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MITRE ATT&CK® Technique

T1574: Hijack Execution Flow

Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the way operating systems run programs. Hijacking execution flow can be for the purposes of persistence, since this hijacked execution may reoccur over time. Adversaries may also use these mechanisms to elevate privileges or evade defenses, such as application control or other restrictions on execution.

There are many ways an adversary may hijack the flow of execution, including by manipulating how the operating system locates programs to be executed. How the operating system locates libraries to be used by a program can also be intercepted. Locations where the operating system looks for programs/resources, such as file directories and in the case of Windows the Registry, could also be poisoned to include malicious payloads.

EnterpriseT1574TechniqueObject v2.0Modified
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceHigh

Hijack Execution Flow matters because it turns normal operating-system behavior—how programs, libraries, paths, environment variables, services, and registry settings are resolved—into a way to run attacker-controlled code. For leaders, the risk is not just malware execution; it is that trusted applications or services may become the launch point, complicating application control, persistence review, privilege boundaries, and incident scoping across Windows, Linux, and macOS.

Executive priority

Prioritize this as a control-assurance issue: are critical endpoints and servers configured so ordinary users or compromised processes cannot alter executable paths, libraries, service definitions, registry locations, or writable directories used by trusted software? This technique family is relevant to operational resilience because it can support persistence, privilege escalation, and defense evasion. It also creates audit evidence needs around least privilege, secure software deployment, update hygiene, and endpoint behavior prevention.

Technical view

ATT&CK provides no standalone detection text for T1574, so defenders should validate coverage through the related detection strategy DET0218 and the listed sub-techniques. Practical validation should span Windows, Linux, and macOS execution paths: DLL and dylib loading behavior, dynamic linker environment variables, PATH search order, unquoted or weak service paths, writable installer or service binaries, sensitive registry permissions, and .NET-related hijack points such as COR_PROFILER and AppDomainManager. SOC and IR teams should focus on whether a trusted process loaded or executed code from an unexpected, user-writable, recently modified, or policy-inconsistent location.

Likely telemetry

  • Process creation events with command line, parent process, executable path, user, integrity/elevation context, and hash where available
  • File creation, modification, replacement, and permission-change events for executable files, DLLs, shared objects, dylibs, installer directories, service directories, and application search paths
  • Library/module load telemetry showing process, module path, signature or trust status, and load location
  • Windows Registry change telemetry for service configuration and other execution-related keys, especially HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services where applicable
  • Environment variable and configuration change evidence for PATH, LD_PRELOAD, DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES, COR_PROFILER, and related runtime loading controls where collected

Detection direction

  • Map detections to the sub-techniques rather than treating T1574 as a single analytic; DLL side-loading, path interception, service permission weakness, dynamic linker hijacking, and .NET hijacks produce different evidence.
  • Baseline legitimate software update, installer, developer, and administrative activity to reduce false positives when files, libraries, or service settings change in trusted locations.
  • Prioritize alerts where trusted or elevated processes execute code from user-writable directories, unexpected search-order locations, recently modified paths, or unsigned/untrusted libraries, subject to local policy.
  • Validate visibility on macOS and Linux as well as Windows; ATT&CK lists all three platforms, but many organizations over-focus on Windows DLL and service cases.
  • Use DET0218 as the ATT&CK-linked detection strategy reference, but confirm local sensors actually collect module loads, registry changes, permission changes, and environment variable evidence needed for the relevant sub-techniques.

Mitigation priorities

  • Start with least privilege and user account management so users and routine processes cannot write to locations used for privileged execution.
  • Restrict file, directory, and registry permissions on service paths, installer paths, application directories, library locations, and sensitive execution configuration.
  • Apply execution prevention and endpoint behavior prevention to reduce unauthorized code execution and suspicious process behavior, while testing for business-process exceptions.
  • Restrict library loading and promote safe library loading practices in supported environments.
  • Use application developer guidance and secure SDLC practices so internally developed or packaged applications do not rely on unsafe search paths, weak linking, or ambiguous executable resolution.
Additional notes and limits

This is a broad parent technique with many sub-techniques across Windows, Linux, and macOS. Its defensive value comes from combining configuration assurance with behavior monitoring: who can modify execution locations, what code is actually loaded, and whether trusted processes are resolving dependencies from expected paths. The strongest local assessment is a control test against representative business applications, services, installers, and developer-managed systems.

