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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S1146: MgBot

MgBot is a modular malware framework exclusively associated with Daggerfly operations since at least 2012. MgBot was developed in C++ and features a module design with multiple available plugins that have been under active development through 2024.[1][2][3]

EnterpriseS1146MalwareObject v1.0Modified
Discuss defensive coverageBack to ATT&CK
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceHigh

MgBot matters because MITRE describes it as a long-running, modular Windows malware framework associated with Daggerfly operations and plugins for credential access, discovery, and collection behaviors. For leaders, the practical issue is not a single signature: a modular tool can present as multiple behaviors across identity, endpoint, and data-access controls, so readiness depends on whether the organization can see and contain credential theft, internal reconnaissance, and sensitive data collection on Windows endpoints.

Executive priority

Prioritize MgBot as an incident-readiness and control-validation use case for Windows environments. The related ATT&CK behaviors touch credential dumping, browser/password-store theft, account and domain discovery, network/service discovery, removable media, clipboard, audio, local data, and database collection. Executives should ask whether SOC and IR teams can prove visibility into those behavior classes, whether identity controls can limit damage if credentials or cookies are stolen, and whether audit evidence shows monitoring for sensitive data access rather than only malware-name detections.

Technical view

ATT&CK provides no official detection text for MgBot, so defenders should validate coverage behaviorally against the linked techniques: T1003, T1056.001, T1539, T1555, T1555.003 for credential access; T1018, T1033, T1046, T1057, T1087.001, T1087.002, T1482 for discovery; and T1005, T1025, T1115, T1123, T1213.006 for collection. In a Windows-focused scope, SOC teams should correlate endpoint events showing credential-store access, browser credential or cookie access, unusual user/domain/network enumeration, and collection from local files, removable media, clipboard, audio devices, or databases. Treat any detection based only on malware family name as incomplete because the supplied object emphasizes a modular plugin design.

Likely telemetry

  • Windows endpoint detection and response events for process execution, process access, file access, and suspicious child-process activity
  • Authentication and identity logs that can show account use after possible credential or session theft
  • Directory and domain query logs for local account, domain account, and domain trust discovery
  • Network telemetry for remote system and network service discovery from endpoints
  • Browser and password-store access evidence, where legally and technically collectable

Detection direction

  • Use behavior-based detections mapped to the related techniques rather than relying on an MgBot label or hash alone.
  • Correlate credential-access signals with discovery and collection activity; the combination is more decision-useful than any single noisy event.
  • Validate visibility specifically on Windows endpoints, since Windows is the supplied platform for this malware object.
  • Tune expected administrative enumeration separately from suspicious enumeration by unusual users, hosts, timing, or process context.
  • Check blind spots around browser credential stores, session cookies, clipboard data, removable media, audio capture, and database access; these are often less consistently logged than process creation.

Mitigation priorities

  • Reduce credential value first: enforce least privilege, restrict administrative rights, and strengthen identity controls so credential dumping or browser/password-store theft has limited blast radius.
  • Harden and monitor Windows endpoints for credential-store access, suspicious discovery, and sensitive data collection behaviors.
  • Limit unnecessary access to local sensitive files, removable media, databases, and collaboration or browser-stored credentials based on business need.
  • Improve segmentation and access governance so remote system discovery and service discovery do not translate easily into lateral movement opportunities.
  • Prepare IR procedures for modular malware cases: isolate affected Windows hosts, preserve endpoint and identity evidence, rotate exposed credentials or sessions when supported by findings, and review discovered/collected data scope.
Additional notes and limits

The strongest decision value is to treat MgBot as a coverage test for the behaviors its plugins are reported by ATT&CK relationships to use. The object is tied to Daggerfly in the official description, but this take does not infer local exposure, active exploitation, or guaranteed detection. The related technique set points to identity compromise and data collection risk, making it relevant to managed detection, incident response, IAM, data protection, and audit readiness.

