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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S1190: Kapeka

Kapeka is a backdoor written in C++ used against victims in Eastern Europe since at least mid-2022. Kapeka has technical overlaps with Exaramel for Windows and Prestige malware variants, both of which are linked to Sandworm Team. Kapeka may have been used in advance of Prestige deployment in late 2022.[1][2]

EnterpriseS1190MalwareObject v1.0Modified
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Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

Kapeka is a Windows backdoor documented by ATT&CK as used against victims in Eastern Europe since at least mid-2022. Its business significance is that it combines persistence, command execution, registry interaction, web-based command-and-control, proxying, and obfuscation behaviors that can let an intruder maintain access while blending into normal Windows and web traffic. For leaders, this is less about one malware name and more about whether the organization can prove it would notice a Windows host creating suspicious scheduled tasks, abusing rundll32, changing registry values, and communicating over encoded web traffic.

Executive priority

Prioritize Kapeka as a validation case for Windows endpoint visibility, SOC detection engineering, and incident response readiness. ATT&CK relates Kapeka to Sandworm Team and notes overlaps with Exaramel for Windows and Prestige, so organizations with exposure to Eastern Europe, critical operations, or destructive-threat planning should use it to test resilience assumptions without assuming local exposure. Executives should ask whether security teams can produce audit-ready evidence for endpoint process execution, registry changes, scheduled task creation/removal, and outbound web/proxy activity during an investigation.

Technical view

ATT&CK does not provide a dedicated detection section for Kapeka, so defenders should build coverage from the related behaviors: Query Registry, Modify Registry, Scheduled Task, Windows Command Shell, Native API execution, Rundll32 abuse, encrypted or encoded files, masqueraded file types, decode/deobfuscation activity, web protocol C2, standard encoded C2 data, proxy use, system information discovery, and clearing persistence artifacts. SOC teams should validate detections on Windows hosts around suspicious rundll32 command lines, unusual scheduled task creation or deletion, registry reads/writes tied to unknown processes, command shell activity launched by unexpected parents, and anomalous outbound HTTP/S patterns from endpoints.

Likely telemetry

  • Windows endpoint process creation and command-line telemetry
  • Parent-child process relationships, especially involving cmd.exe and rundll32.exe
  • Windows Scheduled Task creation, modification, execution, and deletion events
  • Windows Registry query and modification telemetry
  • File creation and metadata telemetry for encoded, encrypted, or masqueraded payloads

Detection direction

  • Because ATT&CK provides no official Kapeka detection text, map detections to the listed techniques rather than relying on a malware-family signature alone.
  • Tune rundll32 detections for unusual DLL paths, uncommon exports, suspicious parent processes, and execution from user-writable locations, while accounting for legitimate administrative and software activity.
  • Correlate scheduled task activity with nearby registry modification, command shell execution, encoded files, or new outbound web connections to reduce false positives.
  • Review whether registry telemetry captures both queries and modifications; many environments log writes but not enough read activity for discovery detection.
  • Inspect outbound HTTP/S and proxy logs for unusual endpoint destinations, encoded payload patterns, uncommon user agents, or processes that do not normally initiate web traffic.

Mitigation priorities

  • Start with visibility: ensure Windows endpoint logging, EDR, scheduled task auditing, registry auditing, and proxy/DNS logging are enabled and retained long enough for incident response.
  • Harden execution paths by limiting unnecessary script and command shell use, monitoring rundll32 abuse, and controlling execution from user-writable directories where feasible.
  • Apply least privilege so routine users cannot create high-impact persistence or modify sensitive registry locations without administrative control.
  • Use egress controls and proxy policy to constrain unauthorized outbound web communications and improve inspection of endpoint-originated HTTP/S traffic.
  • Maintain incident response playbooks for suspected backdoor activity that include persistence review, registry inspection, scheduled task triage, network containment, and evidence preservation.
Additional notes and limits

Kapeka is a Windows malware object in ATT&CK Enterprise. The supplied relationships state that Sandworm Team uses this object and that Kapeka uses multiple Windows-relevant techniques spanning execution, persistence, discovery, defense evasion, and command-and-control. The official description cites WithSecure and Microsoft reporting and notes technical overlaps with Exaramel for Windows and Prestige. Detection guidance here is derived from the supplied ATT&CK relationships because no official Kapeka detection text was provided.

