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MITRE ATT&CK® Group

G0103: Mofang

Mofang is a likely China-based cyber espionage group, named for its frequent practice of imitating a victim's infrastructure. This adversary has been observed since at least May 2012 conducting focused attacks against government and critical infrastructure in Myanmar, as well as several other countries and sectors including military, automobile, and weapons industries.[1]

EnterpriseG0103GroupObject v1.1Modified
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

G0103: Mofang describes [Mofang](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0103) is a likely China-based cyber espionage group, named for its frequent practice of imitating a victim's infrastructure. This adversary has been observed since at least May 2012 conducting focused attacks against government and critical infrastructure in Myanmar, as well as several other countries and sectors including military, automobile, and weapons industries.(Citation: FOX-IT May 2016 Mofang)

Executive priority

G0103: Mofang is an official MITRE ATT&CK group. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate G0103: Mofang by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (the platforms named in the official object), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata

Detection direction

  • Validate whether G0103: Mofang appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Mofang

Mofang is a likely China-based cyber espionage group, named for its frequent practice of imitating a victim's infrastructure. This adversary has been observed since at least May 2012 conducting focused attacks against government and critical infrastructure in Myanmar, as well as several other countries and sectors including military, automobile, and weapons industries.[1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

6 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1566.002Spearphishing LinkSub-technique

Mofang delivered spearphishing emails with malicious links included.[1]

EnterpriseT1204.001Malicious LinkSub-technique

Mofang's spearphishing emails required a user to click the link to connect to a compromised website.[1]

EnterpriseT1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentSub-technique

Mofang delivered spearphishing emails with malicious documents, PDFs, or Excel files attached.[1]

EnterpriseT1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique

Mofang has encrypted payloads before they are downloaded to victims.[1]

EnterpriseT1204.002Malicious FileSub-technique

Mofang's malicious spearphishing attachments required a user to open the file after receiving.[1]

EnterpriseT1027.015CompressionSub-technique

Mofang has compressed the ShimRat executable within malicious email attachments.[1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

ToolEnterprise

S0445: ShimRatReporter

ShimRatReporter is a tool used by suspected Chinese adversary Mofang to automatically conduct initial discovery. The details from this discovery are used to customize follow-on payloads (such as ShimRat) as well as set up faux infrastructure which mimics the adversary's targets. ShimRatReporter has been used in campaigns targeting multiple countries and sectors including government, military, critical infrastructure, automobile, and weapons development.[1]

Windows
MalwareEnterprise

S0444: ShimRat

ShimRat has been used by the suspected China-based adversary Mofang in campaigns targeting multiple countries and sectors including government, military, critical infrastructure, automobile, and weapons development. The name "ShimRat" comes from the malware's extensive use of Windows Application Shimming to maintain persistence. [1]

Windows
Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.1
Created
Modified
Raw hash
a4ad98b7ea69301c...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.1Current bundlea4ad98b7ea69…
19.11.1Older bundle4b013c7845ad…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    FOX-IT May 2016 Mofang

    Yonathan Klijnsma. (2016, May 17). Mofang: A politically motivated information stealing adversary. Retrieved May 12, 2020.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    mitre-attackG0103
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.