S0083: Misdat

S0083: Misdat describes [Misdat](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0083) is a backdoor that was used in [Operation Dust Storm](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0016) from 2010 to 2011.(Citation: Cylance Dust Storm)

Executive priority

S0083: Misdat is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S0083: Misdat by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

Validate whether S0083: Misdat appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.

Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Misdat

Misdat is a backdoor that was used in Operation Dust Storm from 2010 to 2011.[1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

Filter related techniques16 rows

Domain	ID	Name	Relationship / procedure
Enterprise	T1036.005	Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationSub-technique	Misdat saves itself as a file named `msdtc.exe`, which is also the name of the legitimate Microsoft Distributed Transaction Coordinator service binary.[1]CitationMicrosoft DTC
Enterprise	T1083	File and Directory Discovery	Misdat is capable of running commands to obtain a list of files and directories, as well as enumerating logical drives.[1]
Enterprise	T1041	Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	Misdat has uploaded files and data to its C2 servers.[1]
Enterprise	T1095	Non-Application Layer Protocol	Misdat network traffic communicates over a raw socket.[1]
Enterprise	T1005	Data from Local System	Misdat has collected files and data from a compromised host.[1]
Enterprise	T1070.004	File DeletionSub-technique	Misdat is capable of deleting the backdoor file.[1]
Enterprise	T1070.009	Clear PersistenceSub-technique	Misdat is capable of deleting Registry keys used for persistence.[1]
Enterprise	T1082	System Information Discovery	The initial beacon packet for Misdat contains the operating system version of the victim.[1]
Enterprise	T1547	Boot or Logon Autostart Execution	Misdat has created registry keys for persistence, including `HKCU\Software\dnimtsoleht\StubPath`, `HKCU\Software\snimtsOleht\StubPath`, `HKCU\Software\Backtsaleht\StubPath`, `HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed. Components\{3bf41072-b2b1-21c8-b5c1-bd56d32fbda7}`, and `HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components\{3ef41072-a2f1-21c8-c5c1-70c2c3bc7905}`.[1]
Enterprise	T1132.001	Standard EncodingSub-technique	Misdat network traffic is Base64-encoded plaintext.[1]
Enterprise	T1105	Ingress Tool Transfer	Misdat is capable of downloading files from the C2.[1]
Enterprise	T1059.003	Windows Command ShellSub-technique	Misdat is capable of providing shell functionality to the attacker to execute commands.[1]
Enterprise	T1614.001	System Language DiscoverySub-technique	Misdat has attempted to detect if a compromised host had a Japanese keyboard via the Windows API call `GetKeyboardType`.[1]
Enterprise	T1027.002	Software PackingSub-technique	Misdat was typically packed using UPX.[1]
Enterprise	T1070.006	TimestompSub-technique	Many Misdat samples were programmed using Borland Delphi, which will mangle the default PE compile timestamp of a file.[1]
Enterprise	T1106	Native API	Misdat has used Windows APIs, including `ExitWindowsEx` and `GetKeyboardType`.[1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

C0016: Operation Dust Storm

Operation Dust Storm was a long-standing persistent cyber espionage campaign that targeted multiple industries in Japan, South Korea, the United States, Europe, and several Southeast Asian countries. By 2015, the Operation Dust Storm threat actors shifted from government and defense-related intelligence targets to Japanese companies or Japanese subdivisions of larger foreign organizations supporting Japan's critical infrastructure, including electricity generation, oil and natural gas, finance, transportation, and construction.[1]

Operation Dust Storm threat actors also began to use Android backdoors in their operations by 2015, with all identified victims at the time residing in Japan or South Korea.[1]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release: 19.2
Object version: 1.2
Created: May 31, 2017, 21:32 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Modified: Apr 16, 2025, 20:37 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Raw hash: 0bea1555997d2db1...

Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)

Release	Bundle imported	Object version	Modified	Status	Raw hash
19.2	Aug 6, 2026, 02:58 UTC (UTC+00:00)	1.2	Apr 16, 2025, 20:37 UTC (UTC+00:00)	Current bundle	`0bea1555997d…`
19.1	Jul 14, 2026, 09:14 UTC (UTC+00:00)	1.2	Apr 16, 2025, 20:37 UTC (UTC+00:00)	Older bundle	`0bea1555997d…`

Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSON Open MITRE-hosted copy

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

[1]
Cylance Dust Storm
Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved December 22, 2021.
Open source URL
[2]
mitre-attackS0083
Open source URL

Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

Official MITRE ATT&CK site Official STIX data repository MITRE ATT&CK terms of use