This take is limited to the supplied ATT&CK fields, external references, and relationships. It does not assert current activity, customer exposure, specific indicators, exploit paths, or guaranteed detection. Local validation requires environment-specific baselines, endpoint telemetry quality checks, and review of applicable Windows logging and network monitoring coverage.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Kapeka

Kapeka is a backdoor written in C++ used against victims in Eastern Europe since at least mid-2022. Kapeka has technical overlaps with Exaramel for Windows and Prestige malware variants, both of which are linked to Sandworm Team. Kapeka may have been used in advance of Prestige deployment in late 2022.[1][2]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

14 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1218.011Rundll32Sub-technique

Kapeka is a Windows DLL file executed via ordinal by `rundll32.exe`.[2][1]

EnterpriseT1036.008Masquerade File TypeSub-technique

Kapeka masquerades as a Microsoft Word Add-In file, with the extension `.wll`, but is a malicious DLL file.[2][1]

EnterpriseT1082System Information Discovery

Kapeka utilizes WinAPI calls and registry queries to gather system information.[1]

EnterpriseT1059.003Windows Command ShellSub-technique

Kapeka allows for arbitrary Windows command execution.[1]

EnterpriseT1112Modify Registry

Kapeka writes persistent configuration information to the victim host registry.[1]

EnterpriseT1053.005Scheduled TaskSub-technique

Kapeka persists via scheduled tasks.[2][1]

EnterpriseT1071.001Web ProtocolsSub-technique

Kapeka utilizes HTTP for command and control.[1]

EnterpriseT1070.009Clear PersistenceSub-technique

Kapeka will clear registry values used for persistent configuration storage when uninstalled.[1]

EnterpriseT1132.001Standard EncodingSub-technique

Kapeka utilizes JSON objects to send and receive information from command and control nodes.[1]

EnterpriseT1012Query Registry

Kapeka queries registry values for stored configuration information.[1]

EnterpriseT1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

Kapeka utilizes obfuscated JSON structures for various data storage and configuration management items.[1]

EnterpriseT1090Proxy

Kapeka can identify system proxy settings via `WinHttpGetIEProxyConfigForCurrentUser()` during initialization and utilize these settings for subsequent command and control operations.[1]

EnterpriseT1106Native API

Kapeka utilizes WinAPI calls to gather victim system information.[1]

EnterpriseT1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique

Kapeka utilizes AES-256 (CBC mode), XOR, and RSA-2048 encryption schemas for various configuration and other objects.[1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupEnterprise

G0034: Sandworm Team

Sandworm Team is a destructive threat group that has been attributed to Russia's General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) Main Center for Special Technologies (GTsST) military unit 74455.[1][2] This group has been active since at least 2009.[3][4][5][6]

In October 2020, the US indicted six GRU Unit 74455 officers associated with Sandworm Team for the following cyber operations: the 2015 and 2016 attacks against Ukrainian electrical companies and government organizations, the 2017 worldwide NotPetya attack, targeting of the 2017 French presidential campaign, the 2018 Olympic Destroyer attack against the Winter Olympic Games, the 2018 operation against the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and attacks against the country of Georgia in 2018 and 2019.[1][2] Some of these were conducted with the assistance of GRU Unit 26165, which is also referred to as APT28.[7]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · TechniqueT1218.011: Rundll32Enterpriseuses · TechniqueT1036.008: Masquerade File TypeEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1082: System Information DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1059.003: Windows Command ShellEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1112: Modify RegistryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1053.005: Scheduled TaskEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1071.001: Web ProtocolsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1070.009: Clear PersistenceEnterpriseuses · GroupG0034: Sandworm TeamEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1132.001: Standard EncodingEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1012: Query RegistryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1140: Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1090: ProxyEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1106: Native APIEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1027.013: Encrypted/Encoded FileEnterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
1.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
6718778aad069676...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(1)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.11.0Current bundle6718778aad06…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    WithSecure Kapeka 2024

    Mohammad Kazem Hassan Nejad, WithSecure. (2024, April 17). KAPEKA A novel backdoor spotted in Eastern Europe. Retrieved January 6, 2025.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Microsoft KnuckleTouch 2024

    Microsoft. (2024, February 14). Backdoor:Win64/KnuckleTouch.A!dha. Retrieved January 6, 2025.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    KnuckleTouch

    (Citation: Microsoft KnuckleTouch 2024)

  4. [4]
    KnuckleTouch

    (Citation: Microsoft KnuckleTouch 2024)

  5. [5]
    KnuckleTouch

    (Citation: Microsoft KnuckleTouch 2024)

  6. [6]
    Microsoft KnuckleTouch 2024

    Microsoft. (2024, February 14). Backdoor:Win64/KnuckleTouch.A!dha. Retrieved January 6, 2025.

    Open source URL
  7. [7]
    Microsoft KnuckleTouch 2024

    Microsoft. (2024, February 14). Backdoor:Win64/KnuckleTouch.A!dha. Retrieved January 6, 2025.

    Open source URL
  8. [8]
    WithSecure Kapeka 2024

    Mohammad Kazem Hassan Nejad, WithSecure. (2024, April 17). KAPEKA A novel backdoor spotted in Eastern Europe. Retrieved January 6, 2025.

