M1013: Application Developer Guidance
Application Developer Guidance focuses on providing developers with the knowledge, tools, and best practices needed to write secure code, reduce vulnerabilities, and implement secure design principles. By integrating security throughout the software development lifecycle (SDLC), this mitigation aims to prevent the introduction of exploitable weaknesses in applications, systems, and APIs. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: Preventing SQL Injection (Secure Coding Practice):
- Implementation: Train developers to use parameterized queries or prepared statements instead of directly embedding user input into SQL queries. - Use Case: A web application accepts user input to search a database. By sanitizing and validating user inputs, developers can prevent attackers from injecting malicious SQL commands.
Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Mitigation:
- Implementation: Require developers to implement output encoding for all user-generated content displayed on a web page. - Use Case: An e-commerce site allows users to leave product reviews. Properly encoding and escaping user inputs prevents malicious scripts from being executed in other users’ browsers.
Secure API Design:
- Implementation: Train developers to authenticate all API endpoints and avoid exposing sensitive information in API responses. - Use Case: A mobile banking application uses APIs for account management. By enforcing token-based authentication for every API call, developers reduce the risk of unauthorized access.
Static Code Analysis in the Build Pipeline:
- Implementation: Incorporate tools into CI/CD pipelines to automatically scan for vulnerabilities during the build process. - Use Case: A fintech company integrates static analysis tools to detect hardcoded credentials in their source code before deployment.
Threat Modeling in the Design Phase:
- Implementation: Use frameworks like STRIDE (Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information Disclosure, Denial of Service, Elevation of Privilege) to assess threats during application design. - Use Case: Before launching a customer portal, a SaaS company identifies potential abuse cases, such as session hijacking, and designs mitigations like secure session management.
**Tools for Implementation**:
- Static Code Analysis Tools: Use tools that can scan for known vulnerabilities in source code. - Dynamic Application Security Testing (DAST): Use tools like Burp Suite or OWASP ZAP to simulate runtime attacks and identify vulnerabilities. - Secure Frameworks: Recommend secure-by-default frameworks (e.g., Django for Python, Spring Security for Java) that enforce security best practices.
Security context for executives and security teams
M1013: Application Developer Guidance describes Application Developer Guidance focuses on providing developers with the knowledge, tools, and best practices needed to write secure code, reduce vulnerabilities, and implement secure design principles. By integrating security throughout the software development lifecycle (SDLC), this mitigation aims to prevent the introduction of exploitable weaknesses in applications, systems, and APIs. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: Preventing SQL Injection (Secure Coding Practice): - Implement...
Executive priority
M1013: Application Developer Guidance is an official MITRE ATT&CK mitigation. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate M1013: Application Developer Guidance by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (the platforms named in the official object), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Detection direction
- Validate whether M1013: Application Developer Guidance appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Application Developer Guidance
Application Developer Guidance focuses on providing developers with the knowledge, tools, and best practices needed to write secure code, reduce vulnerabilities, and implement secure design principles. By integrating security throughout the software development lifecycle (SDLC), this mitigation aims to prevent the introduction of exploitable weaknesses in applications, systems, and APIs. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: Preventing SQL Injection (Secure Coding Practice):
- Implementation: Train developers to use parameterized queries or prepared statements instead of directly embedding user input into SQL queries. - Use Case: A web application accepts user input to search a database. By sanitizing and validating user inputs, developers can prevent attackers from injecting malicious SQL commands.
Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Mitigation:
- Implementation: Require developers to implement output encoding for all user-generated content displayed on a web page. - Use Case: An e-commerce site allows users to leave product reviews. Properly encoding and escaping user inputs prevents malicious scripts from being executed in other users’ browsers.
Secure API Design:
- Implementation: Train developers to authenticate all API endpoints and avoid exposing sensitive information in API responses. - Use Case: A mobile banking application uses APIs for account management. By enforcing token-based authentication for every API call, developers reduce the risk of unauthorized access.
Static Code Analysis in the Build Pipeline:
- Implementation: Incorporate tools into CI/CD pipelines to automatically scan for vulnerabilities during the build process. - Use Case: A fintech company integrates static analysis tools to detect hardcoded credentials in their source code before deployment.
Threat Modeling in the Design Phase:
- Implementation: Use frameworks like STRIDE (Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information Disclosure, Denial of Service, Elevation of Privilege) to assess threats during application design. - Use Case: Before launching a customer portal, a SaaS company identifies potential abuse cases, such as session hijacking, and designs mitigations like secure session management.
