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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S1147: Nightdoor

Nightdoor is a backdoor exclusively associated with Daggerfly operations. Nightdoor uses common libraries with MgBot and MacMa, linking these malware families together.[1][2]

EnterpriseS1147MalwareObject v1.1Modified
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Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

Nightdoor matters because ATT&CK describes it as a Windows backdoor exclusively associated with Daggerfly operations and linked by common libraries to MgBot and MacMa. For leaders, the practical issue is not a single malware name; it is whether the organization can recognize a quiet post-compromise implant that performs host discovery, establishes persistence, communicates through application-layer or web-service channels, and removes traces.

Executive priority

Prioritize this as an operational resilience and incident-readiness validation item for Windows environments. Executives should ask whether SOC and IR teams can prove visibility into scheduled tasks, command-shell execution, discovery activity, file deletion, and outbound application-layer communications. Because ATT&CK provides no official detection text for Nightdoor, coverage should be evidenced through mapped behavior and telemetry rather than claims that a specific signature will detect it.

Technical view

ATT&CK lists Nightdoor as Windows malware and relates it to techniques for discovery, execution, persistence, command and control, and stealth: System Network Configuration Discovery, System Owner/User Discovery, Scheduled Task, Process Discovery, Windows Command Shell, File Deletion, Application Layer Protocol, System Information Discovery, Web Service, System Time Discovery, Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information, System Checks, Hijack Execution Flow, and Local Storage Discovery. SOC teams should validate behavior-based detections around unusual scheduled task creation or execution, suspicious cmd.exe use, clustered host/network/user/process discovery, deletion of recently created artifacts, execution-flow hijack indicators, and outbound traffic that blends into normal application-layer or web-service use.

Likely telemetry

  • Windows endpoint process creation and command-line telemetry
  • Scheduled task creation, modification, and execution records
  • File creation, modification, deletion, and artifact cleanup events
  • Endpoint module/load path or execution-flow telemetry where available
  • Host discovery evidence such as user, process, system, time, storage, and network configuration queries

Detection direction

  • Build detections from the related ATT&CK behaviors because no official Nightdoor detection is provided.
  • Correlate discovery commands or API-driven enumeration with later scheduled task activity, command-shell execution, file deletion, or outbound application-layer communications.
  • Tune scheduled task detections against known administrative automation to reduce false positives while preserving alerts for unusual users, paths, timing, or newly introduced binaries.
  • Review web-service and application-layer C2 visibility; legitimate services can create blind spots if proxy, DNS, or endpoint network telemetry is incomplete.
  • Account for anti-analysis/system-check behavior; sandbox-only testing may miss behavior that changes outside analysis environments.

Mitigation priorities

  • First, confirm Windows endpoint and network telemetry coverage for the related behaviors before relying on tool claims.
  • Harden and monitor scheduled task usage, command-shell execution, and unusual execution-flow paths in high-value Windows environments.
  • Restrict unnecessary outbound application-layer and web-service access where business processes allow, and ensure exceptions are reviewed.
  • Maintain IR procedures for collecting endpoint artifacts quickly, since file deletion is part of the related behavior set.
  • Use behavior mapping for compliance and audit evidence: show which controls and logs cover persistence, discovery, C2, and stealth behaviors.
Additional notes and limits

Nightdoor is documented by ATT&CK as a backdoor associated with Daggerfly operations, with external references to ESET and Symantec reporting. The most useful defensive approach is behavior-led validation across the related techniques rather than malware-name-only alerting.

