S1066: DarkTortilla
DarkTortilla is a highly configurable .NET-based crypter that has been possibly active since at least August 2015. DarkTortilla has been used to deliver popular information stealers, RATs, and payloads such as Agent Tesla, AsyncRat, NanoCore, RedLine, Cobalt Strike, and Metasploit.[1]
Security context for executives and security teams
S1066: DarkTortilla describes [DarkTortilla](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1066) is a highly configurable .NET-based crypter that has been possibly active since at least August 2015. [DarkTortilla](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1066) has been used to deliver popular information stealers, RATs, and payloads such as [Agent Tesla](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0331), AsyncRat, [NanoCore](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0336), RedLine, [Cobalt Strike](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154), and Metasploit.(Citation: Secureworks ...
Executive priority
S1066: DarkTortilla is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate S1066: DarkTortilla by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether S1066: DarkTortilla appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
DarkTortilla
DarkTortilla is a highly configurable .NET-based crypter that has been possibly active since at least August 2015. DarkTortilla has been used to deliver popular information stealers, RATs, and payloads such as Agent Tesla, AsyncRat, NanoCore, RedLine, Cobalt Strike, and Metasploit.[1]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | DarkTortilla can download additional packages for keylogging, cryptocurrency mining, and other capabilities; it can also retrieve malicious payloads such as Agent Tesla, AsyncRat, NanoCore, RedLine, Cobalt Strike, and Metasploit.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1140 | Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information | DarkTortilla can decrypt its payload and associated configuration elements using the Rijndael cipher.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1027 | Obfuscated Files or Information | DarkTortilla has been obfuscated with the DeepSea .NET and ConfuserEx code obfuscators.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1055.001 | Dynamic-link Library InjectionSub-technique | DarkTortilla can use a .NET-based DLL named `RunPe6` for process injection.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1566.001 | Spearphishing AttachmentSub-technique | DarkTortilla has been distributed via spearphishing emails containing archive attachments, with file types such as .iso, .zip, .img, .dmg, and .tar, as well as through malicious documents.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1547.001 | Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique | DarkTortilla has established persistence via the `Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Run` registry key and by creating a .lnk shortcut file in the Windows startup folder.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1547.004 | Winlogon Helper DLLSub-technique | DarkTortilla has established persistence via the `Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon` registry key.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1497.003 | Time Based ChecksSub-technique | DarkTortilla can implement the `kernel32.dll` Sleep function to delay execution for up to 300 seconds before implementing persistence or processing an addon package.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1574.012 | COR_PROFILERSub-technique | DarkTortilla can detect profilers by verifying the `COR_ENABLE_PROFILING` environment variable is present and active.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1518.001 | Security Software DiscoverySub-technique | DarkTortilla can check for the Kaspersky Anti-Virus suite.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1059.003 | Windows Command ShellSub-technique | DarkTortilla can use `cmd.exe` to add registry keys for persistence.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1082 | System Information Discovery | DarkTortilla can obtain system information by querying the `Win32_ComputerSystem`, `Win32_BIOS`, `Win32_MotherboardDevice`, `Win32_PnPEntity`, and `Win32_DiskDrive` WMI objects.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1036 | Masquerading | DarkTortilla's payload has been renamed `PowerShellInfo.exe`.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1564 | Hide Artifacts | DarkTortilla has used `%HiddenReg%` and `%HiddenKey%` as part of its persistence via the Windows registry.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1497.001 | System ChecksSub-technique | DarkTortilla can search a compromised system's running processes and services to detect Hyper-V, QEMU, Virtual PC, Virtual Box, and VMware, as well as Sandboxie.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1115 | Clipboard Data | DarkTortilla can download a clipboard information stealer module.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1056.001 | KeyloggingSub-technique | DarkTortilla can download a keylogging module.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1204.002 | Malicious FileSub-technique | DarkTortilla has relied on a user to open a malicious document or archived file delivered via email for initial execution.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1057 | Process Discovery | DarkTortilla can enumerate a list of running processes on a compromised system.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1016.001 | Internet Connection DiscoverySub-technique | DarkTortilla can check for internet connectivity by issuing HTTP GET requests.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1047 | Windows Management Instrumentation | DarkTortilla can use WMI queries to obtain system information.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1106 | Native API | DarkTortilla can use a variety of API calls for persistence and defense evasion.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1102 | Web Service | DarkTortilla can retrieve its primary payload from public sites such as Pastebin and Textbin.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1007 | System Service Discovery | DarkTortilla can retrieve information about a compromised system's running services.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1559.001 | Component Object ModelSub-technique | DarkTortilla has used the `WshShortcut` COM object to create a .lnk shortcut file in the Windows startup folder.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1622 | Debugger Evasion | DarkTortilla can detect debuggers by using functions such as `DebuggerIsAttached` and `DebuggerIsLogging`. DarkTortilla can also detect profilers by verifying the `COR_ENABLE_PROFILING` environment variable is present and active.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1112 | Modify Registry | DarkTortilla has modified registry keys for persistence.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1071.001 | Web ProtocolsSub-technique | DarkTortilla has used HTTP and HTTPS for C2.[1] |
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.0 | Current bundle | d41f7539a94a… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Older bundle | d41f7539a94a… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Secureworks DarkTortilla Aug 2022
Secureworks Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2022, August 17). DarkTortilla Malware Analysis. Retrieved November 3, 2022.
Open source URL - [2]mitre-attackS1066Open source URL
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