The supplied ATT&CK object has no official detection section, no aliases, no tactics listed on the malware object itself, and only Windows as the platform. Relationship descriptions include broader platform coverage for the techniques, but this summary does not expand MgBot platform scope beyond the supplied malware platform. Local telemetry, asset criticality, and observed indicators are required to assess exposure or detection quality.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

MgBot

MgBot is a modular malware framework exclusively associated with Daggerfly operations since at least 2012. MgBot was developed in C++ and features a module design with multiple available plugins that have been under active development through 2024.[1][2][3]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

17 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1056.001KeyloggingSub-technique

MgBot includes keylogger payloads focused on the QQ chat application.[2][4]

EnterpriseT1033System Owner/User Discovery

MgBot includes modules for identifying local users and administrators on victim machines.[4]

EnterpriseT1087.002Domain AccountSub-technique

MgBot includes modules for collecting information on Active Directory domain accounts.[4]

EnterpriseT1003OS Credential Dumping

MgBot includes modules for dumping and capturing credentials from process memory.[4]

EnterpriseT1555Credentials from Password Stores

MgBot includes modules for stealing stored credentials from Outlook and Foxmail email client software.[2][4]

EnterpriseT1087.001Local AccountSub-technique

MgBot includes modules for identifying local administrator accounts on victim systems.[4]

EnterpriseT1213.006DatabasesSub-technique

MgBot includes a module capable of stealing content from the Tencent QQ database storing user QQ message history on infected devices.[2]

EnterpriseT1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersSub-technique

MgBot includes modules for stealing credentials from various browsers and applications, including Chrome, Opera, Firefox, Foxmail, QQBrowser, FileZilla, and WinSCP.[2][4]

EnterpriseT1005Data from Local System

MgBot includes modules for collecting files from local systems based on a given set of properties and filenames.[2]

EnterpriseT1025Data from Removable Media

MgBot includes modules capable of gathering information from USB thumb drives and CD-ROMs on the victim machine given a list of provided criteria.[2]

EnterpriseT1482Domain Trust Discovery

MgBot includes modules for collecting information on local domain users and permissions.[4]

EnterpriseT1115Clipboard Data

MgBot can capture clipboard data.[2][4]

EnterpriseT1539Steal Web Session Cookie

MgBot includes modules that can steal cookies from Firefox, Chrome, and Edge web browsers.[2]

EnterpriseT1018Remote System Discovery

MgBot includes modules for performing ARP scans of local connected systems.[4]

EnterpriseT1057Process Discovery

MgBot includes a module for establishing a process watchdog for itself, identifying if the MgBot process is still running.[4]

EnterpriseT1046Network Service Discovery

MgBot includes modules for performing HTTP and server service scans.[4]

EnterpriseT1123Audio Capture

MgBot can capture input and output audio streams from infected devices.[2][4]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupEnterprise

G1034: Daggerfly

Daggerfly is a People's Republic of China-linked APT entity active since at least 2012. Daggerfly has targeted individuals, government and NGO entities, and telecommunication companies in Asia and Africa. Daggerfly is associated with exclusive use of MgBot malware and is noted for several potential supply chain infection campaigns.[1][2][3][4]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · TechniqueT1056.001: KeyloggingEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1033: System Owner/User DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1087.002: Domain AccountEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1003: OS Credential DumpingEnterpriseuses · GroupG1034: DaggerflyEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1555: Credentials from Password StoresEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1087.001: Local AccountEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1213.006: DatabasesEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1555.003: Credentials from Web BrowsersEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1005: Data from Local SystemEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1025: Data from Removable MediaEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1482: Domain Trust DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1115: Clipboard DataEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1539: Steal Web Session CookieEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1018: Remote System DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1057: Process DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1046: Network Service DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1123: Audio CaptureEnterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
1.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
a6edd5b9cff8f3f2...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(1)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.11.0Current bundlea6edd5b9cff8…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Szappanos MgBot 2014

    Gabor Szappanos. (2014, February 3). Needle in a haystack. Retrieved July 25, 2024.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    ESET EvasivePanda 2023

    Facundo Muñoz. (2023, April 26). Evasive Panda APT group delivers malware via updates for popular Chinese software. Retrieved July 25, 2024.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    Symantec Daggerfly 2024

    Threat Hunter Team. (2024, July 23). Daggerfly: Espionage Group Makes Major Update to Toolset. Retrieved July 25, 2024.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    Symantec Daggerfly 2023

    Threat Hunter Team. (2023, April 20). Daggerfly: APT Actor Targets Telecoms Company in Africa. Retrieved July 25, 2024.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    ESET EvasivePanda 2023

    Facundo Muñoz. (2023, April 26). Evasive Panda APT group delivers malware via updates for popular Chinese software. Retrieved July 25, 2024.

    Open source URL
  6. [6]
    ESET EvasivePanda 2023

    Facundo Muñoz. (2023, April 26). Evasive Panda APT group delivers malware via updates for popular Chinese software. Retrieved July 25, 2024.

