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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S9046: IOControl

IOControl is a malware that targeted Linux ARM-based IoT/OT devices including Hikvision IP cameras, D-Link firewalls and routers, Unitronics PLCs and HMIs, Orpak and Gasboy fuel management systems, and Baicells LTE controllers across the United States and Israel. The malware has been attributed to CyberAv3ngers which is suspected to be affiliated with the Iranian Government Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).[1][2][3]

EnterpriseS9046MalwareObject v1.0Modified
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S9046: IOControl describes IOControl is a malware that targeted Linux ARM-based IoT/OT devices including Hikvision IP cameras, D-Link firewalls and routers, Unitronics PLCs and HMIs, Orpak and Gasboy fuel management systems, and Baicells LTE controllers across the United States and Israel. The malware has been attributed to [CyberAv3ngers](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1027) which is suspected to be affiliated with the Iranian Government Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).(Citation: Claroty-IOCONTROL)(Citation: Dragos 2025 Year in R...

Executive priority

S9046: IOControl is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S9046: IOControl by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (the platforms named in the official object), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S9046: IOControl appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

IOControl

IOControl is a malware that targeted Linux ARM-based IoT/OT devices including Hikvision IP cameras, D-Link firewalls and routers, Unitronics PLCs and HMIs, Orpak and Gasboy fuel management systems, and Baicells LTE controllers across the United States and Israel. The malware has been attributed to CyberAv3ngers which is suspected to be affiliated with the Iranian Government Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).[1][2][3]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

9 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

IOCONTROL has used the AES-256-CBC algorithm to decrypt configuration files associated with the malware.[1] CitationDragos-2026-Year-In-Review

EnterpriseT1070.004File DeletionSub-technique

IOCONTROL has removed the malware binary and associated log file (i.e., `/tmp/iocontrol.log`) from a system upon command.[1][3]

EnterpriseT1027.002Software PackingSub-technique

IOCONTROL has used the Ultimate Packer for eXecutables (UPX) to pack the malware.[1] CitationDragos-2026-Year-In-Review

EnterpriseT1033System Owner/User Discovery

IOCONTROL has used the `whoami` command to get the current user on the system.[1][3]

EnterpriseT1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique

IOCONTROL has used the Advanced Encryption Standard 256-bit Cypher Block Chaining (AES-256-CBC) algorithm to encrypt its configuration files which are used to store information like file paths and IP addresses to connect to. [1] CitationDragos-2026-Year-In-Review

EnterpriseT1070.009Clear PersistenceSub-technique

IOCONTROL has removed malware persistence from a system upon command. [1]

EnterpriseT1082System Information Discovery

IOCONTROL has used the `uname -v` and `uname –r` commands to obtain kernel version and release information as well as the `hostname` command to obtain the hostname of the system.[1][3]

EnterpriseT1124System Time Discovery

IOCONTROL has used the `date` and `timezone` commands to gather the system date and time information.[1][3]

EnterpriseT1037.004RC ScriptsSub-technique

IOCONTROL has used an RC script (`/etc/rc3.d/S93InitSystemd.sh`) to establish persistence on a system across restarts.[1][3]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
20.0
Object version
1.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
66e0393d4f1a65a8...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(1)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
20.01.0Current bundle66e0393d4f1a…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Claroty-IOCONTROL

    Claroty Team82. (2024, December 10). Inside a New OT/IoT Cyberweapon: IOCONTROL. Retrieved September 2, 2026.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Dragos 2025 Year in Review

    Dragos. (2026, February). 9TH ANNUAL YEAR IN REVIEW | OT/ICS CYBERSECURITY REPORT . Retrieved April 26, 2026.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    Armis-IOCONTROL

    Michael Freeman. (2024, December 16). IOControl Malware: What's New, What's Not?. Retrieved September 2, 2026.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    mitre-attackS9046
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.