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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S1147: Nightdoor

Nightdoor is a backdoor exclusively associated with Daggerfly operations. Nightdoor uses common libraries with MgBot and MacMa, linking these malware families together.[1][2]

EnterpriseS1147MalwareObject v1.1Modified
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Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S1147: Nightdoor describes [Nightdoor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1147) is a backdoor exclusively associated with [Daggerfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1034) operations. [Nightdoor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1147) uses common libraries with [MgBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1146) and [MacMa](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1016), linking these malware families together.(Citation: ESET EvasivePanda 2024)(Citation: Symantec Daggerfly 2024)

Executive priority

S1147: Nightdoor is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S1147: Nightdoor by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S1147: Nightdoor appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Nightdoor

Nightdoor is a backdoor exclusively associated with Daggerfly operations. Nightdoor uses common libraries with MgBot and MacMa, linking these malware families together.[1][2]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

14 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1102Web Service

Nightdoor can utilize Microsoft OneDrive or Google Drive for command and control purposes.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1057Process Discovery

Nightdoor can collect information on installed applications via Windows registry keys, as well as collecting information on running processes.[1]

EnterpriseT1053.005Scheduled TaskSub-technique

Nightdoor uses scheduled tasks for persistence to load the final malware payload into memory.[2]

EnterpriseT1680Local Storage Discovery

Nightdoor can collect information about disk drives, their total and free space, and file system type.[1]

EnterpriseT1059.003Windows Command ShellSub-technique

Nightdoor creates a cmd.exe shell to send and receive commands from the command and control server via open pipes.[2]

EnterpriseT1574Hijack Execution Flow

Nightdoor uses a legitimate executable to load a malicious DLL file for installation.[2]

EnterpriseT1497.001System ChecksSub-technique

Nightdoor embeds code from the public `al-khaser` project, a repository that works to detect virtual machines, sandboxes, and malware analysis environments.[2]

EnterpriseT1124System Time Discovery

Nightdoor can identify the system local time information.[1]

EnterpriseT1016System Network Configuration Discovery

Nightdoor gathers information on victim system network configuration such as MAC addresses.[1]

EnterpriseT1070.004File DeletionSub-technique

Nightdoor can self-delete.[1]

EnterpriseT1033System Owner/User Discovery

Nightdoor gathers information on victim system users and usernames.[1]

EnterpriseT1082System Information Discovery

Nightdoor gathers information on the victim system such as CPU and Computer name as well as device drivers.[1]

EnterpriseT1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

Nightdoor stores network configuration data in a file XOR encoded with the key value of `0x7A`.[2]

EnterpriseT1071Application Layer Protocol

Nightdoor uses TCP and UDP communication for command and control traffic.[1][2]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupEnterprise

G1034: Daggerfly

Daggerfly is a People's Republic of China-linked APT entity active since at least 2012. Daggerfly has targeted individuals, government and NGO entities, and telecommunication companies in Asia and Africa. Daggerfly is associated with exclusive use of MgBot malware and is noted for several potential supply chain infection campaigns.[1][2][3][4]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · GroupG1034: DaggerflyEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1102: Web ServiceEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1057: Process DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1053.005: Scheduled TaskEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1680: Local Storage DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1059.003: Windows Command ShellEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1574: Hijack Execution FlowEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1497.001: System ChecksEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1124: System Time DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1016: System Network Configuration DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1070.004: File DeletionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1033: System Owner/User DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1082: System Information DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1140: Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1071: Application Layer ProtocolEnterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.1
Created
Modified
Raw hash
a628b77b4a599072...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.1Current bundlea628b77b4a59…
19.11.1Older bundlea628b77b4a59…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    ESET EvasivePanda 2024

    Ahn Ho, Facundo Muñoz, & Marc-Etienne M.Léveillé. (2024, March 7). Evasive Panda leverages Monlam Festival to target Tibetans. Retrieved July 25, 2024.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Symantec Daggerfly 2024

    Threat Hunter Team. (2024, July 23). Daggerfly: Espionage Group Makes Major Update to Toolset. Retrieved July 25, 2024.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    mitre-attackS1147
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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