 | 2.0 | Current bundle | 25a32a49d7fd… | ||
| 19.2 | 2.0 | Older bundle | 25a32a49d7fd… | ||
| 19.1 | 2.0 | Older bundle | 25a32a49d7fd… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Bishop Fox Sliver Framework August 2019
Kervella, R. (2019, August 4). Cross-platform General Purpose Implant Framework Written in Golang. Retrieved July 30, 2021.
Open source URL - [2]Cybereason Sliver Undated
Cybereason Global SOC and Incident Response Team. (n.d.). Sliver C2 Leveraged by Many Threat Actors. Retrieved March 24, 2025.
Open source URL - [3]mitre-attackS0633Open source URL
Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.