The official object does not provide detection guidance, and the relationship descriptions are mitigation- and sub-technique-focused. This take therefore avoids claiming specific detection coverage or exploitation prevalence. Local platform mix, endpoint sensor capabilities, application architecture, and permissions model are required to determine actual exposure and monitoring quality.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Hijack Execution Flow

Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the way operating systems run programs. Hijacking execution flow can be for the purposes of persistence, since this hijacked execution may reoccur over time. Adversaries may also use these mechanisms to elevate privileges or evade defenses, such as application control or other restrictions on execution.

There are many ways an adversary may hijack the flow of execution, including by manipulating how the operating system locates programs to be executed. How the operating system locates libraries to be used by a program can also be intercepted. Locations where the operating system looks for programs/resources, such as file directories and in the case of Windows the Registry, could also be poisoned to include malicious payloads.

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Related techniques

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

13 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1574.010Services File Permissions WeaknessSub-techniqueServices File Permissions Weakness subtechnique of this object.
EnterpriseT1574.013KernelCallbackTableSub-techniqueKernelCallbackTable subtechnique of this object.
EnterpriseT1574.007Path Interception by PATH Environment VariableSub-techniquePath Interception by PATH Environment Variable subtechnique of this object.
EnterpriseT1574.005Executable Installer File Permissions WeaknessSub-techniqueExecutable Installer File Permissions Weakness subtechnique of this object.
EnterpriseT1574.002DLL Side-LoadingSub-techniqueDLL Side-Loading subtechnique of this object.
EnterpriseT1574.009Path Interception by Unquoted PathSub-techniquePath Interception by Unquoted Path subtechnique of this object.
EnterpriseT1574.004Dylib HijackingSub-techniqueDylib Hijacking subtechnique of this object.
EnterpriseT1574.006Dynamic Linker HijackingSub-techniqueDynamic Linker Hijacking subtechnique of this object.
EnterpriseT1574.014AppDomainManagerSub-techniqueAppDomainManager subtechnique of this object.
EnterpriseT1574.001DLLSub-techniqueDLL subtechnique of this object.
EnterpriseT1574.008Path Interception by Search Order HijackingSub-techniquePath Interception by Search Order Hijacking subtechnique of this object.
EnterpriseT1574.011Services Registry Permissions WeaknessSub-techniqueServices Registry Permissions Weakness subtechnique of this object.
EnterpriseT1574.012COR_PROFILERSub-techniqueCOR_PROFILER subtechnique of this object.
Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

MalwareEnterprise

S1111: DarkGate

DarkGate first emerged in 2018 and has evolved into an initial access and data gathering tool associated with various criminal cyber operations. Written in Delphi and named "DarkGate" by its author, DarkGate is associated with credential theft, cryptomining, cryptotheft, and pre-ransomware actions.[1] DarkGate use increased significantly starting in 2022 and is under active development by its author, who provides it as a Malware-as-a-Service offering.[2]

Windows
MalwareEnterprise

S0567: Dtrack

Dtrack is spyware that was discovered in 2019 and has been used against Indian financial institutions, research facilities, and the Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant. Dtrack shares similarities with the DarkSeoul campaign, which was attributed to Lazarus Group. [1][2][3][4][5]

Windows
MalwareEnterprise

S9024: SPAWNCHIMERA

SPAWNCHIMERA is a backdoor that supports command and control and can inject malicious components into native processes.[1][2][3] SPAWNCHIMERA It incorporates capabilities from multiple tools within the SPAWN malware family, including SPAWNANT, SPAWNMOLE, and SPAWNSNAIL.[4][2][3] SPAWNCHIMERA was first reported in April 2024.[2] SPAWNCHIMERA has been observed in activity attributed to People's Republic of China (PRC) state-sponsored threat actors, including UNC5221..[4][5][2][6]

