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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S0559: SUNBURST

SUNBURST is a trojanized DLL designed to fit within the SolarWinds Orion software update framework. It was used by APT29 since at least February 2020.[1][2]

EnterpriseS0559MalwareObject v2.5Modified
Discuss defensive coverageBack to ATT&CK
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceHigh

SUNBURST matters because it represents malicious code delivered through a trusted software update path: a trojanized DLL within the SolarWinds Orion update framework. For leaders, the decision point is not only “can we find this malware,” but whether the organization can validate trust in critical vendor software, investigate Windows systems that run privileged management tools, and preserve enough network, DNS, web, endpoint, and software update evidence to reconstruct a supply-chain incident.

Executive priority

Prioritize this as a supply-chain and operational resilience scenario. The ATT&CK relationships tie SUNBURST to the SolarWinds Compromise campaign and APT29, and the described behaviors span command-and-control, discovery, execution, collection, and stealth. Executives should ask whether software update trust, vendor risk evidence, privileged management server monitoring, incident response retention, and identity/API abuse investigation processes are tested together rather than treated as separate controls.

Technical view

SUNBURST is documented for Windows and is linked to behaviors including web and DNS command-and-control, protocol/service impersonation, junk data, steganography, system and process discovery, registry queries, WMI execution, Visual Basic execution, local data collection, obfuscation, compression, matching legitimate resource names or locations, and multiple forms of indicator or artifact removal. SOC and IR teams should validate whether Orion-related Windows hosts and comparable management servers have endpoint process, module/DLL, registry, WMI, DNS, HTTP/S, file deletion, and log-retention coverage sufficient to correlate trusted update activity with later discovery, C2, and cleanup behaviors.

Likely telemetry

  • Windows endpoint process execution and parent/child process telemetry
  • DLL/module load and file integrity evidence for trusted software directories
  • Software update and application deployment logs for SolarWinds Orion or equivalent management platforms
  • DNS query and response logs, including historical retention
  • HTTP/S proxy, web gateway, firewall, and network flow metadata

Detection direction

  • Do not rely on a single malware signature; the related techniques emphasize obfuscation, compression, impersonated protocols, DNS/web C2, and indicator removal.
  • Validate correlation across trusted software update events, unusual outbound DNS or web behavior, discovery commands, registry queries, WMI use, and cleanup activity on Windows management systems.
  • Tune detections for high-value management servers separately from ordinary workstations because legitimate administration can create false positives for WMI, discovery, and service enumeration.
  • Review whether DNS and web telemetry preserve enough detail and history to identify blended command-and-control patterns using web protocols, DNS, junk data, steganography, or protocol impersonation.
  • Account for evidence loss: related techniques include file deletion, clearing network connection history/configurations, clearing persistence, and broader indicator removal.

Mitigation priorities

  • Inventory SolarWinds Orion and comparable trusted management/update platforms and treat them as high-value assets with enhanced monitoring and retention.
  • Strengthen software supply-chain governance: verify update sources, document vendor risk decisions, and preserve audit evidence for critical software changes.
  • Apply least privilege and administrative segmentation around management servers to reduce the blast radius if trusted software is compromised.
  • Ensure endpoint, DNS, web, registry, WMI, and file telemetry is retained long enough to support supply-chain incident reconstruction.
  • Exercise incident response playbooks that combine malware triage, vendor-software validation, identity/token/API review, and network C2 investigation.
Additional notes and limits

MITRE provides no official detection text for this object, so the take is driven by the official description, external references, and relationships to the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29, and listed ATT&CK techniques. The most useful local validation is whether the organization can correlate activity around trusted Windows management software with network C2, discovery, execution, collection, and cleanup behaviors.

This summary does not assert current exploitation, customer exposure, or guaranteed detection. The object lists Windows as the platform, while several related techniques have broader platform metadata; platform-specific claims should therefore be validated against local affected software and telemetry. ATT&CK tactics are not specified directly on the malware object.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

SUNBURST

SUNBURST is a trojanized DLL designed to fit within the SolarWinds Orion software update framework. It was used by APT29 since at least February 2020.[1][2]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

36 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1497.003Time Based ChecksSub-technique

SUNBURST remained dormant after initial access for a period of up to two weeks.[3]

EnterpriseT1047Windows Management Instrumentation

SUNBURST used the WMI query Select * From Win32_SystemDriver to retrieve a driver listing.[3]

