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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S0559: SUNBURST

SUNBURST is a trojanized DLL designed to fit within the SolarWinds Orion software update framework. It was used by APT29 since at least February 2020.[1][2]

EnterpriseS0559MalwareObject v2.5Modified
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Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S0559: SUNBURST describes [SUNBURST](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0559) is a trojanized DLL designed to fit within the SolarWinds Orion software update framework. It was used by [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) since at least February 2020.(Citation: SolarWinds Sunburst Sunspot Update January 2021)(Citation: Microsoft Deep Dive Solorigate January 2021)

Executive priority

S0559: SUNBURST is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S0559: SUNBURST by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S0559: SUNBURST appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

SUNBURST

SUNBURST is a trojanized DLL designed to fit within the SolarWinds Orion software update framework. It was used by APT29 since at least February 2020.[1][2]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

36 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1497.003Time Based ChecksSub-technique

SUNBURST remained dormant after initial access for a period of up to two weeks.[3]

EnterpriseT1047Windows Management Instrumentation

SUNBURST used the WMI query Select * From Win32_SystemDriver to retrieve a driver listing.[3]

EnterpriseT1082System Information Discovery

SUNBURST collected hostname and OS version.[3]CitationMicrosoft Analyzing Solorigate Dec 2020

EnterpriseT1112Modify Registry

SUNBURST had commands that allow an attacker to write or delete registry keys, and was observed stopping services by setting their HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\services\\[service_name]\\Start registry entries to value 4.[3]CitationMicrosoft Analyzing Solorigate Dec 2020 It also deleted previously-created Image File Execution Options (IFEO) Debugger registry values and registry keys related to HTTP proxy to clean up traces of its activity.[2]

EnterpriseT1573.001Symmetric CryptographySub-technique

SUNBURST encrypted C2 traffic using a single-byte-XOR cipher.[3]

EnterpriseT1132.001Standard EncodingSub-technique

SUNBURST used Base64 encoding in its C2 traffic.[3]

EnterpriseT1070.009Clear PersistenceSub-technique

SUNBURST removed IFEO registry values to clean up traces of persistence.[2]

EnterpriseT1005Data from Local System

SUNBURST collected information from a compromised host.CitationMicrosoft Analyzing Solorigate Dec 2020[3]

EnterpriseT1124System Time Discovery

SUNBURST collected device `UPTIME`.[3]CitationMicrosoft Analyzing Solorigate Dec 2020

EnterpriseT1083File and Directory Discovery

SUNBURST had commands to enumerate files and directories.[3]CitationMicrosoft Analyzing Solorigate Dec 2020

EnterpriseT1685Disable or Modify Tools

SUNBURST attempted to disable software security services following checks against a FNV-1a + XOR hashed hardcoded blocklist.CitationFireEye SUNBURST Additional Details Dec 2020

EnterpriseT1016System Network Configuration Discovery

SUNBURST collected all network interface MAC addresses that are up and not loopback devices, as well as IP address, DHCP configuration, and domain information.[3]

EnterpriseT1027Obfuscated Files or Information

SUNBURST obfuscated collected system information using a FNV-1a + XOR algorithm.[3]

EnterpriseT1546.012Image File Execution Options InjectionSub-technique

SUNBURST created an Image File Execution Options (IFEO) Debugger registry value for the process dllhost.exe to trigger the installation of Cobalt Strike.[2]

EnterpriseT1218.011Rundll32Sub-technique

SUNBURST used Rundll32 to execute payloads.[2]

EnterpriseT1027.015CompressionSub-technique

SUNBURST strings were compressed and encoded in Base64.CitationMicrosoft Analyzing Solorigate Dec 2020

EnterpriseT1007System Service Discovery

SUNBURST collected a list of service names that were hashed using a FNV-1a + XOR algorithm to check against similarly-hashed hardcoded blocklists.[3]

EnterpriseT1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationSub-technique

SUNBURST created VBScripts that were named after existing services or folders to blend into legitimate activities.[2]

EnterpriseT1553.002Code SigningSub-technique

SUNBURST was digitally signed by SolarWinds from March - May 2020.[3]

EnterpriseT1057Process Discovery

SUNBURST collected a list of process names that were hashed using a FNV-1a + XOR algorithm to check against similarly-hashed hardcoded blocklists.[3]

EnterpriseT1001.003Protocol or Service ImpersonationSub-technique

SUNBURST masqueraded its network traffic as the Orion Improvement Program (OIP) protocol.[3]

EnterpriseT1001.001Junk DataSub-technique

SUNBURST added junk bytes to its C2 over HTTP.[3]

EnterpriseT1059.005Visual BasicSub-technique

SUNBURST used VBScripts to initiate the execution of payloads.[2]

EnterpriseT1071.004DNSSub-technique

SUNBURST used DNS for C2 traffic designed to mimic normal SolarWinds API communications.[3]

EnterpriseT1070.004File DeletionSub-technique

SUNBURST had a command to delete files.[3]CitationMicrosoft Analyzing Solorigate Dec 2020

EnterpriseT1070.007Clear Network Connection History and ConfigurationsSub-technique

SUNBURST also removed the firewall rules it created during execution.[2]

EnterpriseT1497.001System ChecksSub-technique

SUNBURST checked the domain name of the compromised host to verify it was running in a real environment.CitationMicrosoft Analyzing Solorigate Dec 2020

