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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S0444: ShimRat

ShimRat has been used by the suspected China-based adversary Mofang in campaigns targeting multiple countries and sectors including government, military, critical infrastructure, automobile, and weapons development. The name "ShimRat" comes from the malware's extensive use of Windows Application Shimming to maintain persistence. [1]

EnterpriseS0444MalwareObject v1.0Modified
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Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S0444: ShimRat describes [ShimRat](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0444) has been used by the suspected China-based adversary [Mofang](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0103) in campaigns targeting multiple countries and sectors including government, military, critical infrastructure, automobile, and weapons development. The name "[ShimRat](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0444)" comes from the malware's extensive use of Windows Application Shimming to maintain persistence. (Citation: FOX-IT May 2016 Mofang)

Executive priority

S0444: ShimRat is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S0444: ShimRat by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S0444: ShimRat appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

ShimRat

ShimRat has been used by the suspected China-based adversary Mofang in campaigns targeting multiple countries and sectors including government, military, critical infrastructure, automobile, and weapons development. The name "ShimRat" comes from the malware's extensive use of Windows Application Shimming to maintain persistence. [1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

21 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1105Ingress Tool Transfer

ShimRat can download additional files.[1]

EnterpriseT1090.002External ProxySub-technique

ShimRat can use pre-configured HTTP proxies.[1]

EnterpriseT1548.002Bypass User Account ControlSub-technique

ShimRat has hijacked the cryptbase.dll within migwiz.exe to escalate privileges. This prevented the User Access Control window from appearing.[1]

EnterpriseT1574Hijack Execution Flow

ShimRat can hijack the cryptbase.dll within migwiz.exe to escalate privileges and bypass UAC controls.[1]

EnterpriseT1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique

ShimRat has installed a registry based start-up key HKCU\Software\microsoft\windows\CurrentVersion\Run to maintain persistence should other methods fail.[1]

EnterpriseT1036.004Masquerade Task or ServiceSub-technique

ShimRat can impersonate Windows services and antivirus products to avoid detection on compromised systems.[1]

EnterpriseT1029Scheduled Transfer

ShimRat can sleep when instructed to do so by the C2.[1]

EnterpriseT1070.004File DeletionSub-technique

ShimRat can uninstall itself from compromised hosts, as well create and modify directories, delete, move, copy, and rename files.[1]

EnterpriseT1071.001Web ProtocolsSub-technique

ShimRat communicated over HTTP and HTTPS with C2 servers.[1]

EnterpriseT1059.003Windows Command ShellSub-technique

ShimRat can be issued a command shell function from the C2.[1]

EnterpriseT1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

ShimRat has decompressed its core DLL using shellcode once an impersonated antivirus component was running on a system.[1]

EnterpriseT1546.011Application ShimmingSub-technique

ShimRat has installed shim databases in the AppPatch folder.[1]

EnterpriseT1008Fallback Channels

ShimRat has used a secondary C2 location if the first was unavailable.[1]

EnterpriseT1027.002Software PackingSub-technique

ShimRat's loader has been packed with the compressed ShimRat core DLL and the legitimate DLL for it to hijack.[1]

EnterpriseT1027.015CompressionSub-technique

ShimRat has been delivered as a package that includes compressed DLL and shellcode payloads within a .dat file.[1]

EnterpriseT1106Native API

ShimRat has used Windows API functions to install the service and shim.[1]

EnterpriseT1543.003Windows ServiceSub-technique

ShimRat has installed a Windows service to maintain persistence on victim machines.[1]

EnterpriseT1135Network Share Discovery

ShimRat can enumerate connected drives for infected host machines.[1]

EnterpriseT1005Data from Local System

ShimRat has the capability to upload collected files to a C2.[1]

EnterpriseT1083File and Directory Discovery

ShimRat can list directories.[1]

EnterpriseT1112Modify Registry

ShimRat has registered two registry keys for shim databases.[1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupEnterprise

G0103: Mofang

Mofang is a likely China-based cyber espionage group, named for its frequent practice of imitating a victim's infrastructure. This adversary has been observed since at least May 2012 conducting focused attacks against government and critical infrastructure in Myanmar, as well as several other countries and sectors including military, automobile, and weapons industries.[1]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · GroupG0103: MofangEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1105: Ingress Tool TransferEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1090.002: External ProxyEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1548.002: Bypass User Account ControlEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1574: Hijack Execution FlowEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1547.001: Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1036.004: Masquerade Task or ServiceEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1029: Scheduled TransferEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1070.004: File DeletionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1071.001: Web ProtocolsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1059.003: Windows Command ShellEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1140: Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1546.011: Application ShimmingEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1008: Fallback ChannelsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1027.002: Software PackingEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1027.015: CompressionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1106: Native APIEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1543.003: Windows ServiceEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1135: Network Share DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1005: Data from Local SystemEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1083: File and Directory DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1112: Modify RegistryEnterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
c0a792afac650a0d...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.0Current bundlec0a792afac65…
19.11.0Older bundlec0a792afac65…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    FOX-IT May 2016 Mofang

    Yonathan Klijnsma. (2016, May 17). Mofang: A politically motivated information stealing adversary. Retrieved May 12, 2020.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    mitre-attackS0444
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

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