EnterpriseT1082System Information Discovery

SUNBURST collected hostname and OS version.[3][4]

EnterpriseT1112Modify Registry

SUNBURST had commands that allow an attacker to write or delete registry keys, and was observed stopping services by setting their HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\services\\[service_name]\\Start registry entries to value 4.[3][4] It also deleted previously-created Image File Execution Options (IFEO) Debugger registry values and registry keys related to HTTP proxy to clean up traces of its activity.[2]

EnterpriseT1573.001Symmetric CryptographySub-technique

SUNBURST encrypted C2 traffic using a single-byte-XOR cipher.[3]

EnterpriseT1132.001Standard EncodingSub-technique

SUNBURST used Base64 encoding in its C2 traffic.[3]

EnterpriseT1070.009Clear PersistenceSub-technique

SUNBURST removed IFEO registry values to clean up traces of persistence.[2]

EnterpriseT1005Data from Local System

SUNBURST collected information from a compromised host.[4][3]

EnterpriseT1124System Time Discovery

SUNBURST collected device `UPTIME`.[3][4]

EnterpriseT1083File and Directory Discovery

SUNBURST had commands to enumerate files and directories.[3][4]

EnterpriseT1685Disable or Modify Tools

SUNBURST attempted to disable software security services following checks against a FNV-1a + XOR hashed hardcoded blocklist.[5]

EnterpriseT1016System Network Configuration Discovery

SUNBURST collected all network interface MAC addresses that are up and not loopback devices, as well as IP address, DHCP configuration, and domain information.[3]

EnterpriseT1027Obfuscated Files or Information

SUNBURST obfuscated collected system information using a FNV-1a + XOR algorithm.[3]

EnterpriseT1546.012Image File Execution Options InjectionSub-technique

SUNBURST created an Image File Execution Options (IFEO) Debugger registry value for the process dllhost.exe to trigger the installation of Cobalt Strike.[2]

EnterpriseT1218.011Rundll32Sub-technique

SUNBURST used Rundll32 to execute payloads.[2]

EnterpriseT1027.015CompressionSub-technique

SUNBURST strings were compressed and encoded in Base64.[4]

EnterpriseT1007System Service Discovery

SUNBURST collected a list of service names that were hashed using a FNV-1a + XOR algorithm to check against similarly-hashed hardcoded blocklists.[3]

EnterpriseT1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationSub-technique

SUNBURST created VBScripts that were named after existing services or folders to blend into legitimate activities.[2]

EnterpriseT1553.002Code SigningSub-technique

SUNBURST was digitally signed by SolarWinds from March - May 2020.[3]

EnterpriseT1057Process Discovery

SUNBURST collected a list of process names that were hashed using a FNV-1a + XOR algorithm to check against similarly-hashed hardcoded blocklists.[3]

EnterpriseT1001.003Protocol or Service ImpersonationSub-technique

SUNBURST masqueraded its network traffic as the Orion Improvement Program (OIP) protocol.[3]

EnterpriseT1001.001Junk DataSub-technique

SUNBURST added junk bytes to its C2 over HTTP.[3]

EnterpriseT1059.005Visual BasicSub-technique

SUNBURST used VBScripts to initiate the execution of payloads.[2]

EnterpriseT1071.004DNSSub-technique

SUNBURST used DNS for C2 traffic designed to mimic normal SolarWinds API communications.[3]

EnterpriseT1070.004File DeletionSub-technique

SUNBURST had a command to delete files.[3][4]

EnterpriseT1070.007Clear Network Connection History and ConfigurationsSub-technique

SUNBURST also removed the firewall rules it created during execution.[2]

EnterpriseT1497.001System ChecksSub-technique

SUNBURST checked the domain name of the compromised host to verify it was running in a real environment.[4]

EnterpriseT1012Query Registry

SUNBURST collected the registry value HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography\MachineGuid from compromised hosts.[3]

EnterpriseT1518.001Security Software DiscoverySub-technique

SUNBURST checked for a variety of antivirus/endpoint detection agents prior to execution.[4][5]

EnterpriseT1033System Owner/User Discovery

SUNBURST collected the username from a compromised host.[3][4]

EnterpriseT1105Ingress Tool Transfer

SUNBURST delivered different payloads, including TEARDROP in at least one instance.[3]

EnterpriseT1027.005Indicator Removal from ToolsSub-technique

SUNBURST source code used generic variable names and pre-obfuscated strings, and was likely sanitized of developer comments before being added to SUNSPOT.[8]