    Open source URL
  7. [7]
    Symantec Daggerfly 2024

    Threat Hunter Team. (2024, July 23). Daggerfly: Espionage Group Makes Major Update to Toolset. Retrieved July 25, 2024.

    Open source URL
  8. [8]
    Symantec Daggerfly 2024

    Threat Hunter Team. (2024, July 23). Daggerfly: Espionage Group Makes Major Update to Toolset. Retrieved July 25, 2024.

    Open source URL
  9. [9]
    Szappanos MgBot 2014

    Gabor Szappanos. (2014, February 3). Needle in a haystack. Retrieved July 25, 2024.

    Open source URL
  10. [10]
    Szappanos MgBot 2014

    Gabor Szappanos. (2014, February 3). Needle in a haystack. Retrieved July 25, 2024.

    Open source URL
  11. [11]
    mitre-attackS1146
    Open source URL
  12. [12]
    mitre-attackS1146
    Open source URL
  13. [13]
    mitre-attackS1146
    Open source URL
  14. [14]
    ESET EvasivePanda 2023

    Facundo Muñoz. (2023, April 26). Evasive Panda APT group delivers malware via updates for popular Chinese software. Retrieved July 25, 2024.

    Open source URL
  15. [15]
    ESET EvasivePanda 2023

    Facundo Muñoz. (2023, April 26). Evasive Panda APT group delivers malware via updates for popular Chinese software. Retrieved July 25, 2024.

    Open source URL
  16. [16]
    Symantec Daggerfly 2023

    Threat Hunter Team. (2023, April 20). Daggerfly: APT Actor Targets Telecoms Company in Africa. Retrieved July 25, 2024.

    Open source URL
  17. [17]
    Symantec Daggerfly 2023

    Threat Hunter Team. (2023, April 20). Daggerfly: APT Actor Targets Telecoms Company in Africa. Retrieved July 25, 2024.

    Open source URL
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    Symantec Daggerfly 2023

    Threat Hunter Team. (2023, April 20). Daggerfly: APT Actor Targets Telecoms Company in Africa. Retrieved July 25, 2024.

    Open source URL
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    Symantec Daggerfly 2023

    Threat Hunter Team. (2023, April 20). Daggerfly: APT Actor Targets Telecoms Company in Africa. Retrieved July 25, 2024.

    Open source URL
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    Symantec Daggerfly 2023

    Threat Hunter Team. (2023, April 20). Daggerfly: APT Actor Targets Telecoms Company in Africa. Retrieved July 25, 2024.

    Open source URL
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    Symantec Daggerfly 2023

    Threat Hunter Team. (2023, April 20). Daggerfly: APT Actor Targets Telecoms Company in Africa. Retrieved July 25, 2024.

    Open source URL
  22. [22]
    Symantec Daggerfly 2023

    Threat Hunter Team. (2023, April 20). Daggerfly: APT Actor Targets Telecoms Company in Africa. Retrieved July 25, 2024.

    Open source URL
  23. [23]
    ESET EvasivePanda 2023

    Facundo Muñoz. (2023, April 26). Evasive Panda APT group delivers malware via updates for popular Chinese software. Retrieved July 25, 2024.

    Open source URL
  24. [24]
    ESET EvasivePanda 2023

    Facundo Muñoz. (2023, April 26). Evasive Panda APT group delivers malware via updates for popular Chinese software. Retrieved July 25, 2024.

    Open source URL
  25. [25]
    ESET EvasivePanda 2023

    Facundo Muñoz. (2023, April 26). Evasive Panda APT group delivers malware via updates for popular Chinese software. Retrieved July 25, 2024.

    Open source URL
  26. [26]
    ESET EvasivePanda 2023

    Facundo Muñoz. (2023, April 26). Evasive Panda APT group delivers malware via updates for popular Chinese software. Retrieved July 25, 2024.

    Open source URL
  27. [27]
    Symantec Daggerfly 2023

    Threat Hunter Team. (2023, April 20). Daggerfly: APT Actor Targets Telecoms Company in Africa. Retrieved July 25, 2024.

    Open source URL
  28. [28]
    Symantec Daggerfly 2023

    Threat Hunter Team. (2023, April 20). Daggerfly: APT Actor Targets Telecoms Company in Africa. Retrieved July 25, 2024.

