LiveActive security incident?Get immediate response
MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S0512: FatDuke

FatDuke is a backdoor used by APT29 since at least 2016.[1]

EnterpriseS0512MalwareObject v1.1Modified
Discuss defensive coverageBack to ATT&CK
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S0512: FatDuke describes [FatDuke](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0512) is a backdoor used by [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) since at least 2016.(Citation: ESET Dukes October 2019)

Executive priority

S0512: FatDuke is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S0512: FatDuke by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S0512: FatDuke appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

FatDuke

FatDuke is a backdoor used by APT29 since at least 2016.[1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

21 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1012Query Registry

FatDuke can get user agent strings for the default browser from HKCU\Software\Classes\http\shell\open\command.[1]

EnterpriseT1036.012Browser FingerprintSub-technique

FatDuke has attempted to mimic a compromised user's traffic by using the same user agent as the installed browser.[1]

EnterpriseT1071.001Web ProtocolsSub-technique

FatDuke can be controlled via a custom C2 protocol over HTTP.[1]

EnterpriseT1497.003Time Based ChecksSub-technique

FatDuke can turn itself on or off at random intervals.[1]

EnterpriseT1016System Network Configuration Discovery

FatDuke can identify the MAC address on the target computer.[1]

EnterpriseT1008Fallback Channels

FatDuke has used several C2 servers per targeted organization.[1]

EnterpriseT1082System Information Discovery

FatDuke can collect the user name, Windows version, computer name, and available space on discs from a compromised host.[1]

EnterpriseT1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique

FatDuke has used HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\CurrentVersion\Run to establish persistence.[1]

EnterpriseT1106Native API

FatDuke can call ShellExecuteW to open the default browser on the URL localhost.[1]

EnterpriseT1027.002Software PackingSub-technique

FatDuke has been regularly repacked by its operators to create large binaries and evade detection.[1]

EnterpriseT1090.001Internal ProxySub-technique

FatDuke can used pipes to connect machines with restricted internet access to remote machines via other infected hosts.[1]

EnterpriseT1057Process Discovery

FatDuke can list running processes on the localhost.[1]

EnterpriseT1027Obfuscated Files or Information

FatDuke can use base64 encoding, string stacking, and opaque predicates for obfuscation.[1]

EnterpriseT1070.004File DeletionSub-technique

FatDuke can secure delete its DLL.[1]

EnterpriseT1005Data from Local System

FatDuke can copy files and directories from a compromised host.[1]

EnterpriseT1218.011Rundll32Sub-technique

FatDuke can execute via rundll32.[1]

EnterpriseT1059.001PowerShellSub-technique

FatDuke has the ability to execute PowerShell scripts.[1]

EnterpriseT1573.001Symmetric CryptographySub-technique

FatDuke can AES encrypt C2 communications.[1]

EnterpriseT1083File and Directory Discovery

FatDuke can enumerate directories on target machines.[1]

EnterpriseT1027.016Junk Code InsertionSub-technique

FatDuke has been packed with junk code and strings.[1]

EnterpriseT1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

FatDuke can decrypt AES encrypted C2 communications.[1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupEnterprise

G0016: APT29

APT29 is threat group that has been attributed to Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR).[1][2] They have operated since at least 2008, often targeting government networks in Europe and NATO member countries, research institutes, and think tanks. APT29 reportedly compromised the Democratic National Committee starting in the summer of 2015.[3][4][5][6]

In April 2021, the US and UK governments attributed the SolarWinds Compromise to the SVR; public statements included citations to APT29, Cozy Bear, and The Dukes.[7][8] Industry reporting also referred to the actors involved in this campaign as UNC2452, NOBELIUM, StellarParticle, Dark Halo, and SolarStorm.[9][10][11][12][13][14]

CampaignEnterprise

C0023: Operation Ghost

Operation Ghost was an APT29 campaign starting in 2013 that included operations against ministries of foreign affairs in Europe and the Washington, D.C. embassy of a European Union country. During Operation Ghost, APT29 used new families of malware and leveraged web services, steganography, and unique C2 infrastructure for each victim.[1]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · CampaignC0023: Operation GhostEnterpriseuses · GroupG0016: APT29Enterpriseuses · TechniqueT1012: Query RegistryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1036.012: Browser FingerprintEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1071.001: Web ProtocolsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1497.003: Time Based ChecksEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1016: System Network Configuration DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1008: Fallback ChannelsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1082: System Information DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1547.001: Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1106: Native APIEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1027.002: Software PackingEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1090.001: Internal ProxyEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1057: Process DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1027: Obfuscated Files or InformationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1070.004: File DeletionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1005: Data from Local SystemEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1218.011: Rundll32Enterpriseuses · TechniqueT1059.001: PowerShellEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1573.001: Symmetric CryptographyEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1083: File and Directory DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1027.016: Junk Code InsertionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1140: Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEnterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.1
Created
Modified
Raw hash
0beb94badc13a762...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.1Current bundle0beb94badc13…
19.11.1Older bundle0beb94badc13…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    ESET Dukes October 2019

    Faou, M., Tartare, M., Dupuy, T. (2019, October). OPERATION GHOST. Retrieved September 23, 2020.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    mitre-attackS0512
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

Official MITRE ATT&CK siteOfficial STIX data repositoryMITRE ATT&CK terms of use