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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S0085: S-Type

S-Type is a backdoor that was used in Operation Dust Storm since at least 2013.[1]

EnterpriseS0085MalwareObject v1.3Modified
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Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S0085: S-Type describes [S-Type](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0085) is a backdoor that was used in [Operation Dust Storm](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0016) since at least 2013.(Citation: Cylance Dust Storm)

Executive priority

S0085: S-Type is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S0085: S-Type by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S0085: S-Type appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

S-Type

S-Type is a backdoor that was used in Operation Dust Storm since at least 2013.[1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

20 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationSub-technique

S-Type may save itself as a file named `msdtc.exe`, which is also the name of the legitimate Microsoft Distributed Transaction Coordinator service binary.[1]CitationMicrosoft DTC

EnterpriseT1033System Owner/User Discovery

S-Type has run tests to determine the privilege level of the compromised user.[1]

EnterpriseT1041Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

S-Type has uploaded data and files from a compromised host to its C2 servers.[1]

EnterpriseT1105Ingress Tool Transfer

S-Type can download additional files onto a compromised host.[1]

EnterpriseT1008Fallback Channels

S-Type primarily uses port 80 for C2, but falls back to ports 443 or 8080 if initial communication fails.[1]

EnterpriseT1071.001Web ProtocolsSub-technique

S-Type uses HTTP for C2.[1]

EnterpriseT1059.003Windows Command ShellSub-technique

S-Type has provided the ability to execute shell commands on a compromised host.[1]

EnterpriseT1614.001System Language DiscoverySub-technique

S-Type has attempted to determine if a compromised system was using a Japanese keyboard via the `GetKeyboardType` API call.[1]

EnterpriseT1136.001Local AccountSub-technique

S-Type may create a temporary user on the system named `Lost_{Unique Identifier}` with the password `pond~!@6”{Unique Identifier}`.[1]

EnterpriseT1070.004File DeletionSub-technique

S-Type has deleted files it has created on a compromised host.[1]

EnterpriseT1082System Information Discovery

The initial beacon packet for S-Type contains the operating system version and file system of the victim.[1]

EnterpriseT1132.001Standard EncodingSub-technique

S-Type uses Base64 encoding for C2 traffic.[1]

EnterpriseT1547.009Shortcut ModificationSub-technique

S-Type may create the file %HOMEPATH%\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\Realtek {Unique Identifier}.lnk, which points to the malicious `msdtc.exe` file already created in the `%CommonFiles%` directory.[1]

EnterpriseT1027.002Software PackingSub-technique

Some S-Type samples have been packed with UPX.[1]

EnterpriseT1070.009Clear PersistenceSub-technique

S-Type has deleted accounts it has created.[1]

EnterpriseT1016System Network Configuration Discovery

S-Type has used `ipconfig /all` on a compromised host.[1]

EnterpriseT1007System Service Discovery

S-Type runs the command net start on a victim.[1]

EnterpriseT1106Native API

S-Type has used Windows APIs, including `GetKeyboardType`, `NetUserAdd`, and `NetUserDel`.[1]

EnterpriseT1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique

S-Type may create a .lnk file to itself that is saved in the Start menu folder. It may also create the Registry key HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\ IMJPMIJ8.1{3 characters of Unique Identifier}.[1]

EnterpriseT1087.001Local AccountSub-technique

S-Type has run the command `net user` on a victim.[1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

CampaignEnterprise

C0016: Operation Dust Storm

Operation Dust Storm was a long-standing persistent cyber espionage campaign that targeted multiple industries in Japan, South Korea, the United States, Europe, and several Southeast Asian countries. By 2015, the Operation Dust Storm threat actors shifted from government and defense-related intelligence targets to Japanese companies or Japanese subdivisions of larger foreign organizations supporting Japan's critical infrastructure, including electricity generation, oil and natural gas, finance, transportation, and construction.[1]

Operation Dust Storm threat actors also began to use Android backdoors in their operations by 2015, with all identified victims at the time residing in Japan or South Korea.[1]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · CampaignC0016: Operation Dust StormEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1036.005: Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1033: System Owner/User DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1041: Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1105: Ingress Tool TransferEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1008: Fallback ChannelsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1071.001: Web ProtocolsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1059.003: Windows Command ShellEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1614.001: System Language DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1136.001: Local AccountEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1070.004: File DeletionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1082: System Information DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1132.001: Standard EncodingEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1547.009: Shortcut ModificationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1027.002: Software PackingEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1070.009: Clear PersistenceEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1016: System Network Configuration DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1007: System Service DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1106: Native APIEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1547.001: Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1087.001: Local AccountEnterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.3
Created
Modified
Raw hash
9f7bd27d9ab4a218...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.3Current bundle9f7bd27d9ab4…
19.11.3Older bundle9f7bd27d9ab4…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Cylance Dust Storm

    Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved December 22, 2021.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    mitre-attackS0085
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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