    Open source URL
  29. [29]
    Symantec Daggerfly 2023

    Threat Hunter Team. (2023, April 20). Daggerfly: APT Actor Targets Telecoms Company in Africa. Retrieved July 25, 2024.

    Open source URL
  30. [30]
    Symantec Daggerfly 2023

    Threat Hunter Team. (2023, April 20). Daggerfly: APT Actor Targets Telecoms Company in Africa. Retrieved July 25, 2024.

    Open source URL
  31. [31]
    ESET EvasivePanda 2023

    Facundo Muñoz. (2023, April 26). Evasive Panda APT group delivers malware via updates for popular Chinese software. Retrieved July 25, 2024.

    Open source URL
  32. [32]
    ESET EvasivePanda 2023

    Facundo Muñoz. (2023, April 26). Evasive Panda APT group delivers malware via updates for popular Chinese software. Retrieved July 25, 2024.

    Open source URL
  33. [33]
    ESET EvasivePanda 2023

    Facundo Muñoz. (2023, April 26). Evasive Panda APT group delivers malware via updates for popular Chinese software. Retrieved July 25, 2024.

    Open source URL
  34. [34]
    ESET EvasivePanda 2023

    Facundo Muñoz. (2023, April 26). Evasive Panda APT group delivers malware via updates for popular Chinese software. Retrieved July 25, 2024.

    Open source URL
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    Symantec Daggerfly 2023

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    Open source URL
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    Symantec Daggerfly 2023

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    Open source URL
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    ESET EvasivePanda 2023

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    Open source URL
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    ESET EvasivePanda 2023

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    Open source URL
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    ESET EvasivePanda 2023

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    Open source URL
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    ESET EvasivePanda 2023

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    Open source URL
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    Symantec Daggerfly 2023

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    Open source URL
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    Symantec Daggerfly 2023

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    Open source URL
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    ESET EvasivePanda 2023

    Facundo Muñoz. (2023, April 26). Evasive Panda APT group delivers malware via updates for popular Chinese software. Retrieved July 25, 2024.

    Open source URL
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    ESET EvasivePanda 2023

    Facundo Muñoz. (2023, April 26). Evasive Panda APT group delivers malware via updates for popular Chinese software. Retrieved July 25, 2024.

    Open source URL
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    Symantec Daggerfly 2023

    Threat Hunter Team. (2023, April 20). Daggerfly: APT Actor Targets Telecoms Company in Africa. Retrieved July 25, 2024.

    Open source URL
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    Symantec Daggerfly 2023

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    Open source URL
  47. [47]
    ESET EvasivePanda 2023

    Facundo Muñoz. (2023, April 26). Evasive Panda APT group delivers malware via updates for popular Chinese software. Retrieved July 25, 2024.

    Open source URL
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    ESET EvasivePanda 2023

    Facundo Muñoz. (2023, April 26). Evasive Panda APT group delivers malware via updates for popular Chinese software. Retrieved July 25, 2024.

    Open source URL
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    Symantec Daggerfly 2023

    Threat Hunter Team. (2023, April 20). Daggerfly: APT Actor Targets Telecoms Company in Africa. Retrieved July 25, 2024.

    Open source URL
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    Symantec Daggerfly 2023

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    Open source URL
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    Symantec Daggerfly 2023

    Threat Hunter Team. (2023, April 20). Daggerfly: APT Actor Targets Telecoms Company in Africa. Retrieved July 25, 2024.

    Open source URL
  52. [52]
    Symantec Daggerfly 2023

    Threat Hunter Team. (2023, April 20). Daggerfly: APT Actor Targets Telecoms Company in Africa. Retrieved July 25, 2024.

    Open source URL
  53. [53]
    Symantec Daggerfly 2023

    Threat Hunter Team. (2023, April 20). Daggerfly: APT Actor Targets Telecoms Company in Africa. Retrieved July 25, 2024.

    Open source URL
  54. [54]
    Symantec Daggerfly 2023

    Threat Hunter Team. (2023, April 20). Daggerfly: APT Actor Targets Telecoms Company in Africa. Retrieved July 25, 2024.

    Open source URL
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    ESET EvasivePanda 2023

    Facundo Muñoz. (2023, April 26). Evasive Panda APT group delivers malware via updates for popular Chinese software. Retrieved July 25, 2024.

    Open source URL
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    Symantec Daggerfly 2023

    Threat Hunter Team. (2023, April 20). Daggerfly: APT Actor Targets Telecoms Company in Africa. Retrieved July 25, 2024.

    Open source URL
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Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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