LinuxNetwork Devices
MalwareEnterprise

S0444: ShimRat

ShimRat has been used by the suspected China-based adversary Mofang in campaigns targeting multiple countries and sectors including government, military, critical infrastructure, automobile, and weapons development. The name "ShimRat" comes from the malware's extensive use of Windows Application Shimming to maintain persistence. [1]

Windows
MalwareEnterprise

S1130: Raspberry Robin

Raspberry Robin is initial access malware first identified in September 2021, and active through early 2024. The malware is notable for spreading via infected USB devices containing a malicious LNK object that, on execution, retrieves remote hosted payloads for installation. Raspberry Robin has been widely used against various industries and geographies, and as a precursor to information stealer, ransomware, and other payloads such as SocGholish, Cobalt Strike, IcedID, and Bumblebee.[1][2][3] The DLL componenet in the Raspberry Robin infection chain is also referred to as "Roshtyak."[4] The name "Raspberry Robin" is used to refer to both the malware as well as the threat actor associated with its use, although the Raspberry Robin operators are also tracked as Storm-0856 by some vendors.[5]

Windows
MalwareEnterprise

S1105: COATHANGER

COATHANGER is a remote access tool (RAT) targeting FortiGate networking appliances. First used in 2023 in targeted intrusions against military and government entities in the Netherlands along with other victims, COATHANGER was disclosed in early 2024, with a high confidence assessment linking this malware to a state-sponsored entity in the People's Republic of China. COATHANGER is delivered after gaining access to a FortiGate device, with in-the-wild observations linked to exploitation of CVE-2022-42475. The name COATHANGER is based on a unique string in the malware used to encrypt configuration files on disk: “She took his coat and hung it up”.[1]

LinuxNetwork Devices
CampaignEnterprise

C0017: C0017

C0017 was an APT41 campaign conducted between May 2021 and February 2022 that successfully compromised at least six U.S. state government networks through the exploitation of vulnerable Internet facing web applications. During C0017, APT41 was quick to adapt and use publicly-disclosed as well as zero-day vulnerabilities for initial access, and in at least two cases re-compromised victims following remediation efforts. The goals of C0017 are unknown, however APT41 was observed exfiltrating Personal Identifiable Information (PII).[1]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Mitigations

Mitigation direction

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
2.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
b693e5d763e4cd5c...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(1)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.12.0Current bundleb693e5d763e4…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Ensilo Darkgate 2018

    Adi Zeligson & Rotem Kerner. (2018, November 13). Enter The DarkGate - New Cryptocurrency Mining and Ransomware Campaign. Retrieved February 9, 2024.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Executable Installers are Vulnerable

    Stefan Kanthak. (2015, December 8). Executable installers are vulnerable^WEVIL (case 7): 7z*.exe allows remote code execution with escalation of privilege. Retrieved December 4, 2014.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    CyberBit Dtrack

    Hod Gavriel. (2019, November 21). Dtrack: In-depth analysis of APT on a nuclear power plant. Retrieved January 20, 2021.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    Google UNC5221 Ivanti January 2025

    John Wolfram, Josh Murchie, Matt Lin, Daniel Ainsworth, Robert Wallace, Dimiter Andonov, Dhanesh Kizhakkinan, Jacob Thompson. (2025, January 8). Ivanti Connect Secure VPN Targeted in New Zero-Day Exploitation. Retrieved April 14, 2026.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    Google UNC5221 BRICKSTORM SPAWNCHIMERA April 2024

    Matt Lin, Austin Larsen, John Wolfram, Ashley Pearson, Josh Murchie, Lukasz Lamparski, Joseph Pisano, Ryan Hall, Ron Craft, Shawn Crew, Billy Wong, Tyler McLellan. (2024, April 4). Cutting Edge, Part 4: Ivanti Connect Secure VPN Post-Exploitation Lateral Movement Case Studies. Retrieved April 16, 2026.