    Open source URL
  9. [9]
    WithSecure Kapeka 2024

    Mohammad Kazem Hassan Nejad, WithSecure. (2024, April 17). KAPEKA A novel backdoor spotted in Eastern Europe. Retrieved January 6, 2025.

    Open source URL
  10. [10]
    mitre-attackS1190
    Open source URL
  11. [11]
    mitre-attackS1190
    Open source URL
  12. [12]
    mitre-attackS1190
    Open source URL
  13. [13]
    Microsoft KnuckleTouch 2024

    Microsoft. (2024, February 14). Backdoor:Win64/KnuckleTouch.A!dha. Retrieved January 6, 2025.

    Open source URL
  14. [14]
    Microsoft KnuckleTouch 2024

    Microsoft. (2024, February 14). Backdoor:Win64/KnuckleTouch.A!dha. Retrieved January 6, 2025.

    Open source URL
  15. [15]
    WithSecure Kapeka 2024

    Mohammad Kazem Hassan Nejad, WithSecure. (2024, April 17). KAPEKA A novel backdoor spotted in Eastern Europe. Retrieved January 6, 2025.

    Open source URL
  16. [16]
    WithSecure Kapeka 2024

    Mohammad Kazem Hassan Nejad, WithSecure. (2024, April 17). KAPEKA A novel backdoor spotted in Eastern Europe. Retrieved January 6, 2025.

    Open source URL
  17. [17]
    Microsoft KnuckleTouch 2024

    Microsoft. (2024, February 14). Backdoor:Win64/KnuckleTouch.A!dha. Retrieved January 6, 2025.

    Open source URL
  18. [18]
    Microsoft KnuckleTouch 2024

    Microsoft. (2024, February 14). Backdoor:Win64/KnuckleTouch.A!dha. Retrieved January 6, 2025.

    Open source URL
  19. [19]
    WithSecure Kapeka 2024

    Mohammad Kazem Hassan Nejad, WithSecure. (2024, April 17). KAPEKA A novel backdoor spotted in Eastern Europe. Retrieved January 6, 2025.

    Open source URL
  20. [20]
    WithSecure Kapeka 2024

    Mohammad Kazem Hassan Nejad, WithSecure. (2024, April 17). KAPEKA A novel backdoor spotted in Eastern Europe. Retrieved January 6, 2025.

    Open source URL
  21. [21]
    WithSecure Kapeka 2024

    Mohammad Kazem Hassan Nejad, WithSecure. (2024, April 17). KAPEKA A novel backdoor spotted in Eastern Europe. Retrieved January 6, 2025.

    Open source URL
  22. [22]
    WithSecure Kapeka 2024

    Mohammad Kazem Hassan Nejad, WithSecure. (2024, April 17). KAPEKA A novel backdoor spotted in Eastern Europe. Retrieved January 6, 2025.

    Open source URL
  23. [23]
    WithSecure Kapeka 2024

    Mohammad Kazem Hassan Nejad, WithSecure. (2024, April 17). KAPEKA A novel backdoor spotted in Eastern Europe. Retrieved January 6, 2025.

    Open source URL
  24. [24]
    WithSecure Kapeka 2024

    Mohammad Kazem Hassan Nejad, WithSecure. (2024, April 17). KAPEKA A novel backdoor spotted in Eastern Europe. Retrieved January 6, 2025.

    Open source URL
  25. [25]
    WithSecure Kapeka 2024

    Mohammad Kazem Hassan Nejad, WithSecure. (2024, April 17). KAPEKA A novel backdoor spotted in Eastern Europe. Retrieved January 6, 2025.

    Open source URL
  26. [26]
    WithSecure Kapeka 2024

    Mohammad Kazem Hassan Nejad, WithSecure. (2024, April 17). KAPEKA A novel backdoor spotted in Eastern Europe. Retrieved January 6, 2025.

    Open source URL
  27. [27]
    Microsoft KnuckleTouch 2024

    Microsoft. (2024, February 14). Backdoor:Win64/KnuckleTouch.A!dha. Retrieved January 6, 2025.

    Open source URL
  28. [28]
    Microsoft KnuckleTouch 2024

    Microsoft. (2024, February 14). Backdoor:Win64/KnuckleTouch.A!dha. Retrieved January 6, 2025.

    Open source URL
  29. [29]
    WithSecure Kapeka 2024

    Mohammad Kazem Hassan Nejad, WithSecure. (2024, April 17). KAPEKA A novel backdoor spotted in Eastern Europe. Retrieved January 6, 2025.

    Open source URL
  30. [30]
    WithSecure Kapeka 2024

    Mohammad Kazem Hassan Nejad, WithSecure. (2024, April 17). KAPEKA A novel backdoor spotted in Eastern Europe. Retrieved January 6, 2025.

