S0517: Pillowmint
Pillowmint is a point-of-sale malware used by FIN7 designed to capture credit card information.[1]
Security context for executives and security teams
S0517: Pillowmint describes [Pillowmint](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0517) is a point-of-sale malware used by [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) designed to capture credit card information.(Citation: Trustwave Pillowmint June 2020)
Executive priority
S0517: Pillowmint is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate S0517: Pillowmint by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether S0517: Pillowmint appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Pillowmint
Pillowmint is a point-of-sale malware used by FIN7 designed to capture credit card information.[1]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1546.011 | Application ShimmingSub-technique | Pillowmint has used a malicious shim database to maintain persistence.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1055.004 | Asynchronous Procedure CallSub-technique | Pillowmint has used the NtQueueApcThread syscall to inject code into svchost.exe.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1112 | Modify Registry | Pillowmint has modified the Registry key |
| Enterprise | T1012 | Query Registry | Pillowmint has used shellcode which reads code stored in the registry keys |
| Enterprise | T1027 | Obfuscated Files or Information | Pillowmint has obfuscated the AES key used for encryption.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1027.015 | CompressionSub-technique | Pillowmint has been compressed and stored within a registry key.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1027.011 | Fileless StorageSub-technique | Pillowmint has stored a compressed payload in the Registry key |
| Enterprise | T1070.009 | Clear PersistenceSub-technique | Pillowmint can uninstall the malicious service from an infected machine.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1057 | Process Discovery | Pillowmint can iterate through running processes every six seconds collecting a list of processes to capture from later.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1106 | Native API | Pillowmint has used multiple native Windows APIs to execute and conduct process injections.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1059.001 | PowerShellSub-technique | Pillowmint has used a PowerShell script to install a shim database.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1140 | Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information | Pillowmint has been decompressed by included shellcode prior to being launched.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1005 | Data from Local System | Pillowmint has collected credit card data using native API functions.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1070.004 | File DeletionSub-technique | Pillowmint has deleted the filepath |
| Enterprise | T1560 | Archive Collected Data | Pillowmint has encrypted stolen credit card information with AES and further encoded it with Base64.[1] |
Groups, software, and campaigns
G0046: FIN7
FIN7 is a financially-motivated threat group that has been active since 2013. FIN7 has targeted the retail, restaurant, hospitality, software, consulting, financial services, medical equipment, cloud services, media, food and beverage, transportation, pharmaceutical, and utilities industries in the United States. A portion of FIN7 was operated out of a front company called Combi Security and often used point-of-sale malware for targeting efforts. Since 2020, FIN7 shifted operations to big game hunting (BGH), including use of REvil ransomware and their own Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS), Darkside. FIN7 may be linked to the Carbanak Group, but multiple threat groups have been observed using Carbanak, leading these groups to be tracked separately.[1][2][3][4][5][6][7]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.2 | Current bundle | 3021c38c7bd3… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.2 | Older bundle | 3021c38c7bd3… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Trustwave Pillowmint June 2020
Trustwave SpiderLabs. (2020, June 22). Pillowmint: FIN7’s Monkey Thief . Retrieved July 27, 2020.
Open source URL - [2]mitre-attackS0517Open source URL
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