**Tools for Implementation**:
- Static Code Analysis Tools: Use tools that can scan for known vulnerabilities in source code. - Dynamic Application Security Testing (DAST): Use tools like Burp Suite or OWASP ZAP to simulate runtime attacks and identify vulnerabilities. - Secure Frameworks: Recommend secure-by-default frameworks (e.g., Django for Python, Spring Security for Java) that enforce security best practices.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1496.003 | SMS PumpingSub-technique | Consider implementing CAPTCHA protection on forms that send messages via SMS. |
| Enterprise | T1647 | Plist File Modification | Ensure applications are using Apple's developer guidance which enables hardened runtime.CitationApple Developer Doco Hardened Runtime |
| Enterprise | T1195 | Supply Chain Compromise | Application developers should be cautious when selecting third-party libraries to integrate into their application. Additionally, where possible, developers should lock software dependencies to specific versions rather than pulling the latest version on build.CitationCider Security Top 10 CICD Security Risks |
| Enterprise | T1574 | Hijack Execution Flow | When possible, include hash values in manifest files to help prevent side-loading of malicious libraries.CitationFireEye DLL Side-Loading |
| Enterprise | T1564 | Hide Artifacts | Application developers should consider limiting the requirements for custom or otherwise difficult to manage file/folder exclusions. Where possible, install applications to trusted system folder paths that are already protected by restricted file and directory permissions. |
| Enterprise | T1212 | Exploitation for Credential Access | Application developers should consider taking measures to validate authentication requests by enabling one-time passwords, providing timestamps or sequence numbers for messages sent, using digital signatures, and/or using random session keys.CitationComparitech Replay AttackCitationBugcrowd Replay Attack |
| Enterprise | T1564.012 | File/Path ExclusionsSub-technique | Application developers should consider limiting the requirements for custom or otherwise difficult to manage file/folder exclusions. Where possible, install applications to trusted system folder paths that are already protected by restricted file and directory permissions. |
| Enterprise | T1550.001 | Application Access TokenSub-technique | Consider implementing token binding strategies, such as Azure AD token protection or OAuth Proof of Possession, that cryptographically bind a token to a secret. This may prevent the token from being used without knowledge of the secret or possession of the device the token is tied to.CitationMicrosoft Token Protection 2023CitationOkta DPoP 2023 |
| Enterprise | T1559.003 | XPC ServicesSub-technique | Enable the Hardened Runtime capability when developing applications. Do not include the |
| Enterprise | T1550 | Use Alternate Authentication Material | Consider implementing token binding strategies, such as Azure AD token protection or OAuth Proof of Possession, that cryptographically bind a token to a secret. This may prevent the token from being used without knowledge of the secret or possession of the device the token is tied to.CitationMicrosoft Token Protection 2023CitationOkta DPoP 2023 |
| Enterprise | T1593.003 | Code RepositoriesSub-technique | Application developers uploading to public code repositories should be careful to avoid publishing sensitive information such as credentials and API keys. |
| Enterprise | T1078 | Valid Accounts | Ensure that applications do not store sensitive data or credentials insecurely. (e.g. plaintext credentials in code, published credentials in repositories, or credentials in public cloud storage). |
| Enterprise | T1564.009 | Resource ForkingSub-technique | Configure applications to use the application bundle structure which leverages the |
| Enterprise | T1574.001 | DLLSub-technique | When possible, include hash values in manifest files to help prevent side-loading of malicious libraries. |
| Enterprise | T1195.001 | Compromise Software Dependencies and Development ToolsSub-technique | Application developers should be cautious when selecting third-party libraries to integrate into their application. Additionally, where possible, developers should lock software dependencies to specific versions rather than pulling the latest version on build.CitationCider Security Top 10 CICD Security Risks GitHub Actions may be pinned to a specific commit hash rather than a tag or branch.CitationUnit 42 Palo Alto GitHub Actions Supply Chain Attack 2025 |
| Enterprise | T1593 | Search Open Websites/Domains | Application developers uploading to public code repositories should be careful to avoid publishing sensitive information such as credentials and API keys. |
| Enterprise | T1559 | Inter-Process Communication | Enable the Hardened Runtime capability when developing applications. Do not include the |
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.2 | Current bundle | 43fd9730d046… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.2 | Older bundle | 43fd9730d046… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]mitre-attackM1013Open source URL
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