ATT&CK provides no official detection text, no aliases, no labels, and no object-level tactics for Nightdoor. The supplied platform is Windows, while several related techniques list broader or different platform sets. Local baselines, approved administration patterns, and available telemetry are required to determine actual detection quality.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Nightdoor

Nightdoor is a backdoor exclusively associated with Daggerfly operations. Nightdoor uses common libraries with MgBot and MacMa, linking these malware families together.[1][2]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

14 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1102Web Service

Nightdoor can utilize Microsoft OneDrive or Google Drive for command and control purposes.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1057Process Discovery

Nightdoor can collect information on installed applications via Windows registry keys, as well as collecting information on running processes.[1]

EnterpriseT1053.005Scheduled TaskSub-technique

Nightdoor uses scheduled tasks for persistence to load the final malware payload into memory.[2]

EnterpriseT1680Local Storage Discovery

Nightdoor can collect information about disk drives, their total and free space, and file system type.[1]

EnterpriseT1059.003Windows Command ShellSub-technique

Nightdoor creates a cmd.exe shell to send and receive commands from the command and control server via open pipes.[2]

EnterpriseT1574Hijack Execution Flow

Nightdoor uses a legitimate executable to load a malicious DLL file for installation.[2]

EnterpriseT1497.001System ChecksSub-technique

Nightdoor embeds code from the public `al-khaser` project, a repository that works to detect virtual machines, sandboxes, and malware analysis environments.[2]

EnterpriseT1124System Time Discovery

Nightdoor can identify the system local time information.[1]

EnterpriseT1016System Network Configuration Discovery

Nightdoor gathers information on victim system network configuration such as MAC addresses.[1]

EnterpriseT1070.004File DeletionSub-technique

Nightdoor can self-delete.[1]

EnterpriseT1033System Owner/User Discovery

Nightdoor gathers information on victim system users and usernames.[1]

EnterpriseT1082System Information Discovery

Nightdoor gathers information on the victim system such as CPU and Computer name as well as device drivers.[1]

EnterpriseT1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

Nightdoor stores network configuration data in a file XOR encoded with the key value of `0x7A`.[2]

EnterpriseT1071Application Layer Protocol

Nightdoor uses TCP and UDP communication for command and control traffic.[1][2]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupEnterprise

G1034: Daggerfly

Daggerfly is a People's Republic of China-linked APT entity active since at least 2012. Daggerfly has targeted individuals, government and NGO entities, and telecommunication companies in Asia and Africa. Daggerfly is associated with exclusive use of MgBot malware and is noted for several potential supply chain infection campaigns.[1][2][3][4]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · TechniqueT1102: Web ServiceEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1057: Process DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1053.005: Scheduled TaskEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1680: Local Storage DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1059.003: Windows Command ShellEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1574: Hijack Execution FlowEnterpriseuses · GroupG1034: DaggerflyEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1497.001: System ChecksEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1124: System Time DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1016: System Network Configuration DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1070.004: File DeletionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1033: System Owner/User DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1082: System Information DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1140: Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1071: Application Layer ProtocolEnterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
1.1
Created
Modified
Raw hash
a628b77b4a599072...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(1)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.11.1Current bundlea628b77b4a59…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    ESET EvasivePanda 2024

    Ahn Ho, Facundo Muñoz, & Marc-Etienne M.Léveillé. (2024, March 7). Evasive Panda leverages Monlam Festival to target Tibetans. Retrieved July 25, 2024.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Symantec Daggerfly 2024

    Threat Hunter Team. (2024, July 23). Daggerfly: Espionage Group Makes Major Update to Toolset. Retrieved July 25, 2024.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    ESET EvasivePanda 2024

    Ahn Ho, Facundo Muñoz, & Marc-Etienne M.Léveillé. (2024, March 7). Evasive Panda leverages Monlam Festival to target Tibetans. Retrieved July 25, 2024.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    ESET EvasivePanda 2024

    Ahn Ho, Facundo Muñoz, & Marc-Etienne M.Léveillé. (2024, March 7). Evasive Panda leverages Monlam Festival to target Tibetans. Retrieved July 25, 2024.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    Symantec Daggerfly 2024

    Threat Hunter Team. (2024, July 23). Daggerfly: Espionage Group Makes Major Update to Toolset. Retrieved July 25, 2024.

    Open source URL
  6. [6]
    Symantec Daggerfly 2024

    Threat Hunter Team. (2024, July 23). Daggerfly: Espionage Group Makes Major Update to Toolset. Retrieved July 25, 2024.

