S0332: Remcos
Security context for executives and security teams
S0332: Remcos describes [Remcos](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0332) is a closed-source tool that is marketed as a remote control and surveillance software by a company called Breaking Security. [Remcos](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0332) has been observed being used in malware campaigns.(Citation: Riskiq Remcos Jan 2018)(Citation: Talos Remcos Aug 2018)
Executive priority
S0332: Remcos is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate S0332: Remcos by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether S0332: Remcos appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Remcos
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1491.001 | Internal DefacementSub-technique | Remcos has the ability to modify the desktop wallpaper.CitationFortinet Remcos Campaign NOV 2024 |
| Enterprise | T1547.001 | Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1082 | System Information Discovery | Remcos can collect the OS version and process architecture of compromised hosts.CitationFortinet Remcos Campaign NOV 2024 |
| Enterprise | T1115 | Clipboard Data | |
| Enterprise | T1055 | Process Injection | |
| Enterprise | T1566.001 | Spearphishing AttachmentSub-technique | Remcos has been spread through emails containing malicious documents.CitationFortinet Remcos Campaign NOV 2024 |
| Enterprise | T1059.006 | PythonSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1090 | Proxy | |
| Enterprise | T1112 | Modify Registry | |
| Enterprise | T1573.002 | Asymmetric CryptographySub-technique | Remcos can use TLS to encrypt C2 communication.CitationFortinet Remcos Campaign NOV 2024 |
| Enterprise | T1027 | Obfuscated Files or Information | |
| Enterprise | T1543.003 | Windows ServiceSub-technique | Remcos can terminate, suspend, and resume a process by PID.CitationFortinet Remcos Campaign NOV 2024 |
| Enterprise | T1497.001 | System ChecksSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1059.003 | Windows Command ShellSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1027.013 | Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique | Remcos can use string encryption to hinder analysis.CitationFortinet Remcos Campaign NOV 2024 |
| Enterprise | T1548.002 | Bypass User Account ControlSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1113 | Screen Capture | |
| Enterprise | T1560.001 | Archive via UtilitySub-technique | Remcos can zip files and folders for upload.CitationFortinet Remcos Campaign NOV 2024 |
| Enterprise | T1070 | Indicator Removal | Remcos can clean saved cookies and logins from the web browser.CitationFortinet Remcos Campaign NOV 2024 |
| Enterprise | T1564.003 | Hidden WindowSub-technique | Remcos can set `ProcessWindowStyle.Hidden` to hide windows.CitationCheck Point Blind Eagle MAR 2025 |
| Enterprise | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | |
| Enterprise | T1059.005 | Visual BasicSub-technique | Remcos can execute VBS remotely.CitationFortinet Remcos Campaign NOV 2024 |
| Enterprise | T1204.002 | Malicious FileSub-technique | Remcos has been executed by luring victims into opening malicious email attachments including Excel files.CitationFortinet Remcos Campaign NOV 2024 |
| Enterprise | T1568 | Dynamic Resolution | Remcos has used dynamic DNS domains in C2 communications.CitationCheck Point Blind Eagle MAR 2025 |
| Enterprise | T1056.001 | KeyloggingSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1125 | Video Capture | |
| Enterprise | T1012 | Query Registry | Remcos can obtain Registry data from targeted systems.CitationFortinet Remcos Campaign NOV 2024 |
| Enterprise | T1564 | Hide Artifacts | Remcos can modify file attributes to hide the file.CitationFortinet Remcos Campaign NOV 2024 |
| Enterprise | T1083 | File and Directory Discovery | |
| Enterprise | T1123 | Audio Capture | |
| Enterprise | T1070.004 | File DeletionSub-technique | Remcos can delete files and folders from victim machines.CitationFortinet Remcos Campaign NOV 2024 |
| Enterprise | T1057 | Process Discovery | Remcos can discover running processes on compromised machines.CitationFortinet Remcos Campaign NOV 2024 |
| Enterprise | T1614 | System Location Discovery | Remcos can identify the location of targeted devices.CitationFortinet Remcos Campaign NOV 2024 |
| Enterprise | T1010 | Application Window Discovery | Remcos can list all windows on victim systems.CitationFortinet Remcos Campaign NOV 2024 |
| Enterprise | T1529 | System Shutdown/Reboot | Remcos can shutdown and restart remote devices.CitationFortinet Remcos Campaign NOV 2024 |
| Enterprise | T1033 | System Owner/User Discovery | Remcos can enumerate the username on targeted hosts.CitationFortinet Remcos Campaign NOV 2024 |
| Enterprise | T1059.007 | JavaScriptSub-technique | Remcos has the ability to execute JavaScript remotely.CitationFortinet Remcos Campaign NOV 2024 |
| Enterprise | T1132.001 | Standard EncodingSub-technique | Remcos can serialize collected data with Protobuf.CitationCheck Point Blind Eagle MAR 2025 |
Groups, software, and campaigns
G0140: LazyScripter
LazyScripter is threat group that has mainly targeted the airlines industry since at least 2018, primarily using open-source toolsets.[1]
G0047: Gamaredon Group
Gamaredon Group is a suspected Russian cyber espionage group that has targeted military, law enforcement, judiciary, non-profit, and non-governmental organizations in Ukraine since at least 2013. The name Gamaredon Group derives from a misspelling of the word "Armageddon," found in early campaigns.[1][2][3][4][5]
In November 2021, the Ukrainian government publicly attributed Gamaredon Group to Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) Center 18, an assessment later supported by multiple independent cybersecurity researchers. [6][5]
G0099: APT-C-36
APT-C-36 is a suspected South American threat group that has engaged in espionage and financially motivated operations since at least 2018. APT-C-36 has targeted government institutions and entities in the financial, energy, and professional manufacturing sectors across Colombia and other Latin American countries.[1][2][3][4]
G0078: Gorgon Group
Gorgon Group is a threat group consisting of members who are suspected to be Pakistan-based or have other connections to Pakistan. The group has performed a mix of criminal and targeted attacks, including campaigns against government organizations in the United Kingdom, Spain, Russia, and the United States. [1]
C0005: Operation Spalax
Operation Spalax was a campaign that primarily targeted Colombian government organizations and private companies, particularly those associated with the energy and metallurgical industries. The Operation Spalax threat actors distributed commodity malware and tools using generic phishing topics related to COVID-19, banking, and law enforcement action. Security researchers noted indicators of compromise and some infrastructure overlaps with other campaigns dating back to April 2018, including at least one separately attributed to APT-C-36, however identified enough differences to report this as separate, unattributed activity.[1]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(3)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 20.0 | 1.4 | Current bundle | 5a3832e1272f… | ||
| 19.2 | 1.4 | Older bundle | 5a3832e1272f… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.4 | Older bundle | 5a3832e1272f… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Riskiq Remcos Jan 2018
Klijnsma, Y. (2018, January 23). Espionage Campaign Leverages Spear Phishing, RATs Against Turkish Defense Contractors. Retrieved November 6, 2018.
Open source URL - [2]Talos Remcos Aug 2018
Brumaghin, E., Unterbrink, H. (2018, August 22). Picking Apart Remcos Botnet-In-A-Box. Retrieved November 6, 2018.
Open source URL - [3]Fortinet Remcos Feb 2017
Bacurio, F., Salvio, J. (2017, February 14). REMCOS: A New RAT In The Wild. Retrieved November 6, 2018.
Open source URL - [4]Remcos
(Citation: Riskiq Remcos Jan 2018)(Citation: Fortinet Remcos Feb 2017)(Citation: Talos Remcos Aug 2018)
- [5]mitre-attackS0332Open source URL
Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.