    Open source URL
  31. [31]
    WithSecure Kapeka 2024

    Mohammad Kazem Hassan Nejad, WithSecure. (2024, April 17). KAPEKA A novel backdoor spotted in Eastern Europe. Retrieved January 6, 2025.

    Open source URL
  32. [32]
    WithSecure Kapeka 2024

    Mohammad Kazem Hassan Nejad, WithSecure. (2024, April 17). KAPEKA A novel backdoor spotted in Eastern Europe. Retrieved January 6, 2025.

    Open source URL
  33. [33]
    WithSecure Kapeka 2024

    Mohammad Kazem Hassan Nejad, WithSecure. (2024, April 17). KAPEKA A novel backdoor spotted in Eastern Europe. Retrieved January 6, 2025.

    Open source URL
  34. [34]
    WithSecure Kapeka 2024

    Mohammad Kazem Hassan Nejad, WithSecure. (2024, April 17). KAPEKA A novel backdoor spotted in Eastern Europe. Retrieved January 6, 2025.

    Open source URL
  35. [35]
    Microsoft KnuckleTouch 2024

    Microsoft. (2024, February 14). Backdoor:Win64/KnuckleTouch.A!dha. Retrieved January 6, 2025.

    Open source URL
  36. [36]
    Microsoft KnuckleTouch 2024

    Microsoft. (2024, February 14). Backdoor:Win64/KnuckleTouch.A!dha. Retrieved January 6, 2025.

    Open source URL
  37. [37]
    WithSecure Kapeka 2024

    Mohammad Kazem Hassan Nejad, WithSecure. (2024, April 17). KAPEKA A novel backdoor spotted in Eastern Europe. Retrieved January 6, 2025.

    Open source URL
  38. [38]
    WithSecure Kapeka 2024

    Mohammad Kazem Hassan Nejad, WithSecure. (2024, April 17). KAPEKA A novel backdoor spotted in Eastern Europe. Retrieved January 6, 2025.

    Open source URL
  39. [39]
    WithSecure Kapeka 2024

    Mohammad Kazem Hassan Nejad, WithSecure. (2024, April 17). KAPEKA A novel backdoor spotted in Eastern Europe. Retrieved January 6, 2025.

    Open source URL
  40. [40]
    WithSecure Kapeka 2024

    Mohammad Kazem Hassan Nejad, WithSecure. (2024, April 17). KAPEKA A novel backdoor spotted in Eastern Europe. Retrieved January 6, 2025.

    Open source URL
  41. [41]
    WithSecure Kapeka 2024

    Mohammad Kazem Hassan Nejad, WithSecure. (2024, April 17). KAPEKA A novel backdoor spotted in Eastern Europe. Retrieved January 6, 2025.

    Open source URL
  42. [42]
    WithSecure Kapeka 2024

    Mohammad Kazem Hassan Nejad, WithSecure. (2024, April 17). KAPEKA A novel backdoor spotted in Eastern Europe. Retrieved January 6, 2025.

    Open source URL
  43. [43]
    WithSecure Kapeka 2024

    Mohammad Kazem Hassan Nejad, WithSecure. (2024, April 17). KAPEKA A novel backdoor spotted in Eastern Europe. Retrieved January 6, 2025.

    Open source URL
  44. [44]
    WithSecure Kapeka 2024

    Mohammad Kazem Hassan Nejad, WithSecure. (2024, April 17). KAPEKA A novel backdoor spotted in Eastern Europe. Retrieved January 6, 2025.

    Open source URL
  45. [45]
    WithSecure Kapeka 2024

    Mohammad Kazem Hassan Nejad, WithSecure. (2024, April 17). KAPEKA A novel backdoor spotted in Eastern Europe. Retrieved January 6, 2025.

    Open source URL
  46. [46]
    WithSecure Kapeka 2024

    Mohammad Kazem Hassan Nejad, WithSecure. (2024, April 17). KAPEKA A novel backdoor spotted in Eastern Europe. Retrieved January 6, 2025.

    Open source URL
  47. [47]
    WithSecure Kapeka 2024

    Mohammad Kazem Hassan Nejad, WithSecure. (2024, April 17). KAPEKA A novel backdoor spotted in Eastern Europe. Retrieved January 6, 2025.

    Open source URL
  48. [48]
    WithSecure Kapeka 2024

    Mohammad Kazem Hassan Nejad, WithSecure. (2024, April 17). KAPEKA A novel backdoor spotted in Eastern Europe. Retrieved January 6, 2025.

    Open source URL
  49. [49]
    WithSecure Kapeka 2024

    Mohammad Kazem Hassan Nejad, WithSecure. (2024, April 17). KAPEKA A novel backdoor spotted in Eastern Europe. Retrieved January 6, 2025.

    Open source URL
Source and licensing

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