    Open source URL
  7. [7]
    mitre-attackS1147
    Open source URL
  8. [8]
    mitre-attackS1147
    Open source URL
  9. [9]
    mitre-attackS1147
    Open source URL
  10. [10]
    ESET EvasivePanda 2024

    Ahn Ho, Facundo Muñoz, & Marc-Etienne M.Léveillé. (2024, March 7). Evasive Panda leverages Monlam Festival to target Tibetans. Retrieved July 25, 2024.

    Open source URL
  11. [11]
    ESET EvasivePanda 2024

    Ahn Ho, Facundo Muñoz, & Marc-Etienne M.Léveillé. (2024, March 7). Evasive Panda leverages Monlam Festival to target Tibetans. Retrieved July 25, 2024.

    Open source URL
  12. [12]
    Symantec Daggerfly 2024

    Threat Hunter Team. (2024, July 23). Daggerfly: Espionage Group Makes Major Update to Toolset. Retrieved July 25, 2024.

    Open source URL
  13. [13]
    Symantec Daggerfly 2024

    Threat Hunter Team. (2024, July 23). Daggerfly: Espionage Group Makes Major Update to Toolset. Retrieved July 25, 2024.

    Open source URL
  14. [14]
    ESET EvasivePanda 2024

    Ahn Ho, Facundo Muñoz, & Marc-Etienne M.Léveillé. (2024, March 7). Evasive Panda leverages Monlam Festival to target Tibetans. Retrieved July 25, 2024.

    Open source URL
  15. [15]
    ESET EvasivePanda 2024

    Ahn Ho, Facundo Muñoz, & Marc-Etienne M.Léveillé. (2024, March 7). Evasive Panda leverages Monlam Festival to target Tibetans. Retrieved July 25, 2024.

    Open source URL
  16. [16]
    Symantec Daggerfly 2024

    Threat Hunter Team. (2024, July 23). Daggerfly: Espionage Group Makes Major Update to Toolset. Retrieved July 25, 2024.

    Open source URL
  17. [17]
    Symantec Daggerfly 2024

    Threat Hunter Team. (2024, July 23). Daggerfly: Espionage Group Makes Major Update to Toolset. Retrieved July 25, 2024.

    Open source URL
  18. [18]
    ESET EvasivePanda 2024

    Ahn Ho, Facundo Muñoz, & Marc-Etienne M.Léveillé. (2024, March 7). Evasive Panda leverages Monlam Festival to target Tibetans. Retrieved July 25, 2024.

    Open source URL
  19. [19]
    ESET EvasivePanda 2024

    Ahn Ho, Facundo Muñoz, & Marc-Etienne M.Léveillé. (2024, March 7). Evasive Panda leverages Monlam Festival to target Tibetans. Retrieved July 25, 2024.

    Open source URL
  20. [20]
    Symantec Daggerfly 2024

    Threat Hunter Team. (2024, July 23). Daggerfly: Espionage Group Makes Major Update to Toolset. Retrieved July 25, 2024.

    Open source URL
  21. [21]
    Symantec Daggerfly 2024

    Threat Hunter Team. (2024, July 23). Daggerfly: Espionage Group Makes Major Update to Toolset. Retrieved July 25, 2024.

    Open source URL
  22. [22]
    Symantec Daggerfly 2024

    Threat Hunter Team. (2024, July 23). Daggerfly: Espionage Group Makes Major Update to Toolset. Retrieved July 25, 2024.

    Open source URL
  23. [23]
    Symantec Daggerfly 2024

    Threat Hunter Team. (2024, July 23). Daggerfly: Espionage Group Makes Major Update to Toolset. Retrieved July 25, 2024.

    Open source URL
  24. [24]
    ESET EvasivePanda 2024

    Ahn Ho, Facundo Muñoz, & Marc-Etienne M.Léveillé. (2024, March 7). Evasive Panda leverages Monlam Festival to target Tibetans. Retrieved July 25, 2024.

    Open source URL
  25. [25]
    ESET EvasivePanda 2024

    Ahn Ho, Facundo Muñoz, & Marc-Etienne M.Léveillé. (2024, March 7). Evasive Panda leverages Monlam Festival to target Tibetans. Retrieved July 25, 2024.

