LiveActive security incident?Get immediate response
MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S0336: NanoCore

NanoCore is a modular remote access tool developed in .NET that can be used to spy on victims and steal information. It has been used by threat actors since 2013.[1][2][3][4]

EnterpriseS0336MalwareObject v1.1Modified
Discuss defensive coverageBack to ATT&CK
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S0336: NanoCore describes [NanoCore](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0336) is a modular remote access tool developed in .NET that can be used to spy on victims and steal information. It has been used by threat actors since 2013.(Citation: DigiTrust NanoCore Jan 2017)(Citation: Cofense NanoCore Mar 2018)(Citation: PaloAlto NanoCore Feb 2016)(Citation: Unit 42 Gorgon Group Aug 2018)

Executive priority

S0336: NanoCore is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S0336: NanoCore by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S0336: NanoCore appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

NanoCore

NanoCore is a modular remote access tool developed in .NET that can be used to spy on victims and steal information. It has been used by threat actors since 2013.[1][2][3][4]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

13 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1105Ingress Tool Transfer

NanoCore has the capability to download and activate additional modules for execution.[1][3]

EnterpriseT1059.003Windows Command ShellSub-technique

NanoCore can open a remote command-line interface and execute commands.[3] NanoCore uses JavaScript files.[2]

EnterpriseT1016System Network Configuration Discovery

NanoCore gathers the IP address from the victim’s machine.[1]

EnterpriseT1125Video Capture

NanoCore can access the victim's webcam and capture data.[1][3]

EnterpriseT1027Obfuscated Files or Information

NanoCore’s plugins were obfuscated with Eazfuscater.NET 3.3.[3]

EnterpriseT1685Disable or Modify Tools

NanoCore can modify the victim's anti-virus.[1][3]

EnterpriseT1123Audio Capture

NanoCore can capture audio feeds from the system.[1][3]

EnterpriseT1686Disable or Modify System Firewall

NanoCore can modify the victim's firewall.[1][3]

EnterpriseT1059.005Visual BasicSub-technique

NanoCore uses VBS files.[2]

EnterpriseT1056.001KeyloggingSub-technique

NanoCore can perform keylogging on the victim’s machine.[3]

EnterpriseT1112Modify Registry

NanoCore has the capability to edit the Registry.[1][3]

EnterpriseT1573.001Symmetric CryptographySub-technique

NanoCore uses DES to encrypt the C2 traffic.[3]

EnterpriseT1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique

NanoCore creates a RunOnce key in the Registry to execute its VBS scripts each time the user logs on to the machine.[2]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupEnterprise

G0064: APT33

APT33 is a suspected Iranian threat group that has carried out operations since at least 2013. The group has targeted organizations across multiple industries in the United States, Saudi Arabia, and South Korea, with a particular interest in the aviation and energy sectors.[1][2]

GroupEnterprise

G0078: Gorgon Group

Gorgon Group is a threat group consisting of members who are suspected to be Pakistan-based or have other connections to Pakistan. The group has performed a mix of criminal and targeted attacks, including campaigns against government organizations in the United Kingdom, Spain, Russia, and the United States. [1]

GroupEnterprise

G0043: Group5

Group5 is a threat group with a suspected Iranian nexus, though this attribution is not definite. The group has targeted individuals connected to the Syrian opposition via spearphishing and watering holes, normally using Syrian and Iranian themes. Group5 has used two commonly available remote access tools (RATs), njRAT and NanoCore, as well as an Android RAT, DroidJack. [1]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · TechniqueT1105: Ingress Tool TransferEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1059.003: Windows Command ShellEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1016: System Network Configuration DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1125: Video CaptureEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1027: Obfuscated Files or InformationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1685: Disable or Modify ToolsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1123: Audio CaptureEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1686: Disable or Modify System FirewallEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1059.005: Visual BasicEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1056.001: KeyloggingEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1112: Modify RegistryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1573.001: Symmetric CryptographyEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1547.001: Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEnterpriseuses · GroupG0064: APT33Enterpriseuses · GroupG0083: SilverTerrierEnterpriseuses · GroupG0078: Gorgon GroupEnterpriseuses · GroupG0043: Group5Enterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
20.0
Object version
1.1
Created
Modified
Raw hash
ddf0071721b3664b...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(3)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
20.01.1Current bundleddf0071721b3…
19.21.1Older bundleddf0071721b3…
19.11.1Older bundleddf0071721b3…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    DigiTrust NanoCore Jan 2017

    The DigiTrust Group. (2017, January 01). NanoCore Is Not Your Average RAT. Retrieved November 9, 2018.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Cofense NanoCore Mar 2018

    Patel, K. (2018, March 02). The NanoCore RAT Has Resurfaced From the Sewers. Retrieved September 25, 2024.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    PaloAlto NanoCore Feb 2016

    Kasza, A., Halfpop, T. (2016, February 09). NanoCoreRAT Behind an Increase in Tax-Themed Phishing E-mails. Retrieved November 9, 2018.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    Unit 42 Gorgon Group Aug 2018

    Falcone, R., et al. (2018, August 02). The Gorgon Group: Slithering Between Nation State and Cybercrime. Retrieved August 7, 2018.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    NanoCore

    (Citation: DigiTrust NanoCore Jan 2017)(Citation: Cofense NanoCore Mar 2018)(Citation: PaloAlto NanoCore Feb 2016)(Citation: Unit 42 Gorgon Group Aug 2018)

  6. [6]
    mitre-attackS0336
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

Official MITRE ATT&CK siteOfficial STIX data repositoryMITRE ATT&CK terms of use