EnterpriseT1071.001Web ProtocolsSub-technique

SUNBURST communicated via HTTP GET or HTTP POST requests to third party servers for C2.[3]

EnterpriseT1001.002SteganographySub-technique

SUNBURST C2 data attempted to appear as benign XML related to .NET assemblies or as a faux JSON blob.[3][5][6]

EnterpriseT1568Dynamic Resolution

SUNBURST dynamically resolved C2 infrastructure for randomly-generated subdomains within a parent domain.[3]

EnterpriseT1070Indicator Removal

SUNBURST removed HTTP proxy registry values to clean up traces of execution.[2]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupEnterprise

G0016: APT29

APT29 is threat group that has been attributed to Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR).[1][2] They have operated since at least 2008, often targeting government networks in Europe and NATO member countries, research institutes, and think tanks. APT29 reportedly compromised the Democratic National Committee starting in the summer of 2015.[3][4][5][6]

In April 2021, the US and UK governments attributed the SolarWinds Compromise to the SVR; public statements included citations to APT29, Cozy Bear, and The Dukes.[7][8] Industry reporting also referred to the actors involved in this campaign as UNC2452, NOBELIUM, StellarParticle, Dark Halo, and SolarStorm.[9][10][11][12][13][14]

CampaignEnterprise

C0024: SolarWinds Compromise

The SolarWinds Compromise was a sophisticated supply chain cyber operation conducted by APT29 that was discovered in mid-December 2020. APT29 used customized malware to inject malicious code into the SolarWinds Orion software build process that was later distributed through a normal software update; they also used password spraying, token theft, API abuse, spear phishing, and other supply chain attacks to compromise user accounts and leverage their associated access. Victims of this campaign included government, consulting, technology, telecom, and other organizations in North America, Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. This activity has been labled the StellarParticle campaign in industry reporting.[1] Industry reporting also initially referred to the actors involved in this campaign as UNC2452, NOBELIUM, Dark Halo, and SolarStorm.[2][3][4][5][1][6][7][8]

In April 2021, the US and UK governments attributed the SolarWinds Compromise to Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR); public statements included citations to APT29, Cozy Bear, and The Dukes.[9][10][11] The US government assessed that of the approximately 18,000 affected public and private sector customers of Solar Winds’ Orion product, a much smaller number were compromised by follow-on APT29 activity on their systems.[12]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · TechniqueT1497.003: Time Based ChecksEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1047: Windows Management InstrumentationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1082: System Information DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1112: Modify RegistryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1573.001: Symmetric CryptographyEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1132.001: Standard EncodingEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1070.009: Clear PersistenceEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1005: Data from Local SystemEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1124: System Time DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1083: File and Directory DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1685: Disable or Modify ToolsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1016: System Network Configuration DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1027: Obfuscated Files or InformationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1546.012: Image File Execution Options InjectionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1218.011: Rundll32Enterpriseuses · TechniqueT1027.015: CompressionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1007: System Service DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1036.005: Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1553.002: Code SigningEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1057: Process DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1001.003: Protocol or Service ImpersonationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1001.001: Junk DataEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1059.005: Visual BasicEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1071.004: DNSEnterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
2.5
Created
Modified
Raw hash
7e266b436b3ed1f1...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(1)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.12.5Current bundle7e266b436b3e…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    SolarWinds Sunburst Sunspot Update January 2021

    Sudhakar Ramakrishna . (2021, January 11). New Findings From Our Investigation of SUNBURST. Retrieved January 13, 2021.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Microsoft Deep Dive Solorigate January 2021

    MSTIC, CDOC, 365 Defender Research Team. (2021, January 20). Deep dive into the Solorigate second-stage activation: From SUNBURST to TEARDROP and Raindrop . Retrieved January 22, 2021.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020

    FireEye. (2020, December 13). Highly Evasive Attacker Leverages SolarWinds Supply Chain to Compromise Multiple Global Victims With SUNBURST Backdoor. Retrieved January 4, 2021.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    Microsoft Analyzing Solorigate Dec 2020

    MSTIC. (2020, December 18). Analyzing Solorigate, the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack, and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers . Retrieved January 5, 2021.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    FireEye SUNBURST Additional Details Dec 2020

    Stephen Eckels, Jay Smith, William Ballenthin. (2020, December 24). SUNBURST Additional Technical Details. Retrieved January 6, 2021.

