S9023: HiddenFace
HiddenFace is a modular backdoor developed and used exclusively by MirrorFace since at least 2021. HiddenFace can communicate both actively and passively and has been used against political and academic targets.[1][2][3]
Security context for executives and security teams
S9023: HiddenFace describes [HiddenFace](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9023) is a modular backdoor developed and used exclusively by [MirrorFace](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1054) since at least 2021. [HiddenFace](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9023) can communicate both actively and passively and has been used against political and academic targets.(Citation: JPCERT MirrorFace JUL 2024)(Citation: Trend Micro Earth Kasha NOV 2024)(Citation: Trend Micro Earth Kasha Updates APR 2025)
Executive priority
S9023: HiddenFace is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate S9023: HiddenFace by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether S9023: HiddenFace appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
HiddenFace
HiddenFace is a modular backdoor developed and used exclusively by MirrorFace since at least 2021. HiddenFace can communicate both actively and passively and has been used against political and academic targets.[1][2][3]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1053.005 | Scheduled TaskSub-technique | HiddenFace has used scheduled tasks for execution and persistence.[4][2] |
| Enterprise | T1571 | Non-Standard Port | HiddenFace's passive mode listens on TCP 47000.[2][1] |
| Enterprise | T1573.002 | Asymmetric CryptographySub-technique | HiddenFace can use RSA-2048 in addition to symmetric algorithms in C2.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1090.001 | Internal ProxySub-technique | HiddenFace can act as an internal HTTP proxy within the targeted environment.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1027.013 | Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique | HiddenFace has encrypted its payload with AES.[4][1] |
| Enterprise | T1480.002 | Mutual ExclusionSub-technique | HiddenFace can create a mutex to ensure only one instance is running at a time.[4] |
| Enterprise | T1095 | Non-Application Layer Protocol | HiddenFace can use a custom TCP protocol over Port 443 for C2.[4][2][1] |
| Enterprise | T1497.003 | Time Based ChecksSub-technique | HiddenFace can sleep randomly between 30 and 60 seconds to avoid behavioral analysis.[4] |
| Enterprise | T1008 | Fallback Channels | HiddenFace can use active and passive C2 modes that use different encryption algorithms and backdoor commands.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1033 | System Owner/User Discovery | HiddenFace can collect the username associated with the compromised host.[4] |
| Enterprise | T1005 | Data from Local System | HiddenFace can upload files from the victim machine to C2 nodes.[2][1] |
| Enterprise | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | HiddenFace can download files from the C2 to victim systems.[2][1] |
| Enterprise | T1027.007 | Dynamic API ResolutionSub-technique | HiddenFace can dynamically resolve Windows APIs.[4][2] |
| Enterprise | T1518.001 | Security Software DiscoverySub-technique | HiddenFace can identify processes identified with security applications and tooling.[4][2] |
| Enterprise | T1070.006 | TimestompSub-technique | HiddenFace can alter timestamps for directory content on targeted machines.[4][2][1] |
| Enterprise | T1568.002 | Domain Generation AlgorithmsSub-technique | HiddenFace has used dynamic domain generation algorithms in C2.[4][2][3][1] |
| Enterprise | T1082 | System Information Discovery | HiddenFace can enumerate the hostname and username of the compromised system.[4][2][1] |
| Enterprise | T1057 | Process Discovery | HiddenFace can check running processes against a list of blocklisted applications.[4] |
| Enterprise | T1055 | Process Injection | HiddenFace can inject code directly into legitimate applications.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1573.001 | Symmetric CryptographySub-technique | HiddenFace can use a randomly selected symmetric encryption algorithm for C2.[4] |
| Enterprise | T1572 | Protocol Tunneling | HiddenFace can hide its IP lookup by using DNS over HTTPS (DoH) for C2.[3] |
| Enterprise | T1140 | Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information | HiddenFace has the ability to decrypt its payload prior to execution.[4][1] |
| Enterprise | T1112 | Modify Registry | HiddenFace can store its configuration file in the Registry.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1480 | Execution Guardrails | HiddenFace can check for the presence of specific analysis tools and will terminate itself if they are found.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1686.003 | Windows Host FirewallSub-technique | HiddenFace can reconfigure Windows firewalls to enable communication by adding a rule named “Cortana” to allow inbound connection to TCP/47000.[4][2] |
Groups, software, and campaigns
G1054: MirrorFace
MirrorFace is a People's Republic of China (PRC)-aligned cyberespionage actor believed to be a subgroup under the menuPass umbrella based on targeting, tools, and infrastructure overlaps. MirrorFace has been active since at least 2019, at first exclusively targeting Japanese organizations across the media, defense, diplomatic, financial, manufacturing, and academic sectors. Subsequent MirrorFace operations included targets in Central Europe and featured use of LODEINFO, HiddenFace, and UPPERCUT malware.[1][2][3][4][5][6]
C0060: Operation AkaiRyū
Operation AkaiRyū (Japanese for RedDragon) was a cyberespionage spearphishing campaign conducted by MirrorFace between June and September 2024 against entities in Japan and Central Europe. Operation AkaiRyū notably included the first reported targeting of a European entity by MirrorFace, as well as their use of UPPERCUT, which was thought to be exclusive to menuPass.[1][2]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(3)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 20.0 | 1.0 | Current bundle | f3cbc91aa05e… | ||
| 19.2 | 1.0 | Older bundle | f3cbc91aa05e… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Older bundle | f3cbc91aa05e… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]JPCERT MirrorFace JUL 2024
Tomonaga, S. (2024, July 16). MirrorFace Attack against Japanese Organisations. Retrieved April 17, 2026.
Open source URL - [2]Trend Micro Earth Kasha NOV 2024
Trend Micro. (2024, November 19). Spot the Difference: Earth Kasha's New LODEINFO Campaign And The Correlation Analysis With The APT10 Umbrella. Retrieved April 17, 2026.
Open source URL - [3]Trend Micro Earth Kasha Updates APR 2025
Hiroaki, H. (2025, April 30). Earth Kasha Updates TTPs in Latest Campaign Targeting Taiwan and Japan. Retrieved April 17, 2026.
Open source URL - [4]ESET HiddenFace 2024
Breitenbacher, D. (2024). Unmasking HiddenFace. Retrieved April 17, 2026.
Open source URL - [5]NOOPDOOR
(Citation: ESET HiddenFace 2024)(Citation: Trend Micro Earth Kasha NOV 2024)(Citation: Trend Micro Earth Kasha Updates APR 2025)
- [6]mitre-attackS9023Open source URL
Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.