    Open source URL
  26. [26]
    Symantec Daggerfly 2024

    Threat Hunter Team. (2024, July 23). Daggerfly: Espionage Group Makes Major Update to Toolset. Retrieved July 25, 2024.

    Open source URL
  27. [27]
    Symantec Daggerfly 2024

    Threat Hunter Team. (2024, July 23). Daggerfly: Espionage Group Makes Major Update to Toolset. Retrieved July 25, 2024.

    Open source URL
  28. [28]
    Symantec Daggerfly 2024

    Threat Hunter Team. (2024, July 23). Daggerfly: Espionage Group Makes Major Update to Toolset. Retrieved July 25, 2024.

    Open source URL
  29. [29]
    Symantec Daggerfly 2024

    Threat Hunter Team. (2024, July 23). Daggerfly: Espionage Group Makes Major Update to Toolset. Retrieved July 25, 2024.

    Open source URL
  30. [30]
    ESET EvasivePanda 2024

    Ahn Ho, Facundo Muñoz, & Marc-Etienne M.Léveillé. (2024, March 7). Evasive Panda leverages Monlam Festival to target Tibetans. Retrieved July 25, 2024.

    Open source URL
  31. [31]
    ESET EvasivePanda 2024

    Ahn Ho, Facundo Muñoz, & Marc-Etienne M.Léveillé. (2024, March 7). Evasive Panda leverages Monlam Festival to target Tibetans. Retrieved July 25, 2024.

    Open source URL
  32. [32]
    ESET EvasivePanda 2024

    Ahn Ho, Facundo Muñoz, & Marc-Etienne M.Léveillé. (2024, March 7). Evasive Panda leverages Monlam Festival to target Tibetans. Retrieved July 25, 2024.

    Open source URL
  33. [33]
    ESET EvasivePanda 2024

    Ahn Ho, Facundo Muñoz, & Marc-Etienne M.Léveillé. (2024, March 7). Evasive Panda leverages Monlam Festival to target Tibetans. Retrieved July 25, 2024.

    Open source URL
  34. [34]
    ESET EvasivePanda 2024

    Ahn Ho, Facundo Muñoz, & Marc-Etienne M.Léveillé. (2024, March 7). Evasive Panda leverages Monlam Festival to target Tibetans. Retrieved July 25, 2024.

    Open source URL
  35. [35]
    ESET EvasivePanda 2024

    Ahn Ho, Facundo Muñoz, & Marc-Etienne M.Léveillé. (2024, March 7). Evasive Panda leverages Monlam Festival to target Tibetans. Retrieved July 25, 2024.

    Open source URL
  36. [36]
    ESET EvasivePanda 2024

    Ahn Ho, Facundo Muñoz, & Marc-Etienne M.Léveillé. (2024, March 7). Evasive Panda leverages Monlam Festival to target Tibetans. Retrieved July 25, 2024.

    Open source URL
  37. [37]
    ESET EvasivePanda 2024

    Ahn Ho, Facundo Muñoz, & Marc-Etienne M.Léveillé. (2024, March 7). Evasive Panda leverages Monlam Festival to target Tibetans. Retrieved July 25, 2024.

    Open source URL
  38. [38]
    Symantec Daggerfly 2024

    Threat Hunter Team. (2024, July 23). Daggerfly: Espionage Group Makes Major Update to Toolset. Retrieved July 25, 2024.

    Open source URL
  39. [39]
    ESET EvasivePanda 2024

    Ahn Ho, Facundo Muñoz, & Marc-Etienne M.Léveillé. (2024, March 7). Evasive Panda leverages Monlam Festival to target Tibetans. Retrieved July 25, 2024.

    Open source URL
  40. [40]
    Symantec Daggerfly 2024

    Threat Hunter Team. (2024, July 23). Daggerfly: Espionage Group Makes Major Update to Toolset. Retrieved July 25, 2024.

    Open source URL
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