    Open source URL
  6. [6]
    Symantec Sunburst Sending Data January 2021

    Symantec Threat Hunter Team. (2021, January 22). SolarWinds: How Sunburst Sends Data Back to the Attackers. Retrieved January 22, 2021.

    Open source URL
  7. [7]
    CheckPoint Sunburst & Teardrop December 2020

    Check Point Research. (2020, December 22). SUNBURST, TEARDROP and the NetSec New Normal. Retrieved January 6, 2021.

    Open source URL
  8. [8]
    CrowdStrike SUNSPOT Implant January 2021

    CrowdStrike Intelligence Team. (2021, January 11). SUNSPOT: An Implant in the Build Process. Retrieved January 11, 2021.

    Open source URL
  9. [9]
    MSTIC NOBELIUM May 2021

    Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC). (2021, May 27). New sophisticated email-based attack from NOBELIUM. Retrieved May 28, 2021.

    Open source URL
  10. [10]
    Secureworks IRON RITUAL Profile

    Secureworks CTU. (n.d.). IRON RITUAL. Retrieved February 24, 2022.

    Open source URL
  11. [11]
    FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020

    FireEye. (2020, December 13). Highly Evasive Attacker Leverages SolarWinds Supply Chain to Compromise Multiple Global Victims With SUNBURST Backdoor. Retrieved January 4, 2021.

    Open source URL
  12. [12]
    FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020

    FireEye. (2020, December 13). Highly Evasive Attacker Leverages SolarWinds Supply Chain to Compromise Multiple Global Victims With SUNBURST Backdoor. Retrieved January 4, 2021.

    Open source URL
  13. [13]
    Microsoft Deep Dive Solorigate January 2021

    MSTIC, CDOC, 365 Defender Research Team. (2021, January 20). Deep dive into the Solorigate second-stage activation: From SUNBURST to TEARDROP and Raindrop . Retrieved January 22, 2021.

    Open source URL
  14. [14]
    Microsoft Deep Dive Solorigate January 2021

    MSTIC, CDOC, 365 Defender Research Team. (2021, January 20). Deep dive into the Solorigate second-stage activation: From SUNBURST to TEARDROP and Raindrop . Retrieved January 22, 2021.

    Open source URL
  15. [15]
    SUNBURST

    (Citation: FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020)

  16. [16]
    SUNBURST

    (Citation: FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020)

  17. [17]
    SUNBURST

    (Citation: FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020)

  18. [18]
    SolarWinds Sunburst Sunspot Update January 2021

    Sudhakar Ramakrishna . (2021, January 11). New Findings From Our Investigation of SUNBURST. Retrieved January 13, 2021.

    Open source URL
  19. [19]
    SolarWinds Sunburst Sunspot Update January 2021

    Sudhakar Ramakrishna . (2021, January 11). New Findings From Our Investigation of SUNBURST. Retrieved January 13, 2021.

    Open source URL
  20. [20]
    Solorigate

    (Citation: Microsoft Deep Dive Solorigate January 2021)

  21. [21]
    Solorigate

    (Citation: Microsoft Deep Dive Solorigate January 2021)

  22. [22]
    Solorigate

    (Citation: Microsoft Deep Dive Solorigate January 2021)

  23. [23]
    mitre-attackS0559
    Open source URL
  24. [24]
    mitre-attackS0559
    Open source URL
  25. [25]
    mitre-attackS0559
    Open source URL
  26. [26]
    FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020

    FireEye. (2020, December 13). Highly Evasive Attacker Leverages SolarWinds Supply Chain to Compromise Multiple Global Victims With SUNBURST Backdoor. Retrieved January 4, 2021.

    Open source URL
  27. [27]
    FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020

    FireEye. (2020, December 13). Highly Evasive Attacker Leverages SolarWinds Supply Chain to Compromise Multiple Global Victims With SUNBURST Backdoor. Retrieved January 4, 2021.

    Open source URL
  28. [28]
    FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020

    FireEye. (2020, December 13). Highly Evasive Attacker Leverages SolarWinds Supply Chain to Compromise Multiple Global Victims With SUNBURST Backdoor. Retrieved January 4, 2021.

    Open source URL
  29. [29]
    FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020

    FireEye. (2020, December 13). Highly Evasive Attacker Leverages SolarWinds Supply Chain to Compromise Multiple Global Victims With SUNBURST Backdoor. Retrieved January 4, 2021.

    Open source URL
  30. [30]
    FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020

    FireEye. (2020, December 13). Highly Evasive Attacker Leverages SolarWinds Supply Chain to Compromise Multiple Global Victims With SUNBURST Backdoor. Retrieved January 4, 2021.

    Open source URL
  31. [31]
    FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020

    FireEye. (2020, December 13). Highly Evasive Attacker Leverages SolarWinds Supply Chain to Compromise Multiple Global Victims With SUNBURST Backdoor. Retrieved January 4, 2021.

    Open source URL
  32. [32]
    Microsoft Analyzing Solorigate Dec 2020

    MSTIC. (2020, December 18). Analyzing Solorigate, the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack, and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers . Retrieved January 5, 2021.

    Open source URL
  33. [33]
    FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020

    FireEye. (2020, December 13). Highly Evasive Attacker Leverages SolarWinds Supply Chain to Compromise Multiple Global Victims With SUNBURST Backdoor. Retrieved January 4, 2021.

    Open source URL
  34. [34]
    FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020

    FireEye. (2020, December 13). Highly Evasive Attacker Leverages SolarWinds Supply Chain to Compromise Multiple Global Victims With SUNBURST Backdoor. Retrieved January 4, 2021.

    Open source URL
  35. [35]
    Microsoft Analyzing Solorigate Dec 2020

    MSTIC. (2020, December 18). Analyzing Solorigate, the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack, and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers . Retrieved January 5, 2021.

    Open source URL
  36. [36]
    Microsoft Analyzing Solorigate Dec 2020

    MSTIC. (2020, December 18). Analyzing Solorigate, the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack, and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers . Retrieved January 5, 2021.

    Open source URL
  37. [37]
    Microsoft Deep Dive Solorigate January 2021

    MSTIC, CDOC, 365 Defender Research Team. (2021, January 20). Deep dive into the Solorigate second-stage activation: From SUNBURST to TEARDROP and Raindrop . Retrieved January 22, 2021.

    Open source URL
  38. [38]
    Microsoft Deep Dive Solorigate January 2021

    MSTIC, CDOC, 365 Defender Research Team. (2021, January 20). Deep dive into the Solorigate second-stage activation: From SUNBURST to TEARDROP and Raindrop . Retrieved January 22, 2021.

    Open source URL
  39. [39]
    FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020

    FireEye. (2020, December 13). Highly Evasive Attacker Leverages SolarWinds Supply Chain to Compromise Multiple Global Victims With SUNBURST Backdoor. Retrieved January 4, 2021.

    Open source URL
  40. [40]
    FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020

    FireEye. (2020, December 13). Highly Evasive Attacker Leverages SolarWinds Supply Chain to Compromise Multiple Global Victims With SUNBURST Backdoor. Retrieved January 4, 2021.

    Open source URL
  41. [41]
    FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020

    FireEye. (2020, December 13). Highly Evasive Attacker Leverages SolarWinds Supply Chain to Compromise Multiple Global Victims With SUNBURST Backdoor. Retrieved January 4, 2021.

    Open source URL
  42. [42]
    FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020

    FireEye. (2020, December 13). Highly Evasive Attacker Leverages SolarWinds Supply Chain to Compromise Multiple Global Victims With SUNBURST Backdoor. Retrieved January 4, 2021.

    Open source URL
  43. [43]
    Microsoft Deep Dive Solorigate January 2021

    MSTIC, CDOC, 365 Defender Research Team. (2021, January 20). Deep dive into the Solorigate second-stage activation: From SUNBURST to TEARDROP and Raindrop . Retrieved January 22, 2021.

    Open source URL
  44. [44]
    Microsoft Deep Dive Solorigate January 2021

    MSTIC, CDOC, 365 Defender Research Team. (2021, January 20). Deep dive into the Solorigate second-stage activation: From SUNBURST to TEARDROP and Raindrop . Retrieved January 22, 2021.

    Open source URL
  45. [45]
    FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020

    FireEye. (2020, December 13). Highly Evasive Attacker Leverages SolarWinds Supply Chain to Compromise Multiple Global Victims With SUNBURST Backdoor. Retrieved January 4, 2021.

    Open source URL
  46. [46]
    FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020

    FireEye. (2020, December 13). Highly Evasive Attacker Leverages SolarWinds Supply Chain to Compromise Multiple Global Victims With SUNBURST Backdoor. Retrieved January 4, 2021.

    Open source URL
  47. [47]
    Microsoft Analyzing Solorigate Dec 2020

    MSTIC. (2020, December 18). Analyzing Solorigate, the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack, and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers . Retrieved January 5, 2021.

    Open source URL
  48. [48]
    Microsoft Analyzing Solorigate Dec 2020

    MSTIC. (2020, December 18). Analyzing Solorigate, the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack, and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers . Retrieved January 5, 2021.

    Open source URL
  49. [49]
    FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020

    FireEye. (2020, December 13). Highly Evasive Attacker Leverages SolarWinds Supply Chain to Compromise Multiple Global Victims With SUNBURST Backdoor. Retrieved January 4, 2021.

    Open source URL
  50. [50]
    FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020

    FireEye. (2020, December 13). Highly Evasive Attacker Leverages SolarWinds Supply Chain to Compromise Multiple Global Victims With SUNBURST Backdoor. Retrieved January 4, 2021.

    Open source URL
  51. [51]
    Microsoft Analyzing Solorigate Dec 2020

    MSTIC. (2020, December 18). Analyzing Solorigate, the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack, and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers . Retrieved January 5, 2021.

    Open source URL
  52. [52]
    Microsoft Analyzing Solorigate Dec 2020

    MSTIC. (2020, December 18). Analyzing Solorigate, the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack, and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers . Retrieved January 5, 2021.

    Open source URL
  53. [53]
    FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020

    FireEye. (2020, December 13). Highly Evasive Attacker Leverages SolarWinds Supply Chain to Compromise Multiple Global Victims With SUNBURST Backdoor. Retrieved January 4, 2021.

    Open source URL
  54. [54]
    FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020

    FireEye. (2020, December 13). Highly Evasive Attacker Leverages SolarWinds Supply Chain to Compromise Multiple Global Victims With SUNBURST Backdoor. Retrieved January 4, 2021.

    Open source URL
  55. [55]
    Microsoft Analyzing Solorigate Dec 2020

    MSTIC. (2020, December 18). Analyzing Solorigate, the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack, and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers . Retrieved January 5, 2021.

    Open source URL
  56. [56]
    Microsoft Analyzing Solorigate Dec 2020

    MSTIC. (2020, December 18). Analyzing Solorigate, the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack, and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers . Retrieved January 5, 2021.

    Open source URL
  57. [57]
    FireEye SUNBURST Additional Details Dec 2020

    Stephen Eckels, Jay Smith, William Ballenthin. (2020, December 24). SUNBURST Additional Technical Details. Retrieved January 6, 2021.

    Open source URL
  58. [58]
    FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020

    FireEye. (2020, December 13). Highly Evasive Attacker Leverages SolarWinds Supply Chain to Compromise Multiple Global Victims With SUNBURST Backdoor. Retrieved January 4, 2021.

    Open source URL
  59. [59]
    FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020

    FireEye. (2020, December 13). Highly Evasive Attacker Leverages SolarWinds Supply Chain to Compromise Multiple Global Victims With SUNBURST Backdoor. Retrieved January 4, 2021.

    Open source URL
  60. [60]
    FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020

    FireEye. (2020, December 13). Highly Evasive Attacker Leverages SolarWinds Supply Chain to Compromise Multiple Global Victims With SUNBURST Backdoor. Retrieved January 4, 2021.

    Open source URL
  61. [61]
    FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020

    FireEye. (2020, December 13). Highly Evasive Attacker Leverages SolarWinds Supply Chain to Compromise Multiple Global Victims With SUNBURST Backdoor. Retrieved January 4, 2021.

    Open source URL
  62. [62]
    Microsoft Deep Dive Solorigate January 2021

    MSTIC, CDOC, 365 Defender Research Team. (2021, January 20). Deep dive into the Solorigate second-stage activation: From SUNBURST to TEARDROP and Raindrop . Retrieved January 22, 2021.

    Open source URL
  63. [63]
    Microsoft Deep Dive Solorigate January 2021

    MSTIC, CDOC, 365 Defender Research Team. (2021, January 20). Deep dive into the Solorigate second-stage activation: From SUNBURST to TEARDROP and Raindrop . Retrieved January 22, 2021.

    Open source URL
  64. [64]
    Microsoft Deep Dive Solorigate January 2021

    MSTIC, CDOC, 365 Defender Research Team. (2021, January 20). Deep dive into the Solorigate second-stage activation: From SUNBURST to TEARDROP and Raindrop . Retrieved January 22, 2021.

    Open source URL
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