    Open source URL
  6. [6]
    Microsoft More information about DLL

    Microsoft. (2010, August 12). More information about the DLL Preloading remote attack vector. Retrieved December 5, 2014.

    Open source URL
  7. [7]
    Microsoft Dynamic Link Library Search Order

    Microsoft. (2018, May 31). Dynamic-Link Library Search Order. Retrieved November 30, 2014.

    Open source URL
  8. [8]
    Powersploit

    PowerSploit. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014.

    Open source URL
  9. [9]
    Microsoft CreateProcess

    Microsoft. (n.d.). CreateProcess function. Retrieved September 12, 2024.

    Open source URL
  10. [10]
    Microsoft Dynamic-Link Library Security

    Microsoft. (n.d.). Dynamic-Link Library Security. Retrieved July 25, 2016.

    Open source URL
  11. [11]
    Vulnerability and Exploit Detector

    Kanthak, S.. (2016, July 20). Vulnerability and Exploit Detector. Retrieved February 3, 2017.

    Open source URL
  12. [12]
    FireEye DLL Side-Loading

    Amanda Steward. (2014). FireEye DLL Side-Loading: A Thorn in the Side of the Anti-Virus Industry. Retrieved March 13, 2020.

    Open source URL
  13. [13]
    FOX-IT May 2016 Mofang

    Yonathan Klijnsma. (2016, May 17). Mofang: A politically motivated information stealing adversary. Retrieved May 12, 2020.

    Open source URL
  14. [14]
    TrendMicro RaspberryRobin 2022

    Christopher So. (2022, December 20). Raspberry Robin Malware Targets Telecom, Governments. Retrieved May 17, 2024.

    Open source URL
  15. [15]
    Elastic Pikabot 2024

    Daniel Stepanic & Salim Bitam. (2024, February 23). PIKABOT, I choose you!. Retrieved July 12, 2024.

    Open source URL
  16. [16]
    Cybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017

    Dahan, A. (2017). Operation Cobalt Kitty. Retrieved December 27, 2018.

    Open source URL
  17. [17]
    Symantec Daggerfly 2024

    Threat Hunter Team. (2024, July 23). Daggerfly: Espionage Group Makes Major Update to Toolset. Retrieved July 25, 2024.

    Open source URL
  18. [18]
    Mandiant APT41

    Rufus Brown, Van Ta, Douglas Bienstock, Geoff Ackerman, John Wolfram. (2022, March 8). Does This Look Infected? A Summary of APT41 Targeting U.S. State Governments. Retrieved July 8, 2022.

    Open source URL
  19. [19]
    NCSC-NL COATHANGER Feb 2024

    Dutch Military Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD) & Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD). (2024, February 6). Ministry of Defense of the Netherlands uncovers COATHANGER, a stealthy Chinese FortiGate RAT. Retrieved February 7, 2024.

    Open source URL
  20. [20]
    Palo Alto Unit 42 OutSteel SaintBot February 2022

    Unit 42. (2022, February 25). Spear Phishing Attacks Target Organizations in Ukraine, Payloads Include the Document Stealer OutSteel and the Downloader SaintBot. Retrieved June 9, 2022.

    Open source URL
  21. [21]
    mitre-attackT1574
    Open source URL
  22. [22]
    mitre-attackT1574
    Open source URL
  23. [23]
    mitre-attackT1574
    Open source URL
  24. [24]
    Ensilo Darkgate 2018

    Adi Zeligson & Rotem Kerner. (2018, November 13). Enter The DarkGate - New Cryptocurrency Mining and Ransomware Campaign. Retrieved February 9, 2024.

    Open source URL
  25. [25]
    Executable Installers are Vulnerable

    Stefan Kanthak. (2015, December 8). Executable installers are vulnerable^WEVIL (case 7): 7z*.exe allows remote code execution with escalation of privilege. Retrieved December 4, 2014.

