S0477: Goopy

Goopy is a Windows backdoor and Trojan used by APT32 and shares several similarities to another backdoor used by the group (Denis). Goopy is named for its impersonation of the legitimate Google Updater executable.[1]

EnterpriseS0477MalwareObject v1.1ModifiedApr 16, 2025, 20:38 UTC (UTC+00:00)

S0477: Goopy describes [Goopy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0477) is a Windows backdoor and Trojan used by [APT32](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0050) and shares several similarities to another backdoor used by the group ([Denis](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0354)). [Goopy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0477) is named for its impersonation of the legitimate Google Updater executable.(Citation: Cybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017)

Executive priority

S0477: Goopy is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S0477: Goopy by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

Validate whether S0477: Goopy appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.

Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Goopy

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

Filter related techniques18 rows

Domain	ID	Name	Relationship / procedure
Enterprise	T1071.004	DNSSub-technique	Goopy has the ability to communicate with its C2 over DNS.[1]
Enterprise	T1059.005	Visual BasicSub-technique	Goopy has the ability to use a Microsoft Outlook backdoor macro to communicate with its C2.[1]
Enterprise	T1027.016	Junk Code InsertionSub-technique	Goopy's decrypter have been inflated with junk code in between legitimate API functions, and also included infinite loops to avoid analysis.[1]
Enterprise	T1685	Disable or Modify Tools	Goopy has the ability to disable Microsoft Outlook's security policies to disable macro warnings.[1]
Enterprise	T1059.003	Windows Command ShellSub-technique	Goopy has the ability to use cmd.exe to execute commands passed from an Outlook C2 channel.[1]
Enterprise	T1033	System Owner/User Discovery	Goopy has the ability to enumerate the infected system's user name.[1]
Enterprise	T1071.001	Web ProtocolsSub-technique	Goopy has the ability to communicate with its C2 over HTTP.[1]
Enterprise	T1057	Process Discovery	Goopy has checked for the Google Updater process to ensure Goopy was loaded properly.[1]
Enterprise	T1070.008	Clear Mailbox DataSub-technique	Goopy has the ability to delete emails used for C2 once the content has been copied.[1]
Enterprise	T1005	Data from Local System	Goopy has the ability to exfiltrate documents from infected systems.[1]
Enterprise	T1106	Native API	Goopy has the ability to enumerate the infected system's user name via `GetUserNameW`.[1]
Enterprise	T1071.003	Mail ProtocolsSub-technique	Goopy has the ability to use a Microsoft Outlook backdoor macro to communicate with its C2.[1]
Enterprise	T1140	Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information	Goopy has used a polymorphic decryptor to decrypt itself at runtime.[1]
Enterprise	T1574.001	DLLSub-technique	Goopy has the ability to side-load malicious DLLs with legitimate applications from Kaspersky, Microsoft, and Google.[1]
Enterprise	T1041	Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	Goopy has the ability to exfiltrate data over the Microsoft Outlook C2 channel.[1]
Enterprise	T1036.005	Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationSub-technique	Goopy has impersonated the legitimate goopdate.dll, which was dropped on the target system with a legitimate GoogleUpdate.exe.[1]
Enterprise	T1053.005	Scheduled TaskSub-technique	Goopy has the ability to maintain persistence by creating scheduled tasks set to run every hour.[1]
Enterprise	T1027.001	Binary PaddingSub-technique	Goopy has had null characters padded in its malicious DLL payload.[1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

G0050: APT32

APT32 is a suspected Vietnam-based threat group that has been active since at least 2014. The group has targeted multiple private sector industries as well as foreign governments, dissidents, and journalists with a strong focus on Southeast Asian countries like Vietnam, the Philippines, Laos, and Cambodia. They have extensively used strategic web compromises to compromise victims.[1][2][3]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release: 19.2
Object version: 1.1
Created: Jun 19, 2020, 20:42 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Modified: Apr 16, 2025, 20:38 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Raw hash: 79483051a47b4d29...

Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)

Release	Bundle imported	Object version	Modified	Status	Raw hash
19.2	Aug 6, 2026, 02:58 UTC (UTC+00:00)	1.1	Apr 16, 2025, 20:38 UTC (UTC+00:00)	Current bundle	`79483051a47b…`
19.1	Jul 14, 2026, 09:14 UTC (UTC+00:00)	1.1	Apr 16, 2025, 20:38 UTC (UTC+00:00)	Older bundle	`79483051a47b…`

Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSON Open MITRE-hosted copy

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

[1]
Cybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017
Dahan, A. (2017). Operation Cobalt Kitty. Retrieved December 27, 2018.
Open source URL
[2]
mitre-attackS0477
Open source URL

Source and licensing

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