S0354: Denis
Security context for executives and security teams
S0354: Denis describes [Denis](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0354) is a Windows backdoor and Trojan used by [APT32](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0050). [Denis](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0354) shares several similarities to the [SOUNDBITE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0157) backdoor and has been used in conjunction with the [Goopy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0477) backdoor.(Citation: Cybereason Oceanlotus May 2017)
Executive priority
S0354: Denis is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate S0354: Denis by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether S0354: Denis appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Denis
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1071.004 | DNSSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1070.004 | File DeletionSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1497.001 | System ChecksSub-technique | Denis ran multiple system checks, looking for processor and register characteristics, to evade emulation and analysis.CitationCybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017 |
| Enterprise | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | Denis deploys additional backdoors and hacking tools to the system.CitationCybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017 |
| Enterprise | T1055.012 | Process HollowingSub-technique | Denis performed process hollowing through the API calls CreateRemoteThread, ResumeThread, and Wow64SetThreadContext.CitationCybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017 |
| Enterprise | T1082 | System Information Discovery | Denis collects OS information and the computer name from the victim’s machine.CitationSecurelist Denis April 2017CitationCybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017 |
| Enterprise | T1012 | Query Registry | Denis queries the Registry for keys and values.CitationCybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017 |
| Enterprise | T1140 | Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information | Denis will decrypt important strings used for C&C communication.CitationCybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017 |
| Enterprise | T1027.010 | Command ObfuscationSub-technique | Denis has encoded its PowerShell commands in Base64.CitationCybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017 |
| Enterprise | T1016 | System Network Configuration Discovery | Denis uses |
| Enterprise | T1132.001 | Standard EncodingSub-technique | Denis encodes the data sent to the server in Base64.CitationCybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017 |
| Enterprise | T1560.002 | Archive via LibrarySub-technique | Denis compressed collected data using zlib.CitationSecurelist Denis April 2017 |
| Enterprise | T1574 | Hijack Execution Flow | Denis replaces the nonexistent Windows DLL "msfte.dll" with its own malicious version, which is loaded by the SearchIndexer.exe and SearchProtocolHost.exe.CitationCybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017 |
| Enterprise | T1083 | File and Directory Discovery | |
| Enterprise | T1106 | Native API | |
| Enterprise | T1059.001 | PowerShellSub-technique | Denis has a version written in PowerShell.CitationCybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017 |
| Enterprise | T1033 | System Owner/User Discovery | Denis enumerates and collects the username from the victim’s machine.CitationSecurelist Denis April 2017CitationCybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017 |
| Enterprise | T1574.001 | DLLSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1027 | Obfuscated Files or Information | Denis obfuscates its code and encrypts the API names.CitationCybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017 |
| Enterprise | T1059.003 | Windows Command ShellSub-technique |
Groups, software, and campaigns
G0050: APT32
APT32 is a suspected Vietnam-based threat group that has been active since at least 2014. The group has targeted multiple private sector industries as well as foreign governments, dissidents, and journalists with a strong focus on Southeast Asian countries like Vietnam, the Philippines, Laos, and Cambodia. They have extensively used strategic web compromises to compromise victims.[1][2][3]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.2 | Current bundle | 788c8f7af7db… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.2 | Older bundle | 788c8f7af7db… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Cybereason Oceanlotus May 2017
Dahan, A. (2017, May 24). OPERATION COBALT KITTY: A LARGE-SCALE APT IN ASIA CARRIED OUT BY THE OCEANLOTUS GROUP. Retrieved November 5, 2018.
Open source URL - [2]Denis
(Citation: Cybereason Oceanlotus May 2017)
- [3]mitre-attackS0354Open source URL
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