S0343: Exaramel for Windows
Exaramel for Windows is a backdoor used for targeting Windows systems. The Linux version is tracked separately under Exaramel for Linux.[1]
Security context for executives and security teams
S0343: Exaramel for Windows describes [Exaramel for Windows](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0343) is a backdoor used for targeting Windows systems. The Linux version is tracked separately under [Exaramel for Linux](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0401).(Citation: ESET TeleBots Oct 2018)
Executive priority
S0343: Exaramel for Windows is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate S0343: Exaramel for Windows by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether S0343: Exaramel for Windows appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Exaramel for Windows
Exaramel for Windows is a backdoor used for targeting Windows systems. The Linux version is tracked separately under Exaramel for Linux.[1]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1560 | Archive Collected Data | Exaramel for Windows automatically encrypts files before sending them to the C2 server.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1059.005 | Visual BasicSub-technique | Exaramel for Windows has a command to execute VBS scripts on the victim’s machine.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1027.011 | Fileless StorageSub-technique | Exaramel for Windows stores the backdoor's configuration in the Registry in XML format.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1543.003 | Windows ServiceSub-technique | The Exaramel for Windows dropper creates and starts a Windows service named wsmprovav with the description “Windows Check AV.”[1] |
| Enterprise | T1112 | Modify Registry | Exaramel for Windows adds the configuration to the Registry in XML format.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1059.003 | Windows Command ShellSub-technique | Exaramel for Windows has a command to launch a remote shell and executes commands on the victim’s machine.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1036.004 | Masquerade Task or ServiceSub-technique | The Exaramel for Windows dropper creates and starts a Windows service named wsmprovav with the description “Windows Check AV” in an apparent attempt to masquerade as a legitimate service.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1074.001 | Local Data StagingSub-technique | Exaramel for Windows specifies a path to store files scheduled for exfiltration.[1] |
Groups, software, and campaigns
G0034: Sandworm Team
Sandworm Team is a destructive threat group that has been attributed to Russia's General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) Main Center for Special Technologies (GTsST) military unit 74455.[1][2] This group has been active since at least 2009.[3][4][5][6]
In October 2020, the US indicted six GRU Unit 74455 officers associated with Sandworm Team for the following cyber operations: the 2015 and 2016 attacks against Ukrainian electrical companies and government organizations, the 2017 worldwide NotPetya attack, targeting of the 2017 French presidential campaign, the 2018 Olympic Destroyer attack against the Winter Olympic Games, the 2018 operation against the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and attacks against the country of Georgia in 2018 and 2019.[1][2] Some of these were conducted with the assistance of GRU Unit 26165, which is also referred to as APT28.[7]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 2.2 | Current bundle | c90ccd7d0a8a… | ||
| 19.1 | 2.2 | Older bundle | c90ccd7d0a8a… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]ESET TeleBots Oct 2018
Cherepanov, A., Lipovsky, R. (2018, October 11). New TeleBots backdoor: First evidence linking Industroyer to NotPetya. Retrieved November 27, 2018.
Open source URL - [2]Exaramel for Windows
(Citation: ESET TeleBots Oct 2018)
- [3]mitre-attackS0343Open source URL
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