    Open source URL
  26. [26]
    CyberBit Dtrack

    Hod Gavriel. (2019, November 21). Dtrack: In-depth analysis of APT on a nuclear power plant. Retrieved January 20, 2021.

    Open source URL
  27. [27]
    Google UNC5221 BRICKSTORM SPAWNCHIMERA April 2024

    Matt Lin, Austin Larsen, John Wolfram, Ashley Pearson, Josh Murchie, Lukasz Lamparski, Joseph Pisano, Ryan Hall, Ron Craft, Shawn Crew, Billy Wong, Tyler McLellan. (2024, April 4). Cutting Edge, Part 4: Ivanti Connect Secure VPN Post-Exploitation Lateral Movement Case Studies. Retrieved April 16, 2026.

    Open source URL
  28. [28]
    Google UNC5221 Ivanti January 2025

    John Wolfram, Josh Murchie, Matt Lin, Daniel Ainsworth, Robert Wallace, Dimiter Andonov, Dhanesh Kizhakkinan, Jacob Thompson. (2025, January 8). Ivanti Connect Secure VPN Targeted in New Zero-Day Exploitation. Retrieved April 14, 2026.

    Open source URL
  29. [29]
    Microsoft Dynamic Link Library Search Order

    Microsoft. (2018, May 31). Dynamic-Link Library Search Order. Retrieved November 30, 2014.

    Open source URL
  30. [30]
    Microsoft More information about DLL

    Microsoft. (2010, August 12). More information about the DLL Preloading remote attack vector. Retrieved December 5, 2014.

    Open source URL
  31. [31]
    Microsoft CreateProcess

    Microsoft. (n.d.). CreateProcess function. Retrieved September 12, 2024.

    Open source URL
  32. [32]
    Microsoft Dynamic-Link Library Security

    Microsoft. (n.d.). Dynamic-Link Library Security. Retrieved July 25, 2016.

    Open source URL
  33. [33]
    Powersploit

    PowerSploit. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014.

    Open source URL
  34. [34]
    Vulnerability and Exploit Detector

    Kanthak, S.. (2016, July 20). Vulnerability and Exploit Detector. Retrieved February 3, 2017.

    Open source URL
  35. [35]
    FireEye DLL Side-Loading

    Amanda Steward. (2014). FireEye DLL Side-Loading: A Thorn in the Side of the Anti-Virus Industry. Retrieved March 13, 2020.

    Open source URL
  36. [36]
    FOX-IT May 2016 Mofang

    Yonathan Klijnsma. (2016, May 17). Mofang: A politically motivated information stealing adversary. Retrieved May 12, 2020.

    Open source URL
  37. [37]
    TrendMicro RaspberryRobin 2022

    Christopher So. (2022, December 20). Raspberry Robin Malware Targets Telecom, Governments. Retrieved May 17, 2024.

    Open source URL
  38. [38]
    Elastic Pikabot 2024

    Daniel Stepanic & Salim Bitam. (2024, February 23). PIKABOT, I choose you!. Retrieved July 12, 2024.

    Open source URL
  39. [39]
    Cybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017

    Dahan, A. (2017). Operation Cobalt Kitty. Retrieved December 27, 2018.

    Open source URL
  40. [40]
    Symantec Daggerfly 2024

    Threat Hunter Team. (2024, July 23). Daggerfly: Espionage Group Makes Major Update to Toolset. Retrieved July 25, 2024.

    Open source URL
  41. [41]
    Mandiant APT41

    Rufus Brown, Van Ta, Douglas Bienstock, Geoff Ackerman, John Wolfram. (2022, March 8). Does This Look Infected? A Summary of APT41 Targeting U.S. State Governments. Retrieved July 8, 2022.

    Open source URL
  42. [42]
    NCSC-NL COATHANGER Feb 2024

    Dutch Military Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD) & Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD). (2024, February 6). Ministry of Defense of the Netherlands uncovers COATHANGER, a stealthy Chinese FortiGate RAT. Retrieved February 7, 2024.

    Open source URL
Source and licensing

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