EnterpriseT1012Query Registry

SUNBURST collected the registry value HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography\MachineGuid from compromised hosts.[3]

EnterpriseT1518.001Security Software DiscoverySub-technique

SUNBURST checked for a variety of antivirus/endpoint detection agents prior to execution.CitationMicrosoft Analyzing Solorigate Dec 2020CitationFireEye SUNBURST Additional Details Dec 2020

EnterpriseT1033System Owner/User Discovery

SUNBURST collected the username from a compromised host.[3]CitationMicrosoft Analyzing Solorigate Dec 2020

EnterpriseT1105Ingress Tool Transfer

SUNBURST delivered different payloads, including TEARDROP in at least one instance.[3]

EnterpriseT1027.005Indicator Removal from ToolsSub-technique

SUNBURST source code used generic variable names and pre-obfuscated strings, and was likely sanitized of developer comments before being added to SUNSPOT.CitationCrowdStrike SUNSPOT Implant January 2021

EnterpriseT1071.001Web ProtocolsSub-technique

SUNBURST communicated via HTTP GET or HTTP POST requests to third party servers for C2.[3]

EnterpriseT1568Dynamic Resolution

SUNBURST dynamically resolved C2 infrastructure for randomly-generated subdomains within a parent domain.[3]

EnterpriseT1070Indicator Removal

SUNBURST removed HTTP proxy registry values to clean up traces of execution.[2]

EnterpriseT1001.002SteganographySub-technique

SUNBURST C2 data attempted to appear as benign XML related to .NET assemblies or as a faux JSON blob.[3]CitationFireEye SUNBURST Additional Details Dec 2020CitationSymantec Sunburst Sending Data January 2021

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupEnterprise

G0016: APT29

APT29 is threat group that has been attributed to Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR).[1][2] They have operated since at least 2008, often targeting government networks in Europe and NATO member countries, research institutes, and think tanks. APT29 reportedly compromised the Democratic National Committee starting in the summer of 2015.[3][4][5][6]

In April 2021, the US and UK governments attributed the SolarWinds Compromise to the SVR; public statements included citations to APT29, Cozy Bear, and The Dukes.[7][8] Industry reporting also referred to the actors involved in this campaign as UNC2452, NOBELIUM, StellarParticle, Dark Halo, and SolarStorm.[9][10][11][12][13][14]

CampaignEnterprise

C0024: SolarWinds Compromise

The SolarWinds Compromise was a sophisticated supply chain cyber operation conducted by APT29 that was discovered in mid-December 2020. APT29 used customized malware to inject malicious code into the SolarWinds Orion software build process that was later distributed through a normal software update; they also used password spraying, token theft, API abuse, spear phishing, and other supply chain attacks to compromise user accounts and leverage their associated access. Victims of this campaign included government, consulting, technology, telecom, and other organizations in North America, Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. This activity has been labled the StellarParticle campaign in industry reporting.[1] Industry reporting also initially referred to the actors involved in this campaign as UNC2452, NOBELIUM, Dark Halo, and SolarStorm.[2][3][4][5][1][6][7][8]

In April 2021, the US and UK governments attributed the SolarWinds Compromise to Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR); public statements included citations to APT29, Cozy Bear, and The Dukes.[9][10][11] The US government assessed that of the approximately 18,000 affected public and private sector customers of Solar Winds’ Orion product, a much smaller number were compromised by follow-on APT29 activity on their systems.[12]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · CampaignC0024: SolarWinds CompromiseEnterpriseuses · GroupG0016: APT29Enterpriseuses · TechniqueT1497.003: Time Based ChecksEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1047: Windows Management InstrumentationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1082: System Information DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1112: Modify RegistryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1573.001: Symmetric CryptographyEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1132.001: Standard EncodingEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1070.009: Clear PersistenceEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1005: Data from Local SystemEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1124: System Time DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1083: File and Directory DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1685: Disable or Modify ToolsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1016: System Network Configuration DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1027: Obfuscated Files or InformationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1546.012: Image File Execution Options InjectionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1218.011: Rundll32Enterpriseuses · TechniqueT1027.015: CompressionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1007: System Service DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1036.005: Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1553.002: Code SigningEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1057: Process DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1001.003: Protocol or Service ImpersonationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1001.001: Junk DataEnterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
2.5
Created
Modified
Raw hash
7e266b436b3ed1f1...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.22.5Current bundle7e266b436b3e…
19.12.5Older bundle7e266b436b3e…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    SolarWinds Sunburst Sunspot Update January 2021

    Sudhakar Ramakrishna . (2021, January 11). New Findings From Our Investigation of SUNBURST. Retrieved January 13, 2021.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Microsoft Deep Dive Solorigate January 2021

    MSTIC, CDOC, 365 Defender Research Team. (2021, January 20). Deep dive into the Solorigate second-stage activation: From SUNBURST to TEARDROP and Raindrop . Retrieved January 22, 2021.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020

    FireEye. (2020, December 13). Highly Evasive Attacker Leverages SolarWinds Supply Chain to Compromise Multiple Global Victims With SUNBURST Backdoor. Retrieved January 4, 2021.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    SUNBURST

    (Citation: FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020)

  5. [5]
    Solorigate

    (Citation: Microsoft Deep Dive Solorigate January 2021)

  6. [6